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Abstract
This dissertation answers how mathematical representations enable knowledge of phys-
ical systems. Contemporary responses rely on matching the properties of physical systems
to properties in mathematical models, arguing that such matching allows scientists to suc-
cessfully draw conclusions about physical systems through the inspection of their models.
We argue that such matching accounts cannot adapt to the routine mismatching pervasive
in physical theories. These mismatching problems arise both when idealized models match
some similar but better behaved potential physical system, and in cases we classify as
pathological idealization, where the models employed must satisfy constraints that could not
possibly be matched by realistic physical systems (e.g. requiring an inﬁnite particle number or
inﬁnite density). In the latter cases such pathological constraints can also lead to incompati-
bilities with the governing laws of the physical theory. Despite such pathologies, conclusions
drawn with these representations seem to enable improved understanding and empirically
conﬁrmable knowledge of the studied physical systems.
To address this dichotomy, we develop a novel condition of successful mathematical rep-
resentation, called -ﬁdelity, under which mismatched models may facilitate knowledge of
realistic physical systems. Arguing against direct matching, we propose that representa-
tions can meet the conditions of -ﬁdelity by establishing a manifold of associations between
topological neighborhoods of mathematical models and clusters of relevantly similar physical
systems. We then demonstrate that this shift in the scope of representation relationships
explains how suitably similar models entail conclusions about the relevant systems while
avoiding the problems of individual model to system mismatching.
iv
As a signature case study, we investigate Einstein's canonical interpretation of the geodesic
principle, originally proposed to govern how gravitating bodies travel according to general
relativity theory. We argue that under the canonical interpretation models of bodies must ei-
ther meet unrealistic assumptions or violate the theory's fundamental ﬁeld equations, mark-
ing them as pathological idealizations. To recover the principle, we reinterpret geodesic
dynamics as a universality thesis about the collective behavior of certain classes of systems,
explaining how this reinterpretation satisﬁes the -ﬁdelity criteria and can be used to gain
knowledge about the observable motion of actual classes of gravitating bodies.
v
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At this point an enigma presents itself, which in all ages has agitated inquiring
minds. How can it be that mathematics, being after all a product of human
thought which is independent of experience, is so admirably appropriate to the
objects of reality?
- Albert Einstein (Einstein, 1922a)
The seduction of applying mathematics to the physical world is compelling: A carpenter
wishes to lay some baseboard along a three meter long hallway, but she only has four meter
long baseboard stock. The stock will not ﬁt. To solve this dilemma, she removes a meter
from the end of the baseboard stock and proceeds to lay the now three meter long baseboard.
How did she know this would work?
It seems undeniable that mathematics was involved in the carpenter's solution. We want
to say that she applied arithmetic to solve her problem. This sort of instance is so terribly
prosaic we take the fact that such applications should work completely for granted. If the
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success of such instances are so easily acceptable, we should be able to answer why it works
so well. How did the carpenter know what to do?
Without reﬂection upon what mathematical claims are supposed to be about, the appli-
cation of these claims appears deceptively unproblematic. Philosophical complications can
arise with the innocent observation that mathematics is abstract. Mathematical inferences
are made about abstract systems of relations on a domain of abstract mathematical objects.
Mathematics is not supposed to be about the physical properties of concrete material objects.
Arithmetic is about numbers and their interrelations, not about wooden baseboards. So
how do such completely abstract inferences like `4 − x = 3 only if x = 1' work so well
when laying oversized baseboard stock? This question deserves an answer not just in prosaic
cases of carpentry, but in the often far more complex and exotic applications of mathemat-
ics in scientiﬁc theories. For sophisticated applications of mathematics in physical theories,
the question becomes vital to understanding if we can trust such applications at all. This
question is precisely Albert Einstein's enigma referred to in the opening quote. How do in-
ferences about abstract mathematical systems allow us to make inferences about the physical
world? How can math apply?
In the ﬁrst half of this work (chapters 1 and 2), we will develop an account of successful
mathematical representation germane, in particular, to mathematical applications used to
gain scientiﬁc knowledge of our physical world. In chapters 3 and 4, we will then immediately
proceed to put our account to work uncovering and then resolving a potential pathology in
the dynamics of Einstein's general theory of relativity. We shall argue that the example
found in Einstein's theory is paradigmatic of many complex and potentially problematic
mathematical representations actually advanced in well accepted physical theories. We hence
present the analysis of these latter chapters as a framework for resolving these complications
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and recovering epistemologically fruitful analyses of such scientiﬁc representations.
In this chapter we begin to develop our account of successful mathematical representa-
tion in science as follows: In section 1.1 we will review the current literature on the theory
of representation. We will also argue (section 1.1.2) that the driving criteria of scientiﬁc
representation should depend on the knowledge gained about the targets of scientiﬁc study.
In section 1.2 we identify the ﬁrst of two major problems facing any account of mathematical
representation aimed at meeting these epistemic goals, called the mysterious ﬁdelity problem.
We proceed by reviewing and then critically analyzing potential options available for resolv-
ing this challenge often discussed in the literature. In section 1.3, using the data-phenomena
distinction of Bogen & Woodward (1988), we argue that the legitimate targets of mathe-
matical representations in science should be scientiﬁc phenomena. We then conclude with a
review of some of the epistemological challenges that result from attempting to identify well
deﬁned abstractions of such targets. It will ultimately be shown that many of the episte-
mological challenges raised in this chapter can be eliminated or at least mitigated with our
ultimate account of successful mathematical representation in science, completed in chapter
2.
1.1 Faithful Representation and the Goals of Science
1.1.1 What is Representation?
The term `representation' has suﬀered from much confusion. This confusion has manifested
in what Sorin Bangu (2009, note 5) recently described as an unfortunately bewildering
variety of uses in recent work in the philosophy of science. This absence of uniformity in the
literature is a symptom of the fact that there is likewise a signiﬁcant lack of a univocal usage
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of the term in natural language. The term `representation' has multiple legitimate usages.
Nonetheless, (if adequately sanitized) it should be evident that something aptly referred to as
representation is going on when we use mathematical models or equations to communicate
or think about certain features of physical systems. It is hence worth considering what
representation is (and is not), and if there exists a subspecies of the concept at work when
using mathematics in physical sciences.
To begin, every representation must have something that is supposed to be represented,
often referred to as the target of the representation, and something doing the representing,
often referred to as the vehicle. So in the case of a tourist map depicting the footpaths of
Prague, the map itself plays the role of the vehicle of representation and its target is the
paths located in that part of that city in eastern Europe. Of course, even this feature of
representation has its hiccups. By saying that a representation has a target, we must not
require that the target exists either now or at any other time. For example, a painting of
Pegasus can still legitimately represent the mythical winged horse even though the creature
does not and has never existed.
Though vehicles of representations may very well have features in common with their
targets, a representation is not reducible to a mere similarity or resemblance relation holding
between any subset of properties or relations true of both the vehicle and its target. For
one thing, misrepresentations are representations too. For example, imagine we attend a
political rally and come across a poster depiction of some United States president dressed
as Hitler and that the poster is claiming that president X is Hitler, such a depiction still
may legitimately be taken as a representation of the president despite the strong manifest
dissimilarity between any United States president and the leader of the Third Reich. Or
consider the presidential seal, which shares dramatically few properties with any United
4
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States president. Even when the vehicle fails to resemble or directly misleads as in these cases,
representation is possible. We may conclude from the overwhelming abundance of examples
such as these that a condition of suﬃciently signiﬁcant resemblance it is not necessary for
every form of successful representation.
Similarity also fails to be suﬃcient for representation. For instance, I am quite similar
(identical in fact) to myself, yet (save perhaps in an instance of pro se legal defense) it would
be inappropriate to ever claim that I represent myself. Or consider the power sander in
my basement shop: It is a quite popular model sander made by a reliable company capable
of manufacturing power tools with negligible variation in their construction. It is safe to
say that there exist many other sanders in the world that share virtually every property of
material construction with the sander in my shop, yet it would be a mistake to think that
these facts alone suﬃce for a representation relation to obtain between my sander and one
of its sander brethren.
Nelson Goodman (1976, pp3-10) classically argued that representation also lacks the log-
ical properties that are characteristic of resemblance (or similarity). As already illustrated
by some of the above examples, representation is not generally symmetric or reﬂexive whereas
resemblance relations are always symmetric and reﬂexive. Everything always resembles itself
and if two things resemble each other there is no directionality to the resemblance. On the
other hand, except in rare cases (e.g. certain paintings by René Magritte), it would be a
mistake to say that representation relations generally hold in which the vehicle and target
are identical. And almost universally it is a mistake to infer that if X represents Y then Y
likewise represents X. So, for example, though a painting of the Eiﬀel tower may represent
the Eiﬀel tower, we are hard pressed to say that the Eiﬀel tower also represents the paint-
ing. There is an inherent directionality to representation, distinguishing the vehicle from the
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target.
Comparison with resemblance or similarity relations highlights the need for a key com-
ponent that has come to be taken (at least implicitly) as necessary for any representation
relation.1 Unlike resemblance or similarity relations, which might be said to obtain in a
vacuum a representation relation obtaining between a vehicle and its target can happen
only by the design of a representing agent or agents. In each of the examples of successful
representation just mentioned, the implicit existence of a representing agent available to use
or treat the vehicle as representative plays a necessary role for a representation relation to
obtain. The tourist map of Prague only represents Prague if its creator designed it as such.
If Putnam's famous ant incidentally were to trace out lines geometrically similar to foot-
paths of Prague with mapping-ink dipped ant legs on mapping paper, the resulting product
would not be a representation. Putnam's ant cannot provide the requisite agency. Hence,
the resulting sheet, even if it is ink-drop for ink-drop identical to my tourist map, would fail
to be a representation of the footpaths in the eastern European city. The Hitler-president
poster held by the protester is representative because we surmise that the protester created
the image for the purpose of representing a president as being Hitler-like and the imagery
encourages viewers to take the poster as being so representative (whether they agree with
the content or not). In the case of my favorite sander, if I were to display it to my neighbor,
proudly suggesting that it is a shining example of the quality associated with Acme Tool
orbit sanders, we might then, in this context (unlike before), say that my usage of the tool
as such enables us to identify it as now representative of its Acme Tool brethren.
Bas van Fraassen has recently focused on this component of representation as the paramount
element required for a representation to obtain, recommending the following (somewhat cir-
1See e.g. (van Fraassen, 2008, Contessa, 2007, Suárez, 2003, Giere, 2004).
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cular) necessary condition for successfully representation:2
There is no representation except in the sense that some things are used, made or taken,
to represent something as thus or so. (van Fraassen, 2008, p23)
This condition suggests that purposeful action of an agent or agents to represent something
is a necessary condition for any representation to occur.3 Following this observation then,
representation is (at least) a three place relation, in which an agent or agentsA use a vehicle V
to represent a target T . The agency required in a representation can, of course, occasionally
be taken as implicit despite its signiﬁcance in this relation. A reason for this might be that
the representer providing the agency of the representation is the one representing, or that the
community of agents for whom the vehicle in question is taken as representative is obvious
from the context. Even if only implicit, however, agency plays an essential role in any
representation relation, the presence of which informs some of the important distinctions
mentioned above (such as directedness) between representation and mere resemblance or
similarity.
A ﬁnal (and also often implicit) component of the representation relation we will refer
to as the content of a representation. The content of a representation is what the target
is being represented as by the vehicle. Not every property of a vehicle of representation
directly communicates the content of the representation intended by a representing agent.
For instance, there might be incidental material properties of a representing vehicle that
2Though he is careful to explain that he does not promote any theory of representation, van Fraassen
nonetheless suggests that if he did the quoted sentence would be his Hauptsatz.
3One ambiguity worth noting but not dwelling on concerns where the agency has to come from. Does
the agent need to be the creator of the vehicle? In many cases this does seem to be a prime source of
relevant agency in a representation. However, in cases of multi-agent representation created and used by
many individuals (as perhaps in scientiﬁc representations), it is not clear that the initial creator's intentions
are paramount. Moreover, in cases where the creator's original intentions are inaccessible (for example, of
works of art created long ago where it is unclear who the original artist even was) it still seems fair to suggest
that a representation occurs if an audience member is available to provide the agency of the representation
in, say, interpreting the ostensible vehicle's target. In general, any user of the vehicle as representative of a
target can count as providing the requisite agency.
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Figure 1.1.1: Shepard Fairey's representation of Obama for the 2008 presidential election.
have nothing to do with its representation of the target. It would be foolish, for example, to
think that our tourist map representation of the footpaths of Prague suggests that the actual
paths are smooth (like paper), or that they may be folded up and placed in our pockets. It
is not just that these claims are untrue about the actual footpaths of Prague (in that case
we would simply have a misrepresentation). Rather, they are not even part of the content of
the representation in question. Not only can mere incidental material properties of a vehicle
of representation be irrelevant to the content, but properties of the vehicle that actually play
a role in indirectly communicating the representational content can nonetheless fail to be
directly part of the content of the representation. For instance, consider the depiction of
Barack Obama in the well known Shepard Fairey poster displayed in ﬁgure 1.1.1. It would
be an error to infer that part of the content of the poster's representation of Obama as a
candidate includes the claim that his face is red, white, and blue. Again, it is not just that
such a claim is manifestly false (Obama's face has never been these unnatural colors, and
deﬁnitely not during his 2008 candidacy for president). The claim plays no part whatsoever
in the properties of Obama that the Fairey poster is meant to represent. Note the subtlety:
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the representational content of the poster presumably has to do with characterizing Obama
as a patriotic candidate, and this point is in part achieved by the very selection of colors of
the American ﬂag in question that are used in Fairey's depiction of Obama. However, an
interpretation of the image depicting the candidate Obama as literally red, white, and blue
is not a part of the representational content.
There is no evident algorithm for identifying the precise representational content of an
arbitrary representation. Instead the precise representational content of a given representa-
tion appears to be highly case sensitive and must be evaluated on a speciﬁc representation by
speciﬁc representation basis. It might be observed that the representing agent or agents and
their intended interpretation or their usage play a central role in adjudicating the appropri-
ate content of a representation. However, this is not to say that in any act of representation,
the content of the representation must be articulable in explicit discursive form even by the
representing agent (or agents). This fact is again exempliﬁed by the Obama poster or, say,
by Pablo Picasso's Guernica (or any number of other of works of art). In each of these works
it is not necessarily comprehensively clear what the precise explicit representational content
of the the respective works is (though we might have some ideas). As they say, a picture is
worth a lot of words. Nonetheless, it is clear that however the content might be explicitly
articulated (if at all), it must be distinguished from the vehicle of representation itself.
At this point we have identiﬁed a minimum of four components of any representation
relation:
(AVTC) Agent A uses vehicle V to represent target T as C.
where C is the content of the representation. In every identiﬁcation of a representation
relation all four components of the (AVTC) need not be explicitly referred to in contexts
9
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where one or more of the roles is obvious or, in the case of the content, not (entirely)
articulable.4 Nevertheless, all four components (perhaps more)5 at minimum play distinct
and important roles in any representation relation.
1.1.2 Inferential Surrogates and Faithful Representation
We have now distinguished between representation and resemblance and have forestalled in-
clinations to treat representation as strictly reducible to the intrinsic properties and relations
held by the target and the vehicle alone. Representation can occur with almost no speciﬁc
resemblance between the vehicle and its target whatsoever. Imagine for instance that while
going for a pensive walk on the beach an agent, Alice, pauses, picks up an unremarkable
stone and turning to her walking companion solemnly states that this stone represents the
totality of all my fears and concerns about the future, and subsequently hurls the stone into
the sea in a cathartic and metaphorical release of those worries. In this story the stone may
count as representative of her concerns (at least for Alice). Representation can be used for
such catharsis if one likes, and in these cases there appears to be absolutely no reason why
the vehicle (like Alice's worry stone) must share anything in common with the target (all her
worries). Other examples of denotational representation established by ﬁat or convention
4Of course, when the content of a representation has some particular emotive component that is non-
discursive, it will be impossible to explicitly capture in the C slot of (AVTC) such emotive content. Since
non-discursive elements of certain (e.g. artistic) representations nonetheless constitute potentially legitimate
representational content, it would be a mistake to eliminate their possibility despite the complications as-
sociated in capturing such content discursively in the (AVTC) form as given. Note, however, the primary
point of identifying the (AVTC) form is to highlight that there are (at least) four components to a repre-
sentation. And, the observation that part of the C component may or may not be discursive does not in
any way suggest that this point is illegitimate even in such complicating cases.
5Instead of representational content, Giere (2004, p743) identiﬁes the agent's purpose as a key fourth
component of representation. It is arguable that the purpose of the agent in representing the target with a
representation's vehicle can be subsumed as part of the content of the representation. That being said, there
is no problem in allowing for the possibility of a ﬁfth (or for that matter sixth, or seventh, etc.) component of
representational relations should there be recalcitrant examples in which this is not possible. For our current
purposes, it is enough to identify that there are at least the four components identiﬁed by the (AVTC)
format. See also (van Fraassen, 2008, p21).
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abound. The presidential seal, the Canadian ﬂag, and countless other symbols in certain
contexts and with certain audiences serve as vehicles of representation which share few if any
properties with their targets. Nonetheless, there are plenty of alternative genuine examples
of representation beyond such cases of conventional or ﬁat denotation.
Representations can be used, for example, to communicate thoughts or induce emotions,
as in some of the artistic examples already mentioned. In these cases, it appears that the
precise properties of the vehicle may well have relevance to the purpose of the representation.
Further, representation instances such as the Prague map example might have speciﬁc prac-
tical purposes, namely, ﬁguring out how to get around Prague. Such practical instances of
representation appear especially germane to the case of scientiﬁc representation because the
representational vehicle is used in speciﬁc ways to improve our understanding of the target.
Hence, we have reason to look at this particular species of usage in investigating the general
kind of representation employed in science.
One prominent family of theories in the philosophy of science literature on representation
can be grouped together as what might be called inferential accounts of representation.6 Each
account varies in its details, but the key feature of inferential accounts lies in their attention
to the use of a representation vehicle as a kind of surrogate for inferences we wish to draw
about target itself.7 In his inferential account of representation, Mauricio Suárez (2004,
p773) proposes the following condition on representation:
(Sur) V represents T only if V allows competent and informed agents to draw speciﬁc
inferences regarding T .
6See e.g. (Swoyer, 1991, Hughes, 1997, Suárez, 2003, Contessa, 2007, Bueno & Colyvan, 2011).
7The term surrogative reasoning was ﬁrst introduced by Chris Swoyer (1991) and has subsequently been
adopted by a number of inferential accounts of representation. Swoyer's original usage of the term was
somewhat less generalized (focusing speciﬁcally on cases of what he calls structural representation) than
the current usage in the literature.
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In cases of representation where (Sur) is satisﬁed, the vehicle of representation acts as an
inferential surrogate for the target of the representation, and the process of drawing such
inferences is referred to as surrogative reasoning. A paradigmatic case of inferential surrogacy
occurs with our Prague map representation. Inferences about where to make particular turns,
or where certain landmarks are located with respect to a location can be made in the case
of the Prague map representation. These inferences are not made by direct inspection of or
reﬂection about the target itself (Prague), but by inspection of the various features of the
representational vehicle (the paper map). In this way, the vehicle indeed acts as a kind of
surrogate for inferences we wish to make about the actual target (hence the terminology).
As already exempliﬁed by the examples of conventional denotation mentioned above, an
inferential account of representation insisting that the only legitimate instances of represen-
tation that ever occur are those in which inferential surrogacy is possible are bound to fail.
(E.g. considering the presidential seal will allow for vanishingly few inferences about the
United States presidency.) However, it is clear that the ability to enable surrogative reason-
ing is rather vital to cases of scientiﬁc representation. Scientiﬁc study in whatever form it
takes aims to increase our knowledge and understanding of the phenomena studied in that
discipline. Scientists seek to form judgments (ideally correct ones in one respect or another)
about the phenomena studied. Though the particular details about what kind of judgments
can or should be formed (e.g. if we can infer facts about unobservables from experimental
data or not), what the phenomena being studied is (unobservable entities, experimental data
in particular scenarios, etc.), and what the standards or modes of correctness might be (e.g.
literal truth, empirical adequacy, adequacy within certain experimental error), the following
thesis should hold uncontroversially:
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(G) The primary goal of scientiﬁc investigation is to form judgments that increase our
knowledge or understanding of the kind of phenomena studied.
If a scientiﬁc representation is intended in any way to contribute to this primary goal,
then it is immediate that enabling us to form judgments about the phenomena studied is
required of any useful scientiﬁc representation. In other words, any scientiﬁc representation
potentially useful to the primary goal of science must act as an inferential surrogate for the
phenomena represented. It must allow us to draw conclusions and form judgments about
the studied phenomena.8 Hence, though inferential surrogacy is demonstrably not necessary
for representations of all types, any scientiﬁc representation that can be put to use for the
primary goal of science must enable surrogative reasoning.
Gabriele Contessa (2007) has recently oﬀered admirable clariﬁcation on the subject of sci-
entiﬁc representation by drawing some signiﬁcant terminological distinctions between certain
varieties of representation often conﬂated in the literature. Using the concept of inferential
surrogacy, he distinguishes three categories of representation. The weakest being referred
to as denotational representation. Paradigm cases of (mere) denotational representations
include the examples mentioned at the opening of this subsection such as the worry stone,
the presidential seal, or the Canadian ﬂag. Denotational representations still take the (at
least) four component form of (AVTC), but particularly in cases where the representation
is merely denotational, there may be vanishingly little representational content (e.g. though
the presidential seal represents something like the United States presidency, there is little
representational content beyond the signiﬁcation itself). Merely denotational representations
are hence highly dependent on conventional or ﬁat signiﬁcation of the target by the vehicle
8To be clear, it is consistent with the thesis suggested here that such conclusions be restricted in various
ways should one adopt an especially restrictive outlook on the possible domain of scientiﬁc knowledge (e.g. we
can only know about observables). The thesis is hence entirely neutral on the epistemic issues of suﬃcient
justiﬁcation under contention in typical scientiﬁc realism debates.
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established by an agent or community of agents employing the representation. The next
variety Contessa identiﬁes is epistemic representation. Epistemic representations are deno-
tational in that their vehicles signify their targets, but they also enable surrogative reasoning
about their targets. Contessa characterizes epistemic representation as follows:
A vehicle is an epistemic representation of a certain target for a certain user if and only
if the user is able to perform valid (though not necessarily sound) surrogative inferences
from the vehicle to the target. (Contessa, 2007, p53)
In order to understand what an epistemic representation is, we must hence take a look at
what it takes to make a surrogate inference valid.9 The general requirements for the validity
of a surrogate inference seem to be suggested in Suárez's (Sur) where he requires that the
speciﬁc surrogate inferences must be made by competent and informed agents using the
representation. The requirement of competent and informed agency should imply that the
representing agents must have an understanding of the content of the representation being
used. We might then say that valid surrogate inferences are those (and only those) drawn
about the target of a representation by an agent who has an understanding of which features
of the vehicle are (and are not) relevant to the representation. In other words, valid surrogate
inferences are the kind of inferences drawn by agents using the representational content in
the way it is supposed to be used. Hence, the ability to draw valid surrogate inferences is
directly dependent on the content of a representation.
We already (indirectly) observed the important distinction between valid and invalid sur-
rogative reasoning while discussing the need for representational content in the ﬁrst place.
In discussing the Prague map representation or the Obama poster, we then noted that not
every feature of the vehicle of representation is relevant to how the target is being repre-
9Contessa does not give an independent deﬁnition of validity in the case of inferential surrogacy, but
instead builds the notion into certain rules for the speciﬁc kind of interpretational account of epistemic
representation that he later develops (Contessa, 2007, p61).
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sented. Taking advantage of our current terminology we can now say that inferring from the
Prague map that the footpaths of Prague are smooth like paper, or inferring from the poster
that Obama's face is red, white, and blue count as invalid surrogate inferences. To draw
such inferences would involve substantive confusion over what counts as the representational
content of the respective representations. On the other hand, inferring from the map that
walking a certain sequence of paths enables one to get to a particular location in Prague, or
inferring from the poster that (according to Fairey's interpretation of patriotism) it would be
patriotic to vote for Obama in the 2008 presidential election, are examples of valid surrogate
inferences. Drawing these conclusions about the respective targets in these cases involves
appropriate understanding and usage of their representational contents.
Determining if a valid surrogate inference has been made is quite sensitive to the partic-
ular representation in question. Just as it would be a mistake to think that there exists a
universal algorithm for determining the content of an arbitrary representation, it is a mistake
to think that there is a universal test of validity for any given surrogate inference indepen-
dent of the speciﬁc content of the representation in question. In such cases substantive work
done by competent users to clarify the content of representations is required to adjudicate
between the valid and invalid inferences.10 That being said, despite the case sensitivity of va-
lidity evaluation, their remains a key point to observe: An understanding of representational
content is essential to successful determination of valid inferential surrogacy.
The ﬁnal variety of representation that Contessa identiﬁes consists of those epistemic
representations which not only enable inferential surrogacy, but enable surrogate inferences
whose conclusions are correct about the represented target. This category, called faithful epis-
temic representation (or faithful representation for short) is meant to designate the usages
10In large part, this is the sort of project embarked on in chapters 3 and 4.
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where the term `represents' is intended as a kind of success verb (Contessa, 2007, p54). The
terminology distinguishes between epistemic representations that end up misrepresenting
their targets (e.g. a depiction of some US president as Hitler) and those that are successful
(e.g. an up to date Prague map). Recall, in the above analysis of epistemic representation,
Contessa carefully notes that though such representations need to enable valid inferential
surrogacy, such inferences need not be sound. The diﬀerences between valid and sound in-
ferential surrogacy lies in whether or not the inferred conclusion is true. Sound surrogate
inferences are valid surrogate inferences with conclusions that are true of their target (Con-
tessa, 2007, p51). Faithful epistemic representations are those epistemic representations with
sound surrogate inferences.
Of course, epistemic representations will typically enable more than one valid surrogate
inference. In general, an epistemic representation might enable some sound surrogate in-
ferences and some unsound (but valid) surrogate inferences. Hence, Contessa explains that
unlike epistemic representation, faithful epistemic representation is a matter of degree, the
idea being that whereas any enabling of surrogate reasoning qualiﬁes a representation as
being epistemic, some epistemic representations are more faithful than others (Contessa,
2007, p55).11 Extreme cases of faithful epistemic representation in which every valid infer-
ence is also sound he refers to as completely faithful epistemic representations, and the other
extreme where every valid inference is unsound he dubs completely unfaithful epistemic rep-
resentations. All other epistemic representations are cases of partial faithfulness (and partial
misrepresentation).
11Of course, the idea that it is a matter of degree suggests the existence of a total ordering of faithful
epistemic representations (presumably) indicating how many or what proportion of valid surrogate infer-
ences are sound. Though the possibility of such an ordering is suspect, nonetheless, the general distinction




1.2.1 The Mysterious Fidelity Problem
With Contessa's distinctions in hand, we can now concisely state what is desired in scien-
tiﬁc representations of physical phenomena. We want our scientiﬁc representations to be as
epistemically faithful as possible with respect to the features of the physical systems studied
by scientists. Of course, there may be signiﬁcant disagreement (amongst philosophers of
science at least) over what the proper features of the physical systems studied by scientists
indeed are: Whereas an anti-realist may suggest that these features include only that which
is experimentally observable, a realist might suggest that unobservable features (e.g. entity
existence, some kind of general structuralist features, etc.) are also properly included. What
is important is that we want our representations to be epistemically faithful to the studied
features (whatever they happen to be). In particular, when physicists use mathematics,
we would like the mathematical representation to be as epistemically faithful to the stud-
ied features of the physical phenomena as possible. These criteria should appear eminently
reasonable. When scientists represent the physical world with math we want their represen-
tations to actually tell us something about the world and we want the things they tell us to
be correct.
Two signiﬁcant problems face these desiderata for mathematical representations of the
physical world. The ﬁrst problem brings us back to what we referred to as Einstein's enigma
in the introduction to this chapter. Contessa remarks on the diﬃculty that faces an exclu-
sively inferential account of representation as follows:
On the inferential conception, the user's ability to perform inferences from a vehicle to
a target seems to be a brute fact, which has no deeper explanation. This makes the
connection between epistemic representation and valid surrogative reasoning needlessly
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obscure and the performance of valid surrogative inferences an activity as mysterious
and unfathomable as soothsaying or divination. (Contessa, 2007, p61)
If a scientiﬁc representation is representative purely in virtue of the epistemic faithfulness
that it engenders, then the soundness of the inferences drawn using the vehicle about the
target is entirely mysterious. If we happen to have a faithful representation, perhaps we
know that the inferences made by means of the vehicle work, but we have no understanding
of why the representation does work or more importantly, why we can continue to expect it
to work in novel situations.
This problem is especially treacherous in the case of mathematical representations of
physical phenomena. Unless one wants to reject a view of mathematics according to which
mathematical claims are not a priori but instead established empirically through some sort
of interaction with the concrete physical world,12 one must concede that mathematics is not
speciﬁcally about any targeted phenomena. But if the mathematics is inherently not about
any physical phenomena (particularly the phenomena targeted), then when a mathematical
representation of a physical phenomena happens to be epistemically faithful, such success
is genuinely mystifying in the absence of further justiﬁcation. Arithmetic is not about
baseboard stock, but how then does it function so well for the carpenter making surrogative
inferences about how much to cut? Let us call this problem facing any faithful mathematical
representation of the physical world the problem of mysterious ﬁdelity. In this section we
we will look at how some accounts of representation, motivated by the mysterious ﬁdelity
problem (if not explicitly then at least by its looming stench), attempt to oﬀer such a
justiﬁcation.13
12The canonical example of this sort of radical position was of course proposed by John Stuart Mill (1986).
13Accounts from Bueno & Colyvan (2011) or Hughes (1997) explicitly try to incorporate some kind of
mapping or denotation into their respective inferential schemas, presumably because of a concern over this
problem. Other accounts such as (Pincock, 2004) apparently take the need for granted and begin by directly
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The second problem, resolved in chapter 2, we will refer to as Plato's problem. This prob-
lem will result from certain attempts to solve the ﬁrst problem. We will argue that standard
attempts to address the mysterious ﬁdelity problem are uniformly foiled by recurring failures
resulting from the fact that mathematical concepts are, in a sense, too precise to be well
matched to the phenomena studied by physicists. As we shall see, all attempts oﬀered so far
in the literature to solve the mysterious ﬁdelity problem fail to account for the pervasive use
of idealization (broadly construed) in physicists' mathematical representations of physical
phenomena.
1.2.2 Matching, Maps and Morphisms
A potential response to the mysterious ﬁdelity problem rests on the idea that though math-
ematical representations use purely abstract mathematics for surrogative inference, in some
way the properties and relations of the (non-abstract) targeted physical system are captured
and simulated by the purely mathematical structures. Supposedly, when there is a certain
kind of similarity between the conditions placed on the abstract mathematical system14 and
the actual properties and relations of the targeted physical system, inferences drawn from
such conditions in the case of the vehicle should hold in the case of the target.
Of course, as already exhibited by the numerous non-epistemic and non-faithful represen-
developing what might serve as a solution. That something like the ﬁdelity mystery facing a purely inferential
account (as in (Suárez, 2004)) motivates the development of a mapping or denotational picture (even when
an inferential surrogacy has been incorporated) is broadly active in these cases. See also Swoyer's original
structuralist account of surrogative reasoning in (Swoyer, 1991).
14Here and in what follows, by mathematical system we will mean a domain (set) of abstract elements
with a set of relations deﬁned on elements in that domain. The structure of a mathematical system refers
precisely to the set of relations deﬁned on the domain of that system. So, for instance, the integers modulo 3
(i.e. ({0, 1, 2}; +)) constitutes a mathematical system, whose structure is the congruence relations of addition
mod 3 (e.g. 1 + 2 ≡ 0). As we shall investigate below, this crisply deﬁned concept of structure in the case
of a mathematical system is not to be conﬂated with the rather amorphous notion of physical structure
or structure of a physical system, which has suﬀered unfortunate obfuscation in philosophical literature
(particularly the scientiﬁc realism literature).
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tations discussed in section 1.1.1, relations like similarity or resemblance are neither necessary
nor suﬃcient for representation. However, according to the response in question, when it
comes to faithful epistemic representations, some sort of similarity condition or conditions
may potentially eliminate the otherwise looming threat of mysterious ﬁdelity. So, how does
such a ﬁdelity through similarity argument look in detail and what kind of similarity is
supposed to be suﬃcient?
To understand how the similarity defense gains traction, let us consider examples of
faithful representations where the vehicle is not mathematical. The potential justiﬁcation of
ﬁdelity through similarity exists, for instance, in cases such as accurate (geographical) maps.
Why does our Prague map work? An answer no doubt can be given by the observation
that the way symbols indicating pathways and landmarks are oriented on the paper map
somehow matches the way that actual physical pathways and landmarks of Prague happen
to be related to one another: The map was designed so that pathways intersect on the map
if and only if the pathways in Prague to which they refer intersect, landmarks are signiﬁed
on the map adjacent to a pathway symbol if and only if the physical landmark is located on
the referred to path. And, assuming the map is to scale, we can even say that the ratio of the
lengths of two pathways on the map is the same as the ratio of the distances along the two
referenced pathways in the city. If these sorts of resemblances (among others) hold, between
the vehicle map and the target city, then we want to say that inferences drawn (exclusively)
from the properties and relations shared by both the target and the vehicle should hold true
not only for the vehicle, but also for the target.
But what is meant by shared properties and relations? Certainly not that the properties
are literally the same of the map and the city. Imagine a marked pathway signifying street
X on a map intersects another marked pathway signifying street Y, and that moreover, the
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actual signiﬁed street X intersects the signiﬁed street Y in the actual city. The markings
on the map signifying street X and the concrete street X do not actually possess the same
property or relation. Unlike the concrete street X, the markings on the map signifying street
X do not really intersect the concrete street Y, instead they intersect a line on the map.
Similarly, unlike the markings on the map signifying street X, the concrete street X does not
intersect the line on the map referring to street Y, instead it intersects the concrete street
Y. What is shared is not the very same properties or relations, but a kind of analogy of
relations: The relation between the signiﬁed streets X and Y is shared by the map and the
city because the symbols on the map signifying X and Y intersect in an analogous way. It
is the presence of such analogous relations between the vehicle and the target that allow
inferences about the target (such as if I want to get to path X, I can continue on path Y)
to be drawn by inspecting the analogous relations depicted by the vehicle of representation,
the paper map.
To take another example, imagine that there is a clock face pictured on our Prague map
in the region of the map labeled `old town square,' we can then say that the presence of
the clock face in that region mimics the city even though it is false that there is literally
a image of a clock pictured on the cobble stones of the actual city's old town. Instead,
what is located in that region of the city is a physical landmark (the old town hall) which is
supposed to be signiﬁed by the clock picture. What is shared by the target and vehicle is
not the precise properties or relations of either the target or the vehicle in question but the
analogous relations between the respective parts of the target and vehicle in question. So,
the old town hall is located in the old town square in the physical city, and analogously, the
clock picture is located in the region of the map labeled `old town square.' It is the analogy
of the relation between the spatial localization of the symbols in the vehicle (the map) to
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the relation of their referents in the target (the city) that the target and vehicle share. The
availability of this sort of analogy between interrelations of the target and the vehicle allows
us to inspect the map in order to draw the (surrogate) inference that if we travel to the old
town square we will be able to visit the old town hall.
Observing that such an analogy of relations potentially plays a pivotal role in ﬁguring
out why faithful epistemic relations work, many analyses of representation in the literature
have endeavored to precisify this concept. The most prominent such family of attempts
are referred to as mapping accounts of mathematical representation.15 A paradigm example
of a mapping account has been recently developed by Chris Pincock, who characterizes
mathematical representation as follows:16
[A] wholly mathematical model represents a physical situation in virtue of a structure-
preserving mapping like an isomorphism or an homomorphism between the physical
situation and the mathematical model. (Pincock, 2007b, p960)
The term `mapping' in this context is suggestive of the mathematical concept of a mapping
function which assigns a unique output for each input. In the exclusively mathematical
context, referring to a mapping as establishing a homomorphism or an isomorphism is well
deﬁned. A mapping from a structured set S onto a structured set T is homomorphic, if the
relations among the elements of S are preserved when we look at their image in the set T
(two elements are related in the structure of S only if they are mapped to elements that are
also so related in the structure of T). To take a simple example, consider the structured sets
S := ({even, odd}; +) and the structured set T := ({positve, negative};×). We know from
15Recent mapping accounts include (Bueno & Colyvan, 2011, Pincock, 2004, 2007a,b, Hughes, 1997), and
more classic considerations of mapping (or in the case of Reichenbach proto-mapping) accounts include
(Putnam, 1978, Lewis, 1984, Reichenbach, 1965).
16Pincock like many mapping theorists does not explicitly distinguish between faithful, epistemic, and
non-epistemic representation. However, it might be inferred (at least implicitly) from the context of his
discussions of representations, which primarily focus on scientiﬁc application and explanation, that the
variety of representation he is analyzing is not representation in general but the faithful variety in particular.
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grade school that the rules for adding even and odd numbers are related by four 3-place
addition relations in the following way:
even = even+ even
even = odd+ odd
odd = odd+ even (1.2.1)
odd = even+ odd
Likewise we know that positive and negative numbers are related by four 3-place multipli-
cation relations in the following way:
positive = positive× positive
positive = negative× negative (1.2.2)
negative = negative× positive
negative = positive× negative
A quick inspection of these sets of relations (i.e. their respective structures) reveals that if







then the elements in the set S are related by the addition relations (1.2.1) only if the elements
in T to which they are mapped are likewise related by a corresponding multiplication relation
(1.2.2). It is in this sense that we can say that the structure (1.2.1) on S is preserved under
the mapping by the multiplication relations (1.2.2) in the structure of T.17
It is not hard to see the attraction of appealing to the mathematical notion of homo-
morphic mapping in order to bring some precision to an account of the kind of analogy of
relations discussed above in the faithful (geographical) map example. The sort of relations
preservation that we get from a homomorphism between two structured mathematical sets
seems to be the sort of analogy of relations of the respective mathematical structures that
we wanted. However, it has recently been argued by van Fraassen that (despite such osten-
sible potential) a mapping between a mathematical system and the physical world involves
a kind of category error:
If the target is not a mathematical object, then we do not have a well-deﬁned range for
the function, so how can we speak of an embedding or isomorphism or homomorphism
17The mapping ϕ establishes an isomorphism between our two structured sets because not only is the
structure of S preserved in T under the mapping, but also there is a one to one correspondence (bijection)
between the respective elements (each element of T has a unique partner in S that gets sent to it by ϕ). This
one to one correspondence is not generally required for homomorphisms. A simple example of this consists
of the mapping from the positive integers with addition to our structured set S in which every even number
is sent to even and every odd number is sent to odd. If we take two numbers that will be sent to even (e.g.
6 and 28), then their sum (34) will also be a number sent to even in accordance with the ﬁrst relation of
(1.2.1). Similarly other combinations of arbitrary even or odd positive integers will be in accordance with
one of the four relations of (1.2.1). Hence the addition relations over the positive integers are preserved in
the structure (1.2.1) of S, making the mapping homomorphic. However, this mapping from positive integers
to S is not one to one, because multiple positive integers get sent to the respective elements even and odd.
So such a mapping is an example of an homomorphism that is not an isomorphism.
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or whatever between the target and some mathematical object? (van Fraassen, 2008,
p241)18
The potential of such an appeal to the concept of homomorphic mappings unravels under
the observation that unlike strictly mathematical contexts, in the abstract structured set
(e.g. S) to another (e.g. T) but instead attempt to establish a mapping between an abstract
mathematical structure (i.e. the theoretical model(s)) and a concrete non-mathematical
target, part of the physical world. In contrast to an abstractly deﬁned mathematical system,
determined by strictly deﬁned sets of conditions and relations on the elements of the system,
the physical world does not come predeﬁned as a structured domain. This is not to say that
there are not certainly all sorts of relations that might be legitimately attributed to parts
of physical systems or groups of systems, but unlike mathematical systems, the relations of
the parts of the physical systems diﬀer fundamentally.
1.2.3 The Bridge Structure of Königsberg
Mapping accounts appear to succumb to a category error in assuming that physical systems
can be treated like mathematical systems, but in a sense such a point may strike us as
merely a technicality. We can imagine a mapping account proponent replying so what
if the relations of a physical systems are not actual mathematical relations, if they are still
true of (parts of) the system, then shouldn't we be able to preserve such physical structure
(i.e. the relations) in a mathematical representation by means of a homomorphism-like
correspondence of parts of the physical system to parts of the mathematical system? In
18It should be noted that the direction of the mapping is not all ways uniform in the literature. Some
mapping accounts (e.g. (Bueno & Colyvan, 2011, Hughes, 1997)) portray the mapping as going from the
physical world to the model, suggesting that parts of the world constitute the domain of the function and
the mathematical systems the range. In contrast van Fraassen appears to conceive the parts of the world as
constituting the range of the mapping.
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Figure 1.2.1: Adapted Map of Königsberg,
1613.
Figure 1.2.2: Representation of Königs-
berg Bridge Structure.
order to consider such a proposal, we must ﬁgure out what such true but non-mathematical
relations/structure imposed on a physical system are supposed to be like.
To do this, let us consider one of Pincock's more compelling example cases of mathe-
matical representation, Leonhard Euler's application of what is now called graph theory to
investigate tours of the seven bridges of Königsberg. Euler states the problem as follows:
In the town of Königsberg, in Prussia there is an island A called Kneiphof, with the
two branches of the river (Pregel) ﬂowing around it, as shown in [ﬁgure 1.2.1]. There
are seven bridges ... crossing the two branches. The question is whether a person can
plan a walk in such a way that he will cross each of these bridges once but not more than
once. I was told that while some denied the possibility of doing this and others were in
doubt, there were none who maintained that it was actually possible. On the basis of
the above I formulated the very general problem for myself: Given any conﬁguration of
the river and the branches into which it may divide, as well as any number of bridges,
to determine whether or not it is possible to cross each bridge exactly once. (Euler,
1956, p574)
A contemporary treatment of this problem in the context of graph theory is to represent the
Königsberg bridge structure as an undirected graph, in which land regions separated by
water (e.g. the regions labeled A, B, C, and D in ﬁgure 1.2.1) are represented by vertices and
the bridges connecting such regions are represented by edges joining the respective vertices.
A quick comparison with ﬁgure 1.2.1 tells us that a graph representing the 1613 Königsberg
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bridge structure in this way can be symbolized as in ﬁgure 1.2.2.
In honor of Euler's work on this problem, a sequence of vertices of a graph in which two
vertices are listed sequentially only if there is an unused edge connecting them and each
edge is used in this way exactly once is now suggestively referred to as an Euler path. If such
an Euler path exists for a graph of the form of ﬁgure 1.2.2, then it is not hard to see how
that sequence would constitute instructions for which bridges to take and in what order to
take them in order to traverse the bridges in the way that reportedly eluded the Königsberg
townsfolk. However, Euler's theorem tells us that a necessary condition for the existence of
such a sequence is that at most two of the vertices can have an odd number of edges joining
it. So, since the Königsberg graph structure clearly fails this condition (all four vertices have
an odd number of edges), we can conclude that no such Euler path exists for the graph in
ﬁgure 1.2.2. So, since we concluded (by inspection of ﬁgure 1.2.1)19 that the graph in ﬁgure
1.2.2 matches the actual bridge structure of the physical city of Königsberg (circa 1613), we
can infer that it is impossible to traverse all the Königsberg bridges exactly once, just as the
townsfolk suspected.
Of course, van Fraassen is absolutely correct that merely whistling at ﬁgure 1.2.1 and
saying this is the structure does not count as providing a well deﬁned mathematical system
to which we can map the relations depicted by ﬁgure 1.2.2. Nonetheless, comparison of the
two ﬁgures quickly cements the feeling that something homomorphism-like can be observed
between the way that the bridges connect the four labeled regions of land, and the way
that the edges of the graph connect its four vertices. Even if we abandon the terminology
of `mapping' and `morphisms' is there a way to rehabilitate the motivation behind such an
19Of course the etching is itself a visual representation of the physical city in 1613. Because we have no
way of directly verifying the properties of the city in the past we will have to make due with the assumption
that the bridge features there depicted (along with other evidence like Euler's own report in (Euler, 1956)




In order to achieve such a rehabilitation, we must address the more signiﬁcant issue of
ﬁguring out what the physical relations that a mapping theorist wishes to homomorphically
preserve could be (even if it is not mathematical). First, we note that the (then not even
nascent) mathematics of graph theory is actually unnecessary to draw the conclusion that
such an Eulerian tour21 across the Königsberg bridges does not exist. As Euler himself noted,
since the number of bridges and land areas separated by the rivers is ﬁnite, a brute force
strategy could be used to reveal that of all the potential walks across Königsberg bridges
without repetition, none will include all seven. However, such a brute force strategy might
seem impractical for arbitrarily large cities with arbitrarily large numbers of bridges.
Better yet, we might explain the general impossibility inferred from Euler's theorem by
considering a particular (entirely non-mathematical) argument about unique bridge walk-
ing.22 We only need to make the principle observation that if the bridges to a particular
region cannot be paired up into separate in-and-out pairs [i.e. if there is an uneven number
of bridges] then it is impossible to walk across each bridge connecting that region without
either getting stuck inside that region or becoming stuck outside of it with no bridges
left to take. For example, if we start outside of Kneiphof (i.e. region A depicted in ﬁgure
1.2.1) and in the course of our attempt, travel into [1], then out of [2], eventually return into
[3], and then leave again [4], and ﬁnally return [5], via the [ﬁve] separate bridges leading to
Kneiphof, then we will ultimately be stuck on Kneiphof island, unable to leave via any of
20Contessa's use of the `denotation' terminology instead of `mapping' terminology in his method of analytic
interpretation (Contessa, 2007, pp57-8), might count as an example of such mitigation. That being said,
even with this terminology, we are still faced with the question of how to determine the interrelations of the
target that are supposed to be captured in the vehicle.
21To be precise, we will call the physical act of walking over the bridges in the city exactly once an Eulerian
tour, to be contrasted with Eulerian paths, which refer to mathematical sequences of edges.
22The following observations are quite close to those used by Euler himself in his original demonstration.
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the bridges without using it for a second time. This works if we intend Kneiphof to be the
ﬁnal destination point, or (if we were to run the path in reverse) the starting point of our
attempt, but there are only so many end points to a trip. More generally, it is ok to get
stuck at a region if we want that region to be a starting point or destination point of an at-
tempt to traverse all the bridges exactly once. The problem is that there is only one starting
point and one destination point of any potential bridge tour of Königsberg. [In other words,
we can only get stuck twice.] But our principle observation was that if a region has an
unpairable [odd] amount of bridges, then we cannot traverse them all exactly once without
getting stuck. Hence, for any city (including Königsberg), we can traverse every bridge in
the city exactly once, only if we will have to get stuck in a single destination region and a
single starting region. But, since our principle observation reveals that we have to get stuck
not just in regions A and B, but also in region C and in region D, we conclude that there
are not enough ends of the path to go around, conﬁrming the townsfolk's suspicions that
such a tour of the bridges is impossible.
Though such an explanation of why the townsfolk's suspicions were correct is somewhat
cumbersome when completely purged (with brackets) of any mathematical language, it is
diﬃcult to argue that such an explanation is a case of mathematical application or repre-
sentation. This is not to say that the math does not make it much easier to communicate
the explanation clearly and concisely, at least to those who are a bit familiar with the ter-
minology. The point is only that the mathematics itself did not seem to be necessary for
the expurgated version. On the other hand, certain presuppositions were absolutely vital
both to the graph theoretical explanation as well as the math-purged version. We had to
assume constraints on walking the Königsberg bridges in order to justify the impossibility
of an Eulerian tour. What are these constraints?
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There are in fact a number of ways to traverse all seven bridges exactly once. If an eighth
pathway between any of the two regions were to exist, then one could easily take an Euler
tour of all the bridges plus the additional path. Now, imagine a mischievous agent bringing
a temporary rope bridge along on the tour, pausing part way through the tour to wait for
winter when the Pregel river freezes over, inventing a ﬂying contraption, arranging for a boat
at some point, or any number of other possibilities. Such an agent could (in a sense) foil the
Königsberg townsfolk's suspicions.
This does not mean that Euler's proof was invalid. It also does not mean that the math-
purged explanation given above is faulty. We might say that by using such strategies our
mischievous agent has cheated. She broke the ground rules that we assumed governed the
way the problem was set up to begin with. And these ground rules were necessary in order to
generate the above arguments (math or no math) for why such bridge tours are impossible.
To take advantage of temporary or non-bridge pathways across the river would violate our
so-called principle observation in the expurgated case. Similarly, such mischievous cheating
would falsify the claim that the available paths are those depicted by the structure of ﬁgure
1.2.2. In both cases, in order to draw the inference that Eulerian tours are impossible, we
needed to assume, for instance, that the bridges are the only (legitimate) method of river
crossing and that the bridge structure has a certain ﬁxed conﬁguration.23 Moreover, we
had to presume a whole host of other conditions on what would and would not count as
unique bridge crossing (like walking along the left side of a bridge is equivalent to walking
along the right side or down the middle, if you close your eyes, hop on one foot, or someone
caries you, it still counts, and so forth).
23As an historical irony, during World War II two of the seven bridges of Königsberg (now called Kalin-




Such constraints are so painfully obvious in the Königsberg example that we hardly notice.
This is part of what makes the example so compelling. It takes little work to see that ﬁgure
1.2.2 captures all and only the legitimate bridge relations depicted by the etching of ﬁgure
1.2.1, rightly treating as equivalent insigniﬁcant variations in how one might uniquely walk
across one of the bridges as well as eliminating other kinds of tricks a mischievous cheater
could pull. In short, ﬁgure 1.2.2 provides a concise summary of the bridge relations that
we might already abstract from inspection of the etching. Again, abstracting in this way is
so natural in the Königsberg example that we hardly notice that we've done it. However,
as exempliﬁed by the mischievous cheater, without this process of laying out the initial
constraints on the physical system in question (Königsberg circa 1613) it is impossible to
answer Euler's question, whether we use the math or not.
Despite the already emphasized simplicity of the Königsberg example, the process of
abstraction is not a straightforward matter of simply observing the physical existence of the
bridges and where they are located. Abstraction processes involve the non-algorithmic skill
of identifying which speciﬁc features of the bridges are relevant while judiciously ignoring
other details that do not matter. In this case, the most relevant features include the facts
that one can travel both ways on any of the seven bridges (they are undirected), that more
than one bridge can be connected to a particular region, that once you are at one end of
the bridge you can access those (and only those) bridges connected to that side, and, of
course, how each of the bridges connects the respective four regions separated by the river.
Features of the bridges that are irrelevant include, diﬀerences in their material construction,
where along banks of the river branches they have been built, variations in length and width,
perturbations in methods of getting across a particular bridge, etc. The process of abstraction
involves culling through all of these ostensibly available properties and interrelations of the
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components of the entire physical system (i.e. Königsberg in 1613) and picking out the
speciﬁc features that are germane while eliminating those that are not.
Once an abstraction has taken place, van Fraassen's category error challenge becomes
nominal at best. Unlike before, after an abstraction has been conducted, we have a well de-
ﬁned system of relations which can (if we wish) be homomorphically24 preserved through
some correspondence with a mathematical system. Hence, particularly in the case of sci-
entiﬁc representations of physical phenomena, if we have a way to abstract all and only
the interrelations of a physical system that we wish to represent with our theory, we would
then be in the right position to employ a homomorphism-like mapping strategy whereby
the abstracted interrelations of the physical system are analogously preserved by the strictly
deﬁned constraints placed on the structure of some mathematical vehicle. In other words,
once we have abstracted relevant physical relations from the system, applying the math in
a non-mysterious way ceases to be a problem, because the physical relations can then be
simulated in the mathematics. If we have correctly abstracted a well-deﬁned structure from
the physical system, then the faithfulness of inferences made by means of a homomorphically
analogous mathematical system will no longer be mysterious. The surrogate inference can
then be justiﬁed as sound thanks to the homomorphic analogy.
24It is debatable whether the relations so abstracted themselves properly count as mathematical or sim-
ply abstract. For those inclined to the latter interpretation, it might still seem inappropriate to refer to
such relation preserving correspondences between the abstracted physical components and a strictly deﬁned
mathematical system a homomorphic mapping, since such terminology is often used in more exclusively
mathematical contexts. That being said, in cases where the physical relations are already abstracted and
hence a well deﬁned relational structure is available, we no longer are faced with the substance of van
Fraassen's challenge (i.e. that there is not a well deﬁned target to map to). Moreover, the literal meaning
of the Greek origins of the term `homomorphic' give us reason to use it in this broader employment. In the
following we will hence continue to use mapping terms like `homomorphism' and other variants with the
explicit caveat that whether or not the narrow mathematical usage is intended will be dependent on the
context.
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1.3 Ampliative Abstraction and Epistemic Debt
We now have a potential defense against the problem of mysterious ﬁdelity. As we have
seen mapping accounts identify a potential justiﬁcation of how certain mathematical rep-
resentations become faithful by appealing to the existence of a kind of analogy of relevant
interrelations of the parts of the mathematical vehicle of representation and its physical tar-
get. The typical mapping proponent suggests appealing to some sort of functional mapping
between the parts of the physical target and the parts of the mathematical vehicle that will
establish the right kind of analogy, such as a homomorphism or isomorphism. The problem
with this solution (raised coyly by van Fraassen's category error challenge) was that in the
case of the physical target, it is not predeﬁned what the relevant parts of the physical system
are supposed to be and which interrelations are supposed to be preserved by such an osten-
sibly homomorphic mapping. To solve this challenge, we observed in the last section that for
successful mathematical applications through representation what we need is a procedure
of abstraction whereby the representer precisely identiﬁes speciﬁc relevant components of
the physical system to be represented and their interrelations in order to provide a set of
well deﬁned abstract physical relations which can then be homomorphically preserved in the
mathematical vehicle of representation. If such an abstraction procedure is both available
and successful in capturing actual and relevant interrelations of the physical system to be
represented, the mysterious ﬁdelity problem will be resolved. So, since our primary concern
is with the mathematical representation of physical phenomena in science, we must now take
a careful look at how such abstraction procedures come about in scientiﬁc practice.
There is little question that when it comes to the representation of physical phenomena
in science, an essential component to determining the relevant interrelations of the physical
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system is observation. The diﬃculty lies in the point already hinted at in the last section,
namely, that, though observation is no doubt central and vital, the abstraction of interre-
lations from observation alone is far from apodictic. In this section we will take a careful
look at how abstracted interrelations represented by mathematical vehicles of representation
can arise in scientiﬁc practice. In particular we will emphasize two signiﬁcant stages of am-
pliative inferences involved in developing such abstractions, which we will have to address
in developing our account of how matching might be suﬃcient for unmysteriously successful
scientiﬁc representation in chapter 2.
1.3.1 The Observation of Data vs. Phenomena
In order to understand how physicists go about abstracting the relevant features of a physical
system from their observations of the system (predominantly by means of experimentation),
we must be able to answer the question of what it is that they actually observe. To answer
this question it will be useful to take advantage of the now seminal distinction between data
and phenomena drawn by James Bogen and James Woodward in their (Bogen & Woodward,
1988). The concept of data in this terminology consists of the records of eﬀects in investi-
gators' sensory systems or experimental equipment (Bogen, 2011, p8). It is constituted by
unmanipulated, unprocessed experimental results of the investigation of the physical system
or system type in question. Examples of data may include, thermometer readings, reaction
times, discharges on a particle detector and so forth. Data can include irrelevant noise
resulting from particular idiosyncrasies of its extraction, including statistical ﬂuctuation,
impurities in the object of measurement, imperfections on particular measurement occasions
or instabilities in the apparatus.
Data plays the role of supplying evidence for the phenomena being studied. In this
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terminology the phenomena investigated is characterized by the stable, repeatable charac-
teristics of the physical system or system type (Bogen & Woodward, 1988, p117). So, for
instance, in one of their paradigm examples of investigating the phase transitions of lead,
the particular thermometer recordings taken upon the melting of a number of individual
lead samples (in otherwise ceteris paribus circumstances) would count as the experimental
data, while the melting point of lead (identiﬁed perhaps through some aggregation of these
entries, say, by averaging) would count as the studied phenomena of the experiment. An
important feature to note (and exempliﬁed by this case) is that phenomena are not always
best thought of as being instantiated (at least not in any straightforward way) by a particu-
lar experimental occasion. For instance, in the lead example none of the particular samples
may actually result in a recording of exactly 327.5◦C even though this aggregation number
is supposed to report the detected phenomena.25 Instead, phenomena are perhaps better
thought of in terms of the stable patterns present across a number of equivalently prepared
systems or experimental occasions.
Bogen and Woodward are also careful to emphasize that while [p]henomena are detected
through the use of data, they are typically not observable in any interesting sense of that
term (Bogen & Woodward, 1988, p306). Though phenomena are indirectly detected by our
direct observation of the data (along with various inferential judgments that such data counts
as evidence of the phenomena in question), phenomena are not directly observable. That
being said, the primary kind of unobservability of phenomena at issue must be carefully
distinguished from another sense of unobservability often discussed by philosophers of science,
particularly in the context of scientiﬁc realism. One way to be unobservable is in the sense
25As we shall elaborate in chapter 2, this number does indicate what can be thought of as the center of
a kind of neighborhood in which lead samples in general will begin to change phase, but falling in such a
neighborhood is still not a straightforward case of the sample instantiating lead melting at exactly 327.5◦C.
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that, say, neutrinos are unobservable. Neutrinos count as unobservable in that (according to
our theories) they are far too tiny to see. They are beyond the limited scope of our sensory
capabilities as human agents. It is tempting to characterize the unobservability of phenomena
in terms of this sort of unobservability, thinking of phenomena as being unobservable because
they are, so to speak, beyond the veil of our limited sensory capabilities, and therefore
their detection must be mediated by data recovering experimental devices which we can
immediately perceive. Thought this might also be the case for certain phenomena, it is
not the only (or even primary) sense in which phenomena are unobservable. The primary
unobservability of phenomena lies in the fact that phenomena unlike neutrinos are not objects
or entities, instead they are characterized by the stable patterns exhibited by physical systems
of a certain type.26 So, since the features of even macroscopic patterns cannot be directly
observed in a single instance, we can say that phenomena are unobservable in the sense that
no pattern is directly observable (at least not on a particular occasion).
The unobservability of phenomena is a Humean point: Just as we cannot directly observe
a piece of bread nourishing, we cannot directly observe phenomena. Of course, with the help
of antecedent theoretical presuppositions we may well infer from a number of instances that
bread nourishes, and having warmed up a number of samples of lead (at constant pressure
etc.) we may infer from thermometer data that lead melts at 327.5◦C. Moreover, once we
have concluded that such a phenomena occurs in these types of instances, we can easily
recognize (detect) that a new piece of lead is melting (at least approximately) at 327.5◦C in
26When claiming that phenomena are not entities, it is not being claimed that phenomena cannot be
indicative (at least to a scientiﬁc realist) of the existence of an entity or event kind in the relevant physical
system(s). For instance, reﬂection on various electromagnetic phenomena might lead a physicist (or real-
istically inclined philosopher of science) to infer the existence of a theoretically postulated entity called an
electron, or reﬂection on photoelectric phenomena might lead a physicist to infer the existence of photons,
etc. The theoretical postulation of such entities explains the presence of the phenomena for which data
recovered in experimental tests provide evidence. But each of these three (entities, phenomena, and data)
plays a distinct role and falls under respectively distinct categories.
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accordance with the phenomena. However, such recognitions are still not cases of directly
observing the phenomena because in order to make such a recognition we had to already
presuppose that the phenomenal pattern in question occurs in that type of instance.27
Last, despite this diﬀerence in the observability of data and phenomena, Bogen and
Woodward frequently emphasize the fact that whereas data typically cannot be predicted or
systematically explained by theory due to inherent ﬂuctuations of collection, well-developed
scientiﬁc theories do predict and explain facts about phenomena (Bogen &Woodward, 1988,
pp305-6). With this ﬁnal point in mind, by adopting their terminology, we have a clear
answer to the question of what it is that physicists directly observe, the data. On the other
27The stark distinction identiﬁed here between the directly observable (data) and the exclusively indirectly
detectable (phenomena) drawn in the context of scientiﬁc theorizing might potentially raise the eyebrows
of readers familiar with the arguments against sense-data theories of knowledge. Reﬂecting on the famous
example of Sellars's tie merchant (see (Sellars, 1963, pp142-6)), who has become so familiar with the way blue
ties look under new lighting that he can now immediately observe that it is blue even though it appears
green, we might wonder how it can be possible to immediately see (after a number of instances) that the
tie is blue in this lighting, while according to the data-phenomena distinction it is impossible to eventually
see that the melting point of lead is 327◦C. After all, one point of the tie example is to disabuse the notion
that there is a ﬁrewall between certain contents that can directly be seen (viz the given or sense data)
and certain facts that cannot be. Hence, one might worry that we have somehow violated this principle by
suggesting that experimental data have been distinguished from phenomena in just this way.
A few responses can be provided to those with these concerns: First, we must remember that part of the
problem with sense data theory, leading to Sellars's rejection, was that it in fact tries to treat perception in
the model of scientiﬁc theories, in which sense data indeed play the role of data and facts about the world
play the role of the phenomena. Since in contrast we are restricting our distinction exclusively to the context
of scientiﬁc investigation (not the so-called manifest image), the distinction between data and phenomena
does not succumb to the myth of the given. Moreover, as emphasized above, there is an important diﬀerence
between say seeing the phenomena of gravitational attraction between two massive bodies and seeing that
two bodies are approaching each other in accordance with the phenomena of gravitational attraction the
former is unobservable in the sense we have described, whereas (if we are familiar enough with gravity) the
latter is immediately and directly observable on analogy with how the tie merchant can directly observe the
blueness of the tie (having become familiar with the fact that blue ties look green in the new light). Again,
recognizing in such a case that it is the type of situation in which gravitational phenomena occur and that
its occurrence accounts for what we have observed (the approach of the bodies) is diﬀerent from seeing the
pattern itself on such an occasion. Finally, by drawing the direct observability distinction between data and
phenomena we by no means must preclude the possibility of, so to speak, seeing a pattern in the data.
Indeed, an experienced experimental physicist may very well possess such an ability and this kind of skill
can be an asset in successful abstraction. However, to immediately see/perceive/observe patterns in data
is quite diﬀerent from observing a phenomenal pattern directly on a particular experimental instance. In the
former, in order to see the pattern one must inspect the spectrum of data collected whereas in the latter,
one is only inspecting a particular instance, and so for the reasons already given cannot be observing the
(entire) phenomenal pattern directly.
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hand, it is the properties and interrelations attributed to the phenomena that seem to be the
sort of features from which we would expect to reliably draw inferences. Though we have
direct observational access to the results of measurement devices in our experiments, the
presence of experimental noise and other ﬂuctuations that are included in data make such
raw measurement results a poor candidate for the abstracted interrelations to be captured by
means of a mathematical representation. Though unreliably ﬂuctuating elements are bound
to occur in most empirical investigations, such ﬂuctuations are not the kind of features that
we want to preserve and use as a basis for drawing (surrogate) inferences about systems of the
relevant type. In contrast, the stable and repeatable patterns characteristic of phenomena are
exactly the kind of desired qualities we might want as our bases for inference about physical
systems. This thesis is punctuated with the fact emphasized by Bogen and Woodward that
phenomena, not data, are the proper target of theoretical prediction and explanation. That
is to say, surrogate scientiﬁc inferences are made about phenomena not data.
So, while the stable interrelations attributed to the phenomena serve as the appropriate
kind of candidate for physical structure to be preserved in faithful representations, this
structure is not what is directly observable by means of experimentation. We have hence
identiﬁed an observability gap between directly observable data records on the one hand,
and on the other hand the interrelations attributed to the phenomena which fail to be
directly observable. Since it is the latter interrelations we actually want for our faithful
representations, the bridging of this gap constitutes a signiﬁcant ampliative inference in
actual scientiﬁc abstraction practice, which we will refer to as the data to phenomena gap.
In addition to this data to phenomena gap, there is a second gap between the system and
the supposedly directly observable data records. In sections 1.3.2 and 1.3.3 below we will
review some of the non-apodictic features of how data is recovered from physical systems
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through experimentation, and in section 1.3.4 we will then review the non-apodictic features
of how the data to phenomena gap is bridged in turn.
To be clear, these sections should not be taken as a critique of scientiﬁc practice. These
sections instead aim to emphasize that the abstraction practices actually used by scientists to
recover well determined interrelations possessed by physical systems is not a straightforward
or deductive task. The abstraction of phenomenal patterns in physical systems is inferentially
ampliative, and as we shall see highly sensitive to the adoption (and revision) of background
empirical and theoretical presuppositions. We will return to this premise in section 2.2, where
in resolving what we will term as Plato's problem we reconsider what physical phenomena
are targeted by mathematical idealizations in a representation relationship.
1.3.2 Determining the Data: Rejecting Naivety
According to the account just laid out data records are recovered from experimentation and
these records serve as evidence for the detection of scientiﬁc phenomena. The detection of
these phenomena can in turn be used as the basis for (an abductive) justiﬁcation of scientiﬁc
theory, explaining their detection in the experiment. Though such a linear progression
captures the principle stages of the process Bogen and Woodward propose, endorsing their
account is not to suggest a naive view of scientiﬁc investigation in which the initial data
recovery of experimentation occurs in a theoretical vacuum.28 According to such a naive
account, theory construction develops directly from the bare perception-determined data
without any presuppositions about the physical system type being measured.
Initial diﬃculty with such a naive account begins with the fact that data cannot be
28Both Bogen and Woodward have moved to reject this naive attribution in recent reviews of their data-
phenomena distinction (see (Bogen, 2011, Woodward, 2011)), along with rejecting the idea that theory
cannot inform data to phenomena reasoning.
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determined merely (so to speak) by whatever is sensed in the course of the experiments. In
dealing with a similar task to our own of accounting for how mathematics coordinates with
physical systems Hans Reichenbach emphasizes the complications arising from identifying
data with the bare perception of experimental apparati as follows:29
The content of every perception is far too complex to serve as an element of coordina-
tion. For instance, if we interpreted the perception of the pointer of the manometer...
as such an element, we would get into diﬃculties because this perception contains much
more than the position of the pointer. Should the factory label be on the manometer,
it would be part of the perception. Two perceptions diﬀerent with respect to this label
may still be equivalent for the coordination to Boyle's equation. Before a perception
is coordinated, its relevant components must be distinguished from the irrelevant ones;
that is, it must be ordered. (Reichenbach, 1965, pp40-1)
Reichenbach's description of how the physicist must carefully cull the relevant components
from irrelevant ones in our total perception of the state of the manometer is strikingly
similar to our discussion of the task of identifying the relevant features of the Königsberg
bridges at the close of section 1.2.3. Before we can even identify particular observations of
experimental results as potential evidence of some phenomenal pattern suitable for mathe-
matical representation, the physicist must decide ﬁrst how to conduct a measurement and
second what properties of the result of the measurement are supposed to be recorded as data
and what properties are inconsequential.
Of course, when it comes to recording the relevant results of a pressure measurement
conducted with a manometer, the suggestion that we don't have a clue as to what to record
might seem rather obtuse. We know the relevant result to record: as indicated by Re-
29In many ways, Reichenbach's program of coordination can be thought of as an early twentieth century
attempt to deal with the very issues of representing physical systems with mathematics that we have been
investigating. He too identiﬁes and attempts to solve the dilemma posed in the introduction to this chapter as
well as the particular challenges, such as van Fraassen's category error challenge, associated with mapping-
like attempts (see (Reichenbach, 1965, pp34-9)). Reichenbach's solution in (Reichenbach, 1965) of relying
only on consistency of coordination is unfortunately shaded by the perhaps overly empiricistic scruples he
held at that time, but the major dilemmas he identiﬁes are still remarkably appropriate (cf. (van Fraassen,
2008, pp218-23)).
40
1.3. AMPLIATIVE ABSTRACTION AND EPISTEMIC DEBT
ichenbach himself, it is the position of the pointer. Once we have chosen well accepted
measurement apparati and techniques of application, the answer of what to record for the
data is manifest. But the development of a well accepted measurement apparatus already
involves a great deal of antecedent theorizing. This antecedent theorizing informs (a) how to
construct the relevant apparatus, (b) our ability to conceptualize what properties or relation
of properties are measured, (c) why we expect that the apparatus is able to indicate the
properties so conceived, and (d) how to display the relations in the data output of the ap-
paratus. Without at least some antecedent knowledge or belief allowing an experimentalist
to answer these requirements, she has no hope of even gathering data (let alone guidance
in conducting the sophisticated task of inferring facts about reliable phenomenal patterns
from such data records). How the scientist answers these requirements comes by way of a
protracted and recursive process whereby immature methods of data collection are informed
by immature theorizing (or proto-theorizing) which leads to (ampliative) judgments about
phenomena, allowing for improved theorizing which in turn informs data collection methods
once again, and so on. In the next subsection, we will brieﬂy review a concrete (albeit some-
what apocryphal) example of this recursive process, taking a look at the well discussed case
history of temperature measurement.30 As for our primary task, the modest point to appre-
ciate has already been made: contrary to the naive view, even the recovery of our observable
data cannot be conducted without signiﬁcant (theoretical or proto-theoretical) presupposition
concerning the type of system studied. The appeal to such antecedent supposition hence
marks an ampliative gap between bare interaction with physical systems and the recovery
of data records. This gap is bridged in actual scientiﬁc practice only through signiﬁcant
30For more extensive critical discussion of the development of temperature measurement in this context
see (Mach, 1986, pp10-61) and (Chang, 2004). See also (van Fraassen, 2008, pp125-30).
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ampliative reasoning used to support the required antecedent theoretical supposition.
1.3.3 Determining the Data: Temperature
Early devices for measuring temperature changes, frequently attributed to Galileo for their
invention, consisted of a long inverted ﬂask with the open end submerged in a small glass
basin of water. The idea was that observations of the volume of the water in the ﬂask might
serve as an indication of temperature. Retrospectively, we can expect that on warm days
Galileo would observe a large volume of water rising up into the ﬂask as the water dilated,
whereas on cooler days the volume would decrease. Similarly, if the basin were to be warmed,
say by one's hands, Galileo might have observed the water in the ﬂask rising, and then falling
again some time after the basin had been set down.
Now imagine it is the turn of the seventeenth century and we have joined Galileo for
the development of his thermoscope.31 He is faced with the challenge of ﬁguring out how to
record such potential thermal data. One suggestion we could give is to make some kind
of markings along the side of the ﬂask and label each marking with a diﬀerent name, say,
arbitrarily chosen names of prior Popes. These markings will then enable him to record,
for instance, that in such and such circumstance the water in the ﬂask had risen to LeoX
whereas under some diﬀerent circumstance, the water had risen only to Paul II. Galileo's
thermal measurement device now (ostensibly) allows him to record rudimentary comparisons
of the relative warmth or coolness of diﬀerent circumstances. By reviewing his notes of which
names were recorded in which circumstances, he might judge (from inspection of where the
pope name was along the device) that on occasion A there was more/less warmth than on
31We will follow the convention of referring to devices capable of (potentially) measuring changes in tem-
perature as thermoscopes. In contrast, we will refer to devices capable of (potentially) measuring temperature
quantitatively as thermometers.
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occasion B. To avoid the need for constant reference to how he arbitrarily listed the pope
names along his device, Galileo could even improve his recording system, by relabeling the
markings so as to take advantage of a natural ordering already well known to exist between
past popes, namely, their order of ascendancy. He can relabel the markings by naming the
top most marking Clement V III (the likely current pope during his invention of the ﬁrst
thermoscope), and working his way back naming the next highest marking with the name
of the next most recent pope, and so on. By taking advantage of this ordering structure
of when each pope presided, he can now impose such an ordering on his recorded data. If
the pope name recorded on occasion A is of a pope who presided after the pope whose name
was recorded on occasion B, Galileo might surmise that it was warmer on occasion A.
Before improving further on Galileo's thermoscope, note the signiﬁcant ampliative steps
that have already been implicitly taken even by imposing such a meager ordering. Galileo's
thermometer is designed on the notion that comparisons of warmth can be made by compar-
isons of the volume of the liquid that has risen in the ﬂask. Presumably this presupposition
could be conﬁrmed by the experiences already noted of the water rising on warm days and
falling on cool ones. Though signiﬁcant temperature diﬀerences might be evident for signiﬁ-
cant changes in water level, such experiences do not entail that this association (the warmer
it is the higher the water) is preserved for every potential diﬀerence in warmth. Just because
we can observe that very warm days result in very high water and very cool days result
very low water, this does not (deductively) entail that subtle variations in warmth result in
analogous variations in water level. That is to say, he has made an ampliative inference that
the association between water level height and warmth exhibited in severe cases generalizes
to cases where the diﬀerences in warmth are quite small (at least to the diﬀerences as small
as he has spaced the pope markings).
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From a contemporary perspective, a skeptic might challenge such an ampliative infer-
ence by pointing out that though we observe through direct experience that it feels cooler
when our (contemporary) thermometer displays 15oC then when it displays 32oC, this does
not deductively entail that it is analogously cooler when our thermometer displays 25.00oC
than when it displays 25.01oC.32 It is well documented that such variations in temperature
are below the threshold of human sensation. Moreover, it had been observed long before
Galileo's (supposed) development of early thermoscopes that human assessment of temper-
ature comparisons are notoriously unreliable.33 This is not to say that the judgment that
a total ordering can be given to temperature records is in error, only that drawing such a
judgment involves signiﬁcant ampliative inference in light of the stark absence of reliable
ordering capacity possessed by humans.
Other potential ampliative judgments regarding Galileo's open air thermometer were
eventually determined to be unwarranted. For instance, we might note from a contemporary
perspective, that variations in atmospheric pressure can introduce a signiﬁcant confounding
inﬂuence on the Galileo's data results. Though pope name recordings may be reliable in
a spatially and temporally local sense, changes in atmospheric pressure from day to day or
altitude to altitude might signiﬁcantly inﬂuence such measurement. But how is Galileo even
to discover such confounding inﬂuences, particularly since barometric pressure measurement
practices were also yet to be fully developed? It would have been possible, if he had some
sort of ﬁxed point of temperature. That is, we could determine that an inﬂuence such as
32This sort of skeptical challenge is not entirely gratuitous. As we know now, the ampliative generaliza-
tion in question fails to hold for every choice of liquid and every temperature variation. For instance, water
reaches its maximum density around 40C and then begins to expand again as it approaches 00C.
33Consider Berkeley's famous experiment in which an agent sticks each of her hands in respectively cool
and warm buckets of water and then places them into a third bucket of water of medium warmth. Recognition
of this unreliability has been documented well into antiquity (for one of the earliest such hints see (Plato,
1997, 154b)).
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atmospheric pressure is confounding our results by identifying a kind of thermal state which
always occurs at the same temperature. Unfortunately, this task was far from straightforward
and fraught with false starts. Candidates for ﬁxed points (which can appear somewhat foolish
from a contemporary perspective) included candle ﬂame (Sanctorius), the greatest summer
heat (Accademia del Cimento), melting butter and deep cellars (Joachim Dalencé), and
body temperature (Issac Newton)(Chang, 2004, p10). The process of ruling out these along
with various other candidates again involves ampliative judgment and supposition. For
instance, we might expect that multiple humans in the same spatial location at the same
time should have the same body temperature if it is to be a ﬁxed point, so we can rule
out Newton's candidate by comparing a number of human body temperatures and judging
that there is signiﬁcant variation among the results. Unfortunately, in order to determine
that the variation among results was signiﬁcant we must ﬁrst have an acceptable method
of determining the data and second have a method of analyzing whether variation is indeed
signiﬁcant or was actually indicative of a reliable ﬁxed point phenomena (i.e. the human
body temperature). But the reason we wanted a ﬁxed point in the ﬁrst place was to help
us achieve the former task.34 Moreover, as we shall discuss in section 1.3.4 such data to
phenomena reasoning required for the second task itself involves a good deal of ampliative
reasoning.
Fixed point standards did not become fully settled until well after Galileo's death. How-
ever, the parallel development of barometric measurement and theoretical conceptualization
eventually led Blaise Pascal to identify the inﬂuence of atmospheric pressure on open air
thermometers (van Fraassen, 2008, p126). This resulted in the development of closed or
34From a retrospective vantage, we expect Galileo's open air thermoscope to be locally reliable because
the confounding inﬂuences of atmospheric pressure are locally stable, but if we already knew that this was a
source of error, we wouldn't need a ﬁxed point to tell us. Cf. Chang's poetical comparison of this challenge
with the task of hanging a picture on a wall that hasn't yet been built. (Chang, 2004, p40)
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liquid thermometers where a heated liquid was introduced into a glass tube that was then
sealed. Initially numerous diﬀerent liquids were used in such thermometers. The problem
with such lack of standard liquid choice was that diﬀerent liquids expand at diﬀerent ratios
with changes in warmth. Moreover, the ratio rates are not constant as warmth (tempera-
ture) varies. Such facts suggested that perhaps a standard liquid convention would need to
be chosen for a particular temperature measurement scale.35
With a convention of standard liquid choice accepted (by ampliative argument) to react
to thermal inﬂuences similarly from sample to sample as well as conventional enclosure (e.g.
glass cylindrical tube), we can again consider how the potential thermal data measured by
such thermoscopes can be recorded. Our ﬁctitious suggestion that Galileo use pope names
for his thermoscope markings would be useful in detecting changes in warmth, but fails to
establish a measurement of temperature level that can be recorded and then compared to
warmth states in wildly diverse situations. Reﬂecting on this point Ernest Mach muses that
such standardized liquid thermoscopes could at least have been used to detect the proper
marking levels of thermal ﬁxed points. After making the ampliative inference that such a
standardized thermoscope indeed detects such ﬁxed points reliably under arbitrary variations
of other conditions,36 he suggests that such a thermoscope could indeed be used to detect
diﬀerences in temperature as desired. Mach immediately reviews the manifest diﬃculties
35Choice of a standard liquid, such as mercury, involves its own ampliative generalizations. Though it
was observed, for instance, by Dalton that mercury appeared to have the least variation (see (Mach, 1986,
p54)), it still evidently varied in ratio compared to other liquids. Moreover, glass expands roughly at a ratio
of seven to one with respect to mercury, meaning that the marking system is not static with temperature
variation either. On both counts, we are hence forced either to generalize and make the ampliative judgment
that such variations are negligible or to attribute a rather uncomfortable position of prominence to our
conventional choices of glass and mercury, insisting that thermal states are inextricably pinned to whatever
the mercury-glass thermometer does in that state.
36Again this is not a trivial conclusion to draw. It requires both that such ﬁxed points exist under arbitrary
variation (they don't), and (as already discussed) that we can presume a linear ordering to the temperatures
at which these ﬁxed points reliably occur. For further discussion of the diﬃculties with identifying such ﬁxed
points see (Chang, 2004, ch1)).
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and limitations of such a purely qualitative standardized thermoscope:
The inconveniences of such a system, which as a matter of fact long prevailed would
soon be manifest. The more delicate the inquiry, the more ﬁxed points of this sort
would be necessary; and ultimately they would no longer be attainable. Furthermore,
the number of the names to be marked would be annoyingly augmented, and it would
be impossible to discover from these names the order in which the thermal states under
consideration succeeded one another. (Mach, 1986, pp49-50)
Like the above discussed ﬁctitious pope markings system, even with such a standardized
thermoscope, the practice of using otherwise unordered ﬁxed points has an impact on the
practical comparison of data recordings (unlike popes, ﬁxed points don't have an independent
antecedent ordering). More importantly, a nominal system of merely labeling the ﬁxed
points only allows for the qualitative comparison of various states. Under the presumption
that there is a total ordering that can be imposed on temperature levels, the best such a
thermoscope could do is identify that a given measured state is between two previously
identiﬁed ﬁxed points. Mach hence proceeds to note the obvious availability of a system
of names which is at the same time a system of ordinal symbols, permitting of indeﬁnite
extension and reﬁnement, viz, numbers (Mach, 1986, p50). The beneﬁts of using a system of
names with such a well known ordering structure are clear: Unlike our pope names system,
by using the real (or rational) numbers, the developer of the thermometer could make use of
the density and unboundedness of their ordering to compare arbitrary disparate variations of
thermal states (there is no upper bound to potential temperature measurements recorded by
real numbers) and to arrange them with arbitrary precision (between any two temperature
measurements, there can exist a record of an intermediate state). However, by choosing to
use such a richly structured system of names, the thermometer creator presupposes that
the actual thermal states possible admit such arbitrary precision and unboundedness. But,
as was already evident from our pope ordering, such a presupposition requires inductive
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generalization.
Even if it were the case that we could observe an invariant ordering of ﬁxed points with
a standardized thermoscope, as already noted, this does not deductively entail that there
is an invariant ordering of all thermal states. How do we justify that a state measured by
a (contemporary) thermometer at 23.0001oC is really warmer than a state measured at
23.0000oC. Further, how do we justify that thermal states should be diﬀerentiated with
arbitrary precision? There is reason to believe that there is a thermal diﬀerence between
100oC and 0oC because of the diﬀerence between the boiling and melting of water, but if there
are no ﬁxed points to distinguish between a situation where the thermometer gives a reading
of 23.0001oC and a situation where it gives a reading of 23.0000oC, it does not automatically
follow there is a thermal diﬀerence between the two (even if there is a detectable diﬀerence in
the volume of the thermometer liquid). Imposing such a richly structured system of names
hence requires the ampliative judgment that such a structure exists for the thermal states
being measured. Choosing to use the real (or rational) numbers to record these diﬀerences
suggests that such diﬀerences can exist. But the judgment that such diﬀerences do exist
cannot be drawn deductively from our knowledge of more coarsely diﬀerentiated thermal
states. In other words, the only answer to how we might justify totally ordering thermal
states with arbitrary precision is by ampliative generalization (from our knowledge of the
coarsely diﬀerentiated thermal states).
Again, by recognizing that such ampliative inference is inherent, especially when we
employ numbers for our measurement records, we are not proposing a thesis of skepticism.
Such a move may well be epistemically warranted. The point is only to note, that by
appealing to such a richly structured system of names like the real or rational numbers
we must (so to speak) ﬁll in gaps that cannot be justiﬁed by deduction and observation
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alone. By ﬁlling in those gaps by presupposing that a such a richly structured measurement
system is appropriate, we are going beyond what is immediately justiﬁed by prior experience
and experimentation alone. Using rich mathematical systems to record the data as in the
example of temperature measurement, hence, constitutes a signiﬁcant ampliative move that
must be taken in actual scientiﬁc practice. The presuppositions required for such ampliative
judgments constitute an epistemological voucher: Even at the data extraction stage of
abstraction, the physicist must borrow on the presupposition of structure (in this case the
metric structure of R) that is not directly warranted by experimentation. In chapter 2 we will
argue that such epistemic debts can be rebalanced (in part) through our proposed account
of scientiﬁc representation.
1.3.4 Data to Phenomena Reasoning
In the last two subsections we have argued for the existence of an inferential gap between
knowledge we can gain by direct interaction with physical systems and data records recov-
erable through experimentation. As we saw in the case history of thermometery, ampliative
inference is inherent, particularly if we wish to record the data by means of richly struc-
tured recording systems such as the real numbers. This move required the presupposition
of properties of thermal states (e.g. between any two temperature states there exists an
intermediate state) for which there exists no deductive justiﬁcation. Hence, we suggested
that such abstraction judgments may incur what we characterized as a kind of epistemic
debt. Let us call the inferential gap that must be bridged by incurring such a debt the
system to data gap.
As already noted at the close of section 1.3.1, a second gap that must be bridged exists
in moving from the raw data results of experimentation to claims about the phenomenal
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patterns exhibited by the physical systems studied. Since we also noted there that such
phenomenal patterns capture the kind of stable properties and interrelations that could be
used for sound surrogative inference about the systems themselves, we must hence ﬁnd a
way to bridge this second gap as well. As with the system to data gap, the gap between
data and phenomena must also primarily be bridged by ampliative inference.
In his recent review of the data-phenomena distinction, Woodward oﬀers an account of
how the data to phenomena gap is rationally bridged. He suggests that data to phenomena
reasoning is ampliative in the sense that the conclusion reached (a claim about phenomena)
goes beyond or has additional content besides the evidence on which it is based (data)
(Woodward, 2011, p172). Though the literature on philosophical accounts of ampliative
inference (or reasoning) is vast, the concept typically refers to inferences where the conclusion
is not deductively guaranteed by the premises alone. The most prominent such inferences of
course include cases of inductive generalization such as
Many Fs areG
∴ All Fs areG
(1.3.1)
and cases of abduction (a.k.a. inference to the best explanation) such as
E
E is best explained by T (1.3.2)
∴ T
as well as numerous variations on these themes. For such inference types the possible falsity
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of the conclusion is not precluded (at least not on pain of inconsistency) by the truth of
the premises. The premises instead are supposed to support the conclusion in virtue of
some alternative method(s) or standard(s) of justiﬁcation. So, if claims about phenomena
indeed have content additional to the data records themselves as Woodward readily grants,
it would seem that data to phenomena reasoning likewise counts as ampliative.
In order to get a sense of why claims about phenomena go beyond the content of the
bare data records, let's consider a few examples. For instance, as already discussed in the
paradigm example of the melting lead phenomena, the quantity 327.5◦C is recovered by
means of the aggregation of numerous data records from individual samplings. But none of
the individual data results may necessarily have the exact value of 327.5◦C. Moreover, due
to (almost inevitable) experimental noise, if such measurements are conducted with suﬃcient
precision, we should expect that many of the data results diﬀer (if only a little) from sample
to sample. Nonetheless, an aggregation process such as calculating the arithmetic mean of
the data results will recover the quantity 327.5◦C as representative of the melting point of
lead even though that speciﬁc number may not be equal to any one of the actual measurement
results recorded in the data. By aggregating the data numbers to recover the claim about
lead's melting point, we have done more than simply restate the content of the data itself. To
the contrary, it may be indicative of a claim about the phenomena that can easily diﬀer from
the particular data records. For a second example, consider a physicist conducting a double
slit experiment with individually ﬁred particles. The data recovered by such an experiment
might be recorded as an array of numbers indicating the location where the individual
particles irradiated the screen. What if the physicist next wants to make a claim about
the phenomena concerning the probability distribution describing the chances of particles
prepared in her experiment irradiating each region? In that case she will ﬁnd a best ﬁt curve
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for the data recorded. However, there is a good deal of ﬂexibility aﬀorded to curve ﬁtting
analysis that is not determined by a set of data points alone. Nothing in the data alone
determines which methods of interpolation one must use to best ﬁt the plots: Should one
use polynomials or special functions? Must we use only smooth functions, or diﬀerentiable
functions, and if so to what order of diﬀerentiability? Shall we use piecewise interpolations?
How many pieces, and with what kind of functions should the pieces be interpolated? As
we will see in subsequent chapters when discussing the representation of thermal systems
undergoing phase transitions, these questions are far from idle and are potently inﬂuenced
by background choices of theoretical context.
Though many sophisticated methods have been developed to guide data analysis within
certain theoretical contexts, the question of how to best ﬁt the data cannot be found in the
experimental records alone. Moreover, even if this were not the case, a probability distribu-
tion for particles prepared in the experiment certainly involves claims about the likelihood of
a particle hitting regions that were never struck in the course of the experiment, and hence
not part of the recorded data. As a third example for the ampliative reasoning involved in
data analysis, Woodward oﬀers the analysis of fMRI data (Woodward, 2011, p173). Raw
fMRI measurement for each voxel can be especially noisy. To mollify such ﬂuctuations in
data records due to this noise, analysts make use of spatial smoothing procedures by aver-
aging the value at each voxel with its neighbors. Again the analyst must go beyond the data
records themselves in ﬁnding a way to describe the phenomena detected in a certain kind of
smoothed form.
We might also consider a case recently emphasized by Sorin Bangu (2009) in discussing
the diﬀerence between how thermodynamics and statistical mechanics are able to treat phase
transitions. Phase transitions appear to manifest as certain sudden changes in the state
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Figure 1.3.1: Thermodynamic P-V curve
representation of a system at ﬁxed T <
Tc.
Figure 1.3.2: Possible P-V data records of
a thermal system held at ﬁxed T < Tc.
variables of the system (e.g. pressure and volume). In thermodynamics the ostensible sud-
denness of these changes is characterized by mathematical properties such as kinks and
discontinuities in functions relating these variables. In ﬁgure 1.3.1 a thermodynamic de-
piction of the relation between pressure and volume of a thermal system held at constant
temperature is given. As the curve crosses the region bounded by the dotted line a kink
occurs indicating a (ﬁrst-order) phase transition along the Maxwell Plateau.37 A physicist,
charged with the task of curve ﬁtting data records as depicted in ﬁgure 1.3.2, might hence
use such background theoretical presuppositions as a guide to ﬁtting the curve, searching
for least error solutions that ﬁt the curve in three pieces (the middle of which is linear).38
What is remarkable is that nothing about the actual data points can tell us anything about
whether there is a kink or not in the best ﬁt curve for the data. No matter how many
measurements are taken, as long as we assume any measurement takes a non-zero amount




occurring in a coexistence region between liquid and vapor states.
38This is essentially the kind of procedure used by thermal physicists (see (Malanowski, 1988, pp282-3)).
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of time to conduct, there will only be a ﬁnite number of points. But a kink in the curve
is a property of how the curve behaves as we continuously vary one of the state parameters.
Hence, such data records alone cannot possibly indicate a kinky relationship between the
pressure and volume of a thermal system. Further theoretical presupposition is required. As
in the quantum example, not only is it the case that the analyst ﬁlls in places between the
data points that were never actually measured, but she also may use signiﬁcant theoretical
presuppositions in guiding how to best ﬁt the curve at all.39
Such curve ﬁtting issues generalize well beyond our double slit and ﬁrst-order phase tran-
sition examples. In any case where a scientist wishes to use a ﬁnite sampling of measurement
results in order to detect properties of a scientiﬁc phenomena in the form a functional de-
pendency, she will be faced with such data ﬁtting challenges. But that means she must
(a) go beyond the scope of the data itself to ﬁgure out what type of curve to ﬁt the data
with, and (b) she will have to ﬁll in the untested missing regions between neighboring data
entries. Hence, in moving from the raw data to more well behaved smoothed out functional
descriptions of the phenomena, the analyst inevitably must go beyond the data itself. She
must conduct ampliative reasoning in moving from the data records alone to claims about
the phenomena.
Woodward notes that in the case of data to phenomena reasoning (as well as induction
at large), further so-called substantive empirical assumptions must be adopted (either
implicitly or explicitly) to license the drawing of the conclusion.40 For instance, in the lead
example, the choice to take the arithmetic mean of the data entries to determine the quantity
39In the case of the latter, the selection of certain thermodynamic presuppositions about phase transitions
over those of statistical mechanics is stark, since it is impossible in the theoretical context of statistical
mechanics to generate such kinks in representing the state variable relations of systems with ﬁnite degrees
of freedom (see sections 2.2.3 and 2.3.2 in the next chapter).
40Cf. John Norton's appeal to material facts to license ampliative inferences in his material theory of
induction (Norton, 2003).
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327.5◦C as a description of the melting point of lead is supported not only by the data entries
but by two further assumptions about the sources of error. Namely, the analyst assumes
that the error eﬀects are normally distributed (or at least symmetrical) and that their eﬀects
accumulate linearly.
Theoretical background assumptions about the type of physical system investigated are
typically used to guide such ampliative inferences as well. In the quantum example, because
it is common to make use of Hilbert space structures to describe the vector states of quantum
systems, we might quickly judge that the proper curve to best ﬁt our data with is the square
of a Lebesgue square integrable function. That is to say, since the quantum mechanical
theoretical context in which we describe wave functions makes use of normalized Hilbert
space structures such as L2, with that background information we are easily guided into
trying to best ﬁt the data with that speciﬁc kind of function.41 In this case, what happens
is the ampliative reasoning from data to phenomenal description is informed by additional
theoretical assumptions about the kind of system under examination.
Examples such as these are ubiquitous in science. Overwhelmingly, when a scientist
makes the ampliative move of abstracting from raw data to a model that attributes the
well speciﬁed interrelations of a phenomena, she appeals to a host of theoretical as well as
empirical background assumptions. The point of this section and the chapter as a whole is
not to impugn such practices. To the contrary, it does not appear that science could thrive
at all without it. Instead our claim is that the process of abstraction both in extracting data
and in moving from data to phenomena is guided by a number of non-apodictic inﬂuences
independent of features directly manifested by the physical systems. In short, the thesis
41In quantum mechanics, (in part because of the Schrödinger equation) we typically go beyond just best
ﬁtting with normalized square integrable functions and whenever possible stick to even more well behaved
functional descriptions such as smooth or at least doubly diﬀerentiable functions.
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emphasized in this section is that abstraction is ampliative. Hence, in abstracting well de-
ﬁned phenomena potentially targeted by mathematical vehicles of representation, additional
assumptions (theoretical and otherwise) are inevitably presupposed, incurring a kind of epis-
temic debt. Again, the claim is not a skeptical one: healthy scientiﬁc practice likely could
not function at all without such presupposition. However, it is a mistake to trust our models
without a recognition of the epistemic debt incurred through such ampliative abstraction
procedures. In the next chapter, we shall focus on how such mistakes can occur when we
take our mathematical vehicles to be representing more than the abstraction procedure li-
censes, and we will complete our development of a generalized account successful scientiﬁc
representation designed to compensate for such potential errors.
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Chapter 2
Scientiﬁc Representation and -Fidelity
In chapter 1, we began our investigation of how mathematics can be successfully applied
to gain knowledge of the physical world. In particular, we began answering how scientists
successfully use mathematical representations to gain knowledge of physical systems. In de-
veloping this answer we argued for the following: First, we saw that scientiﬁc representations
used to successfully gain knowledge (i.e. faithful scientiﬁc representations) can face a mys-
terious ﬁdelity problem, if the mathematical vehicle fails to capture any of the properties or
interrelations exhibited by the targeted physical phenomena. We went on to argue in section
1.2 that while similarity matching is not necessary for representation, the mysterious ﬁdelity
problem may be resolved if the structure of the mathematical vehicle of representation does
present a well deﬁned abstraction of the relevant properties and interrelations of the physical
system or systems. In section 1.3, we then argued that under such an account of success-
ful scientiﬁc representation, the relevant interrelations abstracted from the physical systems
targeted are not constituted by directly observed data records, but instead the detected
phenomena. The chapter closed with the observation that, though the phenomenal patterns
abstracted from experimental data clearly count as the relevant interrelations to be captured
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by successful scientiﬁc representations, the epistemic procedure of extracting these patterns
from the experimental data is ampliative. Abstracting the phenomenal patterns that can be
well represented by the kind of mathematical representations useful to scientists is heavily
dependent on background presupposition. In other words, the process of abstracting and
then capturing phenomenal patterns useful for successful scientiﬁc inference incurs a kind of
epistemic debt that we claimed should not be ignored when interpreting the signiﬁcance of
our mathematical representations.
In this chapter we will consider a further threat facing current matching solutions to the
mysterious ﬁdelity problem, arising from the widespread use of idealization in scientiﬁc rep-
resentation. We will then complete our account of successful mathematical representation
in science by developing a generalized1 account of a class, called -faithful representations,
that may be legitimately applied to gain knowledge of physical targets. In particular, in this
chapter we will show (1) that -faithful representations are able to deal with the epistemo-
logical threat to soundness resulting from the use of both straightforward and pathological
idealizations in science, (2) that -faithful accounts of representation can be no less conﬁrmed
by examples of successful mathematical application than traditional matching accounts, and
(3) that much of the epistemic debt that was highlighted in section 1.3 as accruing dur-
ing the abstraction process can be eliminated when the success of our representations are
understood under the -ﬁdelity account.
1Note, it is consistent with this thesis both that alternative solutions to the mysterious ﬁdelity problem
exist and that accounts of representation used under such solutions need not satisfy -ﬁdelity. That is to
say, we are not claiming that the account of -faithful scientiﬁc representation argued for in this chapter is
the only possible resolution of the mysterious ﬁdelity problem posed in section 1.2.1. (Though it is diﬃcult
to imagine how such alternative accounts might function.) Rather, we argue that accounts of representation
that take advantage of some sort of matching relationship to avoid this problem as developed in section
1.2 must allow for the broader conception of matching developed below in section 2.1.2, Moreover, the
-ﬁdelity solution completed in this chapter oﬀers a general method of broadening this conception without
running into the sorts of errors that will be introduced in section 2.1.1 or highlighted in more complex cases
of universality discussed in chapter 4.
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Figure 2.1.1: Physical wooden frame with interior diagonals D1 and D2.
2.1 Idealization and Plato's Problem
2.1.1 Framing the Problem
In this section we will consider a potential problem associated with misinterpreting the
signiﬁcance of abstracted models. Speciﬁcally, we will be concerned with understanding
the role of models in cases where (a) the mathematical representation can be used to gain
knowledge about target physical systems, but (b) the properties of the abstracted model
must either fail to preserve or directly misrepresent certain relevant properties or relations
present in the actual physical systems in order to gain such knowledge. We begin with a
simple example:
A carpenter is framing a square shaped window, and wants to make sure that the interior
corners are joined at right angles. She proceeds to measure the diagonals of the interior as
in ﬁgure 2.1.1, to recover the lengths of D1 and D2. Observing that the measured values are
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Figure 2.1.2: Quadrilaterals A and B with congruent side lengths.
equivalent, she now knows that the interior corners have been joined at right angles.2 How
does she know this?
An apparent justiﬁcation of this knowledge can be given with a matching account of
mathematical representation of the sort discussed in section 1.2. She ﬁrst models the interior
edges of the frame as a geometric ﬁgure in a two dimensional Euclidean plane. Since she
cut all four frame pieces to the same dimensions, she matches this (relevant) property by
requiring that that all four edges of her abstract geometric model have congruent side lengths
(i.e. the model is a rhombus). She can now make use of the following elementary theorem
of Euclidean geometry:
Theorem 2.1. (Congruent Diagonals Theorem) Let X be any rhombus, then the diag-
onals of X are congruent if and only if all of X's interior angles are right angles.
The congruent diagonals theorem allows our carpenter to distinguish whether her geo-
metric model representing the wooden frame is like object A or object B in ﬁgure 2.1.2.
2This diagonals measuring technique is an actual practice well recognized in cabinetry and framing as
more reliable (and convenient) than direct angle measurement.
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Object A has congruent diagonals so according to the theorem, it must have only right
angles. It is a square. Object B on the other hand has diagonals that are not congruent.
Hence, its angles cannot be right, and it is a mere rhombus. The reasoning behind our car-
penter's conclusion that the physical frame has right angles now works as follows: Because
the wooden frame has congruent diagonals, she matches this (relevant) property in the ab-
stract geometric model representing the frame, requiring it to also have congruent diagonals.
So by the congruent diagonals theorem, she can make the mathematical deduction that the
geometric model must also have right angles. Matching this (relevant) right angles property
of her geometric model with the angle measure properties of the wooden frame it represents,
she concludes that the actual wooden frame also has interior angles that are right.
This justiﬁcation, much like the Königsberg bridge example of section 1.2.3 above has
a lot of intuitive appeal. The justiﬁcation appears only to rely on matching unequivocally
relevant properties of the physical wooden frame with the abstract geometric model. The
reasoning schema is straightforward: First, develop a mathematical model that matches the
relevant properties exhibited by the physical target. Then, use these matched properties
in the mathematical model to deduce further properties that the mathematical model must
exhibit. Last, determine which physical properties would be needed to match the newly
deduced mathematical properties, and conclude that the physical system must also have
these properties. The reasoning is diagrammed in ﬁgure 2.1.3. This C-shaped inference
schema is typical of many matching accounts found in the literature.3
The problem with this inference schema is that the matching inferences (diagrammed
by the horizontal arrows) frequently fail. That is to say, the relevant properties of the
3See e.g. (Bueno & Colyvan, 2011, 4) or (Hughes, 1997, 2) and their respective IDI and DDI schemas.
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Figure 2.1.3: C-shaped inference schema found in matching accounts of scientiﬁc represen-
tation.
mathematical model do not match the relevant properties of the concrete physical system. The
properties don't actually match. This mismatching problem is evident even in our simple
carpentry example. In order to draw the conclusion of the congruent diagonals theorem the
mathematical ﬁgure must not only have congruent diagonals, it must be a rhombus. Rhombi
are necessarily bounded by four edges that are all perfectly straight and perfectly congruent
to one another.4 So, in order for the above elaborated mathematical deduction to be sound,
we invoked a mathematical model with perfectly straight and congruent edges. On the other
hand, these very properties of the mathematical model were supposed to match up with the
corresponding physical properties abstracted from the actual wooden frame.
The problem is that in order to make a sound mathematical deduction scientists fre-
quently appear to match mathematical models meeting very speciﬁc constraints with phys-
ical systems that fail to exhibit such properties. The messy properties of the physical
4Theorem 2.1 of course generalizes for non-rhombus parallelograms, which need not have four congruent
edges. However, their opposing edges must still be perfectly congruent.
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system are matched with the more ideal properties imposed on the mathematical model. In
deference to his classic attention to the mismatch between mathematical structures and the
world of experience, we will refer to this epistemological challenge to soundness resulting from
relevant properties of a represented physical system not meeting the idealized constraints of
a mathematical model as Plato's problem.
The failure of physical systems to meet the precisely deﬁned constraints imposed on their
mathematical models is almost ubiquitous in science. Of course, if a property (or relation)
is irrelevant to deductions made using the representation, it is unproblematic when such
properties of the physical system fail to be recovered in the model.5 Mismatching becomes a
problem, however, when the very properties that are used in the mathematical deduction step
of the C-shaped inference pattern are not or cannot be matched by the physical system. In
such cases, matching accounts are faced with a dilemma: either the mathematical deduction
is unsound, or the matching inferences cannot apply to the actual physical targets. Plato's
problem poses an epistemological challenge that must be met by any account of faithful
(knowledge enabling) scientiﬁc representation that relies on some sort of matching solution
to the mysterious ﬁdelity problem. Unfortunately, accounts in the literature appealing to
matching solutions are uniformly ill equipped to deal with this challenge.6
5E.g., in the Königsberg bridge example of section 1.2.3, it was irrelevant how wide each of the seven
bridges were, so it did not matter that such information was not captured in the abstract bridge structure
depicted in ﬁgure 1.2.2.
6Pincock observes that what he calls matching models (models with properties that do match up with
those of an individual physical target) may be related to the idealized models (called equation models) used
for drawing mathematical inferences, by means of an acceptable mathematical transformation, where [a]
mathematical transformation will be acceptable when it is consistent with the goals of the scientists in terms
of scale and accuracy (Pincock, 2007b, p963). However, he does not oﬀer any method of evaluating the
epistemological legitimacy of such transformations or an account of why a transformation may (or may not)
be trusted as staying consistent with such desiderata. Bueno & Colyvan (2011) develop an elaborate account
of what they describe as partial isomorphisms which preserve some but not all of the relevant constraints
potentially matched with the physical target, but then fail to oﬀer any account of why the mismatched
relevant properties may be legitimately used at the stage of mathematical deduction to gain knowledge of
the actual target. (Cf. further critiques found in (Batterman, 2010).)
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One reason for the dearth of acceptable solutions has to do with the concept of `idealiza-
tion.'7 There is a strong temptation, especially in cases such as our above simple carpentry
example, to dismiss the dilemma and ignore minor mismatching as cases of simple idealiza-
tion. While in some cases, as the below solution of section 2.3 will elaborate, idealization can
be invoked in such an exculpatory fashion, Plato's problem reveals a very direct epistemo-
logical threat. As we shall see in section 2.3 this threat becomes especially vivid in examples
that we will refer to as pathological idealizations in which a representation uses constraints
on a particular mathematical model to gain knowledge of a physical system that either (I)
cannot possibly be realized by any physical system or (II) render the mathematical model
incompatible with the deﬁning constraints of the theory under which the model is invoked.
Our solution to Plato's problem presented below in section 2.2.1 is aimed not only at re-
solving the often overlooked epistemological deﬁciency of matching accounts resulting from
minor idealizations (as in our carpentry example) but more importantly those deﬁciencies
involved in the abundant use of such pathological idealizations in the mathematical sciences.
2.1.2 Scope and Structure
In order to develop our solution to Plato's problem presented below, in this section we will
take a look at precisely what kind of properties may ostensibly be matched in general
mathematical representations. An apparent candidate would be something like the relevant
properties of the target being represented, where relevance is cashed out in terms of the
intrinsic features of the system of interest to the representing agent(s) (e.g. the physicist).
Matching the intrinsic properties of the target to the internal relations of a mathematical
7The concept `idealization' like the concept `representation' suﬀers from a signiﬁcant lack of univocal
usage. In the present context we invoke the term `idealization' broadly to include alternative concepts such
as `approximation' that are also occasionally (though again not univocally) employed to indicate a kind of
legitimate mismatching of mathematical models with physical targets in scientiﬁc representation.
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model can be useful when the model itself has rich internal structure. However, in some cases,
the internal relations of the target and the corresponding model are not the only features of
interest. That is to say, the internal structure of an object is not the only structure to be
tracked.
To bring out this distinction, let us consider Pincock's example of counting apples on a
table. He describes in this example the process of assigning natural numbers (in order) to
the respective apples. When there are no further apples to which we can assign a further
number, the apples are counted and the last assigned number tells us how many apples are
on the table:
What is going on here? A natural thing to say is that there is a mapping of a speciﬁc
kind from the apples on the table to an initial segment of the natural numbers. This
mapping is called an isomorphism. Brieﬂy, an isomorphism is a mapping that preserves
cardinality and structure. Now, when I count the apples I am determining that there
is an isomorphism from the apples to the natural numbers starting with 1. We can
capture, then, the kind of external relation that is required by talking of mappings and
their properties. Here we have a statement of the form `There are n F s' coming out true
just in case there is an isomorphism from the F s to an initial segment of the natural
numbers ending with n. (Pincock, 2004, pp145-6)
Pincock describes his appeal to isomorphic matching in mathematical representation as the
structuralist approach.8 The relevant structure of internal relations of the apple system
(e.g. how one apple relates to an other) bear an external relationship to some mathematical
system. The external relationship is given by the existence of a mapping relationship, an
isomorphism from the apples on the table onto a particular (ordered) initial subset of the
natural numbers.
As discussed in section 1.2.2 above, establishing an isomorphism from physical apples
8Structuralism in mathematical representation is not to be confused with structural realism. The latter
pertains to a kind of ontological position one might take with regard to mathematics, whereas the former
pertains to applying mathematics and does not take a position on the ontological status of the mathematics
being applied.
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on the table to natural number sub-sequences constituted a kind of category error. The
speciﬁc apples on the table and their structure is not (yet) well deﬁned. It was argued there
that, instead of mapping concrete physical systems or components of the physical systems,
we must abstract the relevant and stable properties from the physical system(s) or system
type(s) in question. In this counting example, it appears that the relevant stable structure
preserved by a Pincock isomorphism (ϕn) is constituted by the non-identity relations that
obtain between the various apples on the table. That is to say, a non-identity relation obtains
between any two distinct apples that are on the table. Other properties or relations that hold
of apples on the table (such as which one is the largest apple, which ones are ripe, etc.) are
ignored as irrelevant to the structure preserved by ϕn. So, an abstraction of a given batch
of apples may be constituted by a set of non-identical apple tokens, one for each distinct
apple on the table. Such an abstract apple-batch set represents the domain of a particular
Pincock isomorphism ϕn.9 This abstracted apple-batch structure is matched through a ϕn
with a well deﬁned (and structured) initial subset of the natural numbers.
Pincock is correct that such a bijective (i.e. one-to-one and onto) mapping from the
batch of distinct apples (or at least an abstraction of their mutual distinction) to initial sub-
sequences of the natural numbers preserves the cardinality of the domain once we move to
the range. That is to say, such a bijection exists if and only if the domain (the abstraction of
the apples) has the same cardinality as the range (members of an initial subset of the natural
numbers). Hence, since the largest member of such initial sequences speciﬁes the cardinality
of the segments, this largest number must also specify the cardinality abstracted from the
apple system in question. If all we are concerned with is assigning diﬀerent numbers to
9Note, Pincock's construction does not actually specify a single isomorphism ϕ in the above long quote
but a multitude of isomorphisms ϕ1, ϕ2, ... where the range of each distinct mapping ϕn is the initial sequence
of natural numbers ending with n and the domains of the respective isomorphisms are constituted by batches
of n distinct apples (or as we have argued, abstractions of these respective batches).
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diﬀerent amounts of apples, then a mere bijection between abstractions of the apple systems
and initial sequences of diﬀerent cardinality does the trick. However, when we say, for
example, that there are 8 apples on this table or there are 4 apples on that table, such
an application of numerals typically is intended to entail more than the mere fact that the
number, 8, assigned to the ﬁrst batch of apples is not identical to the number, 4, assigned to
the latter batch. There is usually more structure implied when we count batches of apples.
Each of the ϕn bijections establish that there are n F s on the table on what van
Fraassen refers to as a merely nominal scale: It assigns numerical labels to diﬀerent sets of
F s without implying any algebraic structure (van Fraassen, 2008, p116). An example of
such a (merely) nominal assignment is the numbering of players on a sports team. A baseball
player with the number 8 is not so labeled because he is twice as good in some respect
when compared to a player with the number 4, nor does it suggest that the player with the
lower number is better (or worse) than a player with a higher number. The numbers are
simply assigned to provide a nominal distinction.
In contrast, when we make such claims about the number of apples on tables we typically
are making claims that do imply further facts: A table with 8 apples has more apples than
the table with 4 apples; in fact, the former has twice as many apples as the latter; both sets
of apples can be divided into two equal groups whereas a table with 9 apples cannot be, etc.
It is arguable that the structure preserved in Pincock's original counting example (con-
trary to our above reconstruction) is not merely nominal, but also establishes an ordering
among various batches of apples. After all, there do exist well deﬁned orderings on the ﬁnite
cardinal numbers. What kind of relationship would such an ordering mean with respect to
sets of apples? It would be a set of relations that exist not between diﬀerent apples on a ta-
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Figure 2.1.4: The mapping ϕ4 from an abstract batch of four apples onto the set {1, 2, 3, 4}.
ble, but between diﬀerent potential batches of apples.10 For instance, it would establish that
our table with 4 apples bears a certain relationship (a fewer than relationship) to the table
with 8 apples. But recall, the isomorphism that Pincock identiﬁes is not a mapping from
the set of sets of potential apple-batches (or their abstractions) to a structured set of initial
subsets of the natural numbers as in ﬁgure 2.1.5. Rather, it was a mapping from apples in
a batch (or better yet their abstraction) to numbers in an initial segment as in ﬁgure 2.1.4.
The members in set A of ﬁgure 2.1.5 are abstractions of entire batches of apples, and the
members in set B are initial subsets of the natural numbers. The Pincock isomorphisms ϕn
do not preserve the structure that exists between members of set A by mapping those mem-
bers (in an ordered preserving way) to the members of the set B. The scope of the structure
10The concept `potential' used here is quite broad. It includes actual and physically possible batches of
apples. However, it may also include apple systems that are, in some sense, not physically possible. For
example, if there is a ﬁnite amount of matter-energy in the universe, then according to any modern physical
theory with a law of conservation of matter-energy, there is an upper limit N on the number of apples
that could exist in our universe. Despite this fact, in some cases it may be epistemologically legitimate to
draw ampliative inferences (based on relationships between apple systems with less than N apples) that, for
example, a batch of 4 apples bears other relationships to systems with more than N apples, even if the latter
system is (in some sense) physically impossible. Ultimately, an answer to what counts as a potential or
possible system will be dependent on the ampliative inferences involved in abstracting this kind of extrinsic
structure.
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Figure 2.1.5: A mapping Φ from the set A of abstract apple-batch sets onto the set B of
initial subsets of the natural numbers.
preserved by Pincock isomorphisms is too narrow. The bijection ϕ4 maps elements from a
single member of A (i.e. the abstraction of a table with 4 apples) to a particular subset of
the natural numbers (i.e. the ordered set {1, 2, 3, 4}). But such an isomorphism can only
preserve the intrinsic relations abstracted from the apples on the table, the intrinsic struc-
ture. If we want to preserve (and then make use of) facts about how the number 4 relates
to the number 8, we must preserve extrinsic structure too. The structured domain of the
mapping must include not just relations between the 4 apples on the table but, for example,
how those apples relate to a potential table with 8 apples. If we want to be able to imply
something about the order relations that may also obtain between a batch of 4 apples and
a batch of 8 apples, we must expand the scope of the domain and structure preserved by the
mapping. The internal structure abstracted from a particular batch of apples is not the only
thing that can be preserved. If we want to help ourselves to the rich algebraic and ordering
relations that can be imposed on the natural numbers (or isomorphically equivalent sets like
B),11 the mapping appealed to must preserve not merely the (intrinsic) relations that exist
11Note, the set B is not technically the set of natural numbers N. However, it is trivial to deﬁne a desired
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among the individual apples on the table, but the extrinsic relations that the batch on the
table has with respect to other potential apple batches.
By preserving an abstraction of these external relationships that exist between diﬀerent
potential apple-batches, like a batch of 4 apples and a batch of 8, a mapping like Φ depicted
in ﬁgure 2.1.5 preserves more than the fact that the ﬁrst batch has a diﬀerent amount
than the second. It allows us to take advantage of a number of the other interrelations
in the algebraic and ordering structure of the natural numbers. This means that a large
scope structure preserving map like Φ, which takes into account the external relationships to
other apple batches, allows us to gain knowledge that would not be justiﬁed by the Pincock
isomorphisms. Unlike before, when this larger scope structure is preserved, claims like there
are 4 apples on the table can now be used to conclude that if we eat half the apples there will
be 2 left, because, in particular, the relevant extrinsic apple-batch relations were preserved
in the algebraic relationship 4− 4
2
= 2.
The point generalizes: representation with well deﬁned, structured mathematical systems
allows us to formalize physical relations as a rich network of relationships that exist among
the members of the mathematical systems. But if the knowledge we wish to gain from these
mathematical representations is going to hinge on this rich structure, then an account of
mathematical representation that appeals to relationship preserving matching techniques
like (isomorphic or homomorphic mappings) can error if the scope of the representational
target's preserved structure is too narrow. In the Pincock example, we may want to count
apples on the table to draw a number of conclusions, but many (perhaps most) of the
conclusions we would like to draw when we note that there are 4 apples on the table do
algebraic and ordering structure of the natural numbers on a set like B that would enable the existence of
an isomorphism between the two. We hence proceed under the assumption that B is so structured.
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not require merely matching the number 4 with an abstraction of the apples on the table.
They require matching a whole host of numbers (e.g. all the natural numbers) with a host
of potential apple-batches, one of which happens to be instantiated by the actual batch on
our table. It is only by enlarging the scope of the representation's target to include not only
the apples on the table but their external relationships to other apple systems that such a
(matching dependent) representation can hope to accomplish the epistemic goals we expect.
As we shall see, such scope enlargement, especially when it comes to preserving extrinsic
similarity relationships in the form, for example, of topological and metric relations in
the mathematical structure of a vehicle of representation, will be vital to resolving Plato's
problem in order to legitimize the use of idealizations.
2.1.3 Close Enough for Carpentry
We saw in section 2.1.1 that Plato's problem arises for strict matching accounts of mathemat-
ical representation whenever the mathematical models used to draw conclusions about the
physical system fail to precisely match features of the physical system relevant to the math-
ematical deduction. The problem, exempliﬁed by our carpentry example, was that some of
the mathematical model's conditions that were essential to the deduction are not met by the
actual wooden frame that the model was supposed to represent. Such a matching account
faces the following dilemma: either the deduction is not sound (the mathematical conditions
are not actually satisﬁed by our model) or the model does not apply to our physical target (it
cannot be used to gain knowledge about the system in which we are interested). Since such
mismatching between model and physical system is nearly ubiquitous in the mathematical
sciences (more the rule than the exception), this dilemma poses a signiﬁcant epistemological
deﬁciency for such matching based accounts of mathematical representation or application.
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Though the signiﬁcance of this dilemma should not be overlooked, there is a compelling
temptation to insist that Plato's problem is only a problem if we take our matching ex-
pectations too seriously. Recall, an alleged mismatching observed in section 2.1.1 was that
the edges of the wooden frame were not perfectly congruent and hence could not match
the perfect congruency properties of a geometric ﬁgure like a rhombus. In response to this
observation it is diﬃcult to deny that despite this lack of perfect matching the wooden
frame can be made to come close to being congruent. This temptation to rely on closeness is
the key to resolving Plato's problem. The challenge facing a matching account of represen-
tation is to build a way of keeping track of relevant closeness into our matching inferences
and, when appropriate, to avoid drawing conclusions about a physical target that can only
succeed in the case of perfect matches.
The primary step in resolving Plato's problem is ﬁnding a way to keep track of close but
imperfect matches between the models used for a mathematical deduction and the actual
physical systems about which we wish to gain knowledge. In section 2.1.2 we saw that when
the matching relationship is prescribed too narrowly (e.g. between a single model and an
abstraction of a individual physical system), we lose the ability to draw all of the mathemat-
ical deductions that might be made to gain knowledge about the physical target. Instead, it
was argued that in some cases we should expand the scope of such matching relationships,
matching not just individual physical system abstractions with individual mathematical ob-
jects or elements (i.e. individual models), but abstractions of the physical system and all of
the extrinsic relationships it potentially bears to other relevant physical systems with a set
or space of models. If we move to this kind of larger scope matching then we have the ability
to gain knowledge entailed not just by a matching of internal relations that are preserved
when we move from individual system to individual model.
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Our solution to Plato's problem relies in particular on keeping track of external closeness
or similarity relationships that exist, on the one hand, between actual physical systems
and physically idealized versions of those systems, and, on the other hand, between perfectly
matched mathematical models and the kind of idealized mathematical models frequently
employed in mathematical applications.
To see how this works, let us return to our carpentry example. According to our story, the
carpenter cut each of the wood pieces by the same method, and so after joining the interior
edges of the frame our carpenter concluded that they should be of equivalent length.
However, even with the best carpentry techniques, it is not certain that the lengths of
the interior edges of the wooden frame must be exactly the same length. Hence, it was
suggested that modeling the frame with a rhombus with four perfectly congruent sides may
have involved a mismatching. Instead of modeling the frame with a ﬁgure that has four
perfectly congruent sides of length equal to exactly S, the frame might be less mismatched
if it were modeled by some quadrilateral with edges of side lengths that are close to S.
For every ﬁxed δ ∈ [0, 1) and S ∈ R, let us consider the set Vδ,S of quadrilaterals with
congruent diagonals of measure D1 = D2 = S
√
2. The four side lengths of a member in
Vδ,S are determined by multiplying the original side length S by a factor (1 + δi) where
δi ∈ (−δ, δ) for i = 0, 1, 2, 3 (see ﬁgure 2.1.6). For suﬃciently small δ ≥ 0, the members of
a set Vδ,S will all have side lengths that are close to congruent (diﬀering from one another
in measure by at most 2δS) and close to the idealized case in which δi = 0 for all four
sides. For ﬁxed S, each choice of δ determines a well deﬁned closeness neighborhood Vδ,S
of models that are δ-close to the idealized model with congruent diagonals and ﬁxed side
lengths of exactly S, and the smaller δ gets, the closer the members in the neighborhood are
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Figure 2.1.6: A member of the set Vδ,S with congruent diagonals of measure S
√
2 and δi ∈
(−δ, δ) for i = 0, 1, 2, 3.
guaranteed to having the perfect congruency property found in the idealized model.
What happens if our representation keeps track of these extrinsic relationships between
diﬀerent models in such spaces of quadrilaterals? In particular, we would like to know if we
can gain any knowledge about whether members of a suﬃciently narrow neighborhood Vδ,S
must have right interior angles. The answer is no but we can make them come close. More
precisely, let i := |θi − pi2 | for each of the interior angles θi of a given δ-close quadrilateral
in Vδ,S, then it follows from the law of cosines12 that i ≤ piδ(δ+2)2(1−δ)2 for all four angles. So, if we
want a model with angles that diﬀer from pi
2
by no more than , then there is a neighborhood
12For i ≡ 0, 1, 2, 3 (mod 4) and δi ∈ (−δ, δ), then from the law of cosines we get:
cos(θi) = f(δi, δi−1) :=
δ2i + δ
2
i−1 + 2(δi + δi−1)
2(1 + δi)(1 + δi−1)
.










∣∣δ2i ∣∣+ ∣∣δ2i−1∣∣+ 2 |δi|+ 2 |δi−1|
(1− |δi|)(1− |δi|) ≤
piδ (δ + 2)
2(1− δ)2 .
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of models δ-close to the square with side-length S (i.e. the set of models Vδ,S), whose angles
are guaranteed to be that close or better.
This -δ-relationship gives rigorous support to the above mentioned temptation to re-
spond to Plato's problem by pointing out that though the model does not precisely match
the wooden frame, it is close enough. What the above analysis demonstrates (in a sense) is
how close close enough actually should be. If we want our angles to be less than a certain
number of radians from pi
2
all we have to do is make sure that the variation from congruency
of the edge lengths is no worse than a certain δ. As long as our wooden frame is well matched
with some member of Vδ,S the above analysis ensures that the angles of our wooden frame
must be  = piδ(δ+2)
2(1−δ)2 close to being right (or better).
13 Hence, though we cannot use our
geometric representation to guarantee that the interior edges of our wooden frame have been
joined at exactly right angles, by taking advantage of the -δ-relationship, we can still gain
knowledge related to this claim. By using a representation that keeps track of the extrinsic
δ-neighborhood structure we can gain knowledge that the angles are -close to being right.
2.2 Solving Plato's Problem
2.2.1 -Faithful Representation
The idealized rhombus representation from section 2.1.1 matched in isolation runs afoul of
Plato's problem. The soundness dilemma generated by this problem prohibits gaining the
13The reader may be bothered by the constraint imposed on membership into Vδ,S that D1 = D2 = S
√
2.
After all it is as suspect to assume that the diagonals are congruent as it is to claim that the sides are
congruent. For the purpose of simplicity, we left out this constraint, but it is not diﬃcult to verify by a
calculation similar to the one used in note 12 that if we instead considered sets of the form V̂δ,S such that
not only were the side lengths Si = S(1 + δi) perturbed by suitably small δi ∈ (−δ, δ) for i = 0, 1, 2, 3, but
also the diagonal lengths Dj = S
√
2(1 + δ̂j) where δ̂i ∈ (−δ, δ) for j = 1, 2 then the upper bound on each
error term i increases by at most 50%. That is to say, the interior angles of each member in such a V̂δ,S
diﬀer from pi2 by no more than
3
2 · piδ(δ+2)2(1−δ)2 .
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knowledge that the wooden frame has right angles and is hence not epistemically faithful.
However, we saw in section 2.1.3 that if we use a larger scope representation, matching our
actual wooden frame and its extrinsic relationships to other potential physical frames with
the δ-neighborhood structure encoded through membership in the various Vδ,S sets, we could
deduce the knowledge that our wooden frame has right angles up to an -error.
Let us call representations that enable knowledge of a target up to a speciﬁed margin of
error (epistemically) -faithful representations. As in the carpentry example, -faithful sci-
entiﬁc representation occurs whenever it is possible to deduce the knowledge that a physical
target is -close to having certain well deﬁned properties. To be precises, let S be some
structured set of mathematical models such that the structure on S and the properties of
the elements of S match certain relevant extrinsic and intrinsic relations that might be ab-
stracted from a potential physical target system type. For example, in the carpentry case, S
might be the set of all Euclidean quadrilaterals with congruent diagonals.14 Let a structured
mathematical space P be referred to as a property space of S if there exists a P-property
mapping ϕ : S → P such that ϕ is a homomorphism with respect to a given subset of the
total set of relations (i.e. the structure) deﬁned on S. In other words, this subset of relations
is preserved by ϕ in the structure deﬁned on P.15
Observe, property mappings are not necessarily surjective. That is to say, there may be
elements in P that do not exist in ϕ[S].16 If part of the structure deﬁned on a given property
14As discussed in note 13, S could have been broadened so as to weaken the congruent diagonals constraint.
15Note, unlike the homomorphic mappings from physical systems to mathematical systems, property
mappings do not run into van Fraassen's category error challenge of section 1.2.2 because S is a structured
set of mathematical elements, already abstracted from some physical target or targets. Hence, both the
domain S and the range P are well deﬁned structured sets.
16For example, let S be the set of all ﬁnite subsets of (ruler and compass) constructable vertices in R2
and let P be the space of real numbers R with all of the algebraic relations and structure entailed by those
relations. We can deﬁne one possible P-property mapping ϕ such that for a given s ∈ S, ϕ(s) is the distance
between the farthest two vertices of s. Since all vertices in s must be constructible points in R2, it is
provable that the image ϕ[S] consists of only elements in the ﬁeld of constructable real numbers. Hence, the
non-constructable number 3
√
2 /∈ ϕ[S] even though it is clearly a real number and hence in P.
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space P includes a topological structure τP (or, of course, any richer structure entailing the
existence of a topological structure, such as a metric structure), then we can speak rigorously
of closeness relationships of members of P in terms of these topological relations.17 Hence,
if P is a property space of a space of models S with topology τP, given some property
p ∈ P, for any model s ∈ S we may rigorously state how close s is to having property p by
looking at which of the neighborhoods of p (i.e. the topological elements (p) ∈ τP such that
p ∈ (p)) contain the ϕ-image of s in the property space (i.e. which (p) contain the element
ϕ(s) ∈ P). For every neighborhood (p) such that ϕ(s) ∈ (p) we may say that s is -close
to having property p (with respect to the P-property mapping ϕ and topology τP).18 In such
cases, we may also say that model s has property p up to an -error.
The paradigm of -ﬁdelity uses what will be called δ to  deductions. Such deductions
occur whenever it can be shown that a model that is δ-close to having a particular prop-
erty p must be -close to having some further property q. More precisely, let ϕ : S → P
and ψ : S → Q be property mappings from the space of mathematical models S to the
respective property spaces P with a topology τP and Q with a topology τQ (see ﬁgure
2.2.1). Given the neighborhoods δ(p) ⊂ P and (q) ⊂ Q we may deduce that a model
s ∈ S is δ-close to having property p only if it is -close to having property q whenever
ϕ−1 [δ(p) ∩ ϕ[S]] ⊂ ψ−1 [(q) ∩ ψ[S]] as in ﬁgure 2.2.1. If in addition to this mathematical
entailment, it is possible to determine by epistemologically legitimate abstraction methods
that a given physical target is well matched to some model that is δ-close to having property
17There may, of course, exist more than one topological structure deﬁned on a given property space P. In
such cases, there exist multiple modes of rigorously speaking of closeness relations with respect to properties
in P so the relevant topology in use must be speciﬁed.
18Though the particular property mapping and topology on the property space is necessary for a well
deﬁned claim of -closeness, when these are evident from the context without ambiguity, we will continue to
leave these speciﬁcations implicit.
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   -1[(p)  [S]]         -1[(q)  [S]]  
Figure 2.2.1: Diagram of δ to  deduction: any model in the set ϕ−1 [δ(p) ∩ ϕ[S]] of math-
ematical models in S homomorphically embedded by ϕ into the neighborhood δ(p) of point
p ∈ P is also in the set ψ−1 [(q) ∩ ψ[S]] of models embedded by ψ into the neighborhood (q)
of q ∈ Q.
p, then it will be epistemologically sound to deduce that the physical target is -close to
having property q. Hence, the representation is -faithful.
This is precisely the form of deduction that was used on our carpentry example in section
2.1.3. In that example, both the P space and the Q space may be given by the ordered ﬁeld of
real numbers R.19 For the property space P we want the property assignment of an element
ϕ(s) ∈ P to a quadrilateral s ∈ S to tell us the maximum diﬀerence between the side-lengths
of s and the ﬁxed value S. Hence we may deﬁne the P-property homomorphism ϕ as follows:
ϕ : s 7→ arg max
Si
|Si − S|
19Observe, the respective property spaces may be constituted by isomorphic, homomorphic, or (as in
this case) identical mathematical spaces. What distinguishes the properties that they keep track of is their
respective property homomorphisms.
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where the Si values range through the side lengths of the quadrilateral s ∈ S. On the
other hand, for the Q space we want the property assignment of an element ψ(s) ∈ Q to a
quadrilateral s ∈ S to tell us the maximum diﬀerence between the angle measurements of s
and the ﬁxed value pi
2
. Hence we may deﬁne the Q-property homomorphism ψ as follows:





where the θi values range through the interior angle measures of the quadrilateral s ∈ S.
Using the additive and ordering structures of the property spaces P and Q we also have
a natural metric (and corresponding topological) structure deﬁned on the respective spaces.
Given these explicit speciﬁcations a model s ∈ S can be deﬁned as δ-close to having the
property S ∈ P, whenever ϕ(s) ∈ δ(S) := (S− δ, S + δ). Hence, a set Vδ,S from section 2.1.3
is identical to the set of models in S that get mapped to some point in the neighborhood
(S − δ, S + δ), i.e. Vδ,S = ϕ−1 [(S − δ, S + δ) ∩ ϕ[S]]. Similarly, a model s ∈ S can now be
deﬁned as -close to having the property pi
2







By deducing the inequality  ≤ piδ(δ+2)
2(1−δ)2 in section 2.1.3 from law of cosines constraint
imposed on all of our (Euclidean) models in S,20 we were therefore able to take advantage
of the respective metric structures preserved in the respective property spaces to conclude




+ ) ∩ ψ[S]] on the
models in S. Hence, this representation counts as -faithful, providing knowledge that a
wooden physical target must be -close to having right angles, whenever the carpenter can
20The reader may note that obeying the Euclidean geometry constraint of satisfying the law of cosines
perfectly is as guilty of expecting perfect matching as the constraint of perfect congruence. As with our
relaxation of the (perfectly) congruent diagonals constraint imposed on S (see note 13 above), this constraint
can be relaxed to allow for δ-imprecision as well. That is to say, we may allow that the models (merely) be
almost Euclidean, satisfying the law of cosines only up to some order of δ. As in note 13, such a relaxation,
though expanding membership in our new space of abstracted models S′, ultimately allows for the deduction
of a similar inequality.
79
2.2. SOLVING PLATO'S PROBLEM
gain the knowledge that the wooden frame is well matched to some δ-close model s ∈ S.
Unlike the precise case, however, gaining knowledge that the carpenter's frame is δ-close in
this way is far more epistemologically tractable that than her gaining the precise knowledge
required of matching accounts that are more narrow in scope.
It follows immediately that (perfectly) faithful representations also count as -faithful
representations. If we can precisely gain knowledge about a physical target by using a
perfectly matched epistemically faithful representation, then such further knowledge is true
up to any -error, including no error. In this sense, an epistemically faithful representation is
trivially an -faithful representations since the -error can be reduced to nothing. Though
faithful representations are necessarily -faithful, not all -faithful representations must be
(strictly) faithful. While (like the narrow scope representation of section 2.1.1) our larger
scope representation of section 2.1.3 is not an epistemically faithful representation, it does
count as an epistemically -faithful representation, because it can be used to gain further
knowledge of the physical target within a suﬃciently small  margin of error.
Deductions from δ-closeness to -closeness to establish -ﬁdelity are especially robust when
there exists the kind of -δ deductive continuity demonstrated in the carpentry solution. To
be precise, -δ deductive continuity is said to exists with respect to a particular Q-property,
q, if for every suﬃciently small -error with respect to q, there exists some δ-neighborhood
in the topology of P such that all such δ-close models must be at least -close to q. The
existence of a δ to  deduction establishing the -ﬁdelity of a representation does not entail
the existence of deductive continuity. It may be that a representation is -faithful only for
deductions concerning certain ﬁxed -errors. However, the existence of such continuity can
be far more epistemically robust, enabling not only knowledge about target systems for a
particular suﬃciently small error margin, but also establishing a range of potential margins
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and the corresponding δ-neighborhoods that the physical system must meet in order to
remain within the respective -error margins. Moreover, as we shall observe in section 2.3,
such deductive continuity enables knowledge of a kind of limiting behavior about how
narrowing the δ-neighborhoods forces the Q-properties of such δ-close models to approach
the property q ∈ Q.
An important point that will become relevant in section 2.3 is that δ to  deductions
establishing -ﬁdelity as we have deﬁned them do not require the existence of a model
s ∈ S such that ϕ(s) = p and ψ(s) = q. Though the selection of speciﬁc points p and
q play an essential role in anchoring the respective senses of δ and  closeness in their
respective P and Q property spaces, it is not necessary that any mathematical model of a
representation actually satisfy these anchor properties (even in cases of deductive continuity).
In the following, given a δ to  deduction we will refer to the set ϕ−1[p] ∩ ψ−1[q] ⊂ S as the
set of anchor models of the deduction.21
This language allows us to render precise the temptation (raised at the close of section
2.1.1) to refer to the mismatching of the rhombus with perfectly congruent sides and our
physical target as an innocuous idealization. The idealization works because the idealized
model was an anchor model of the δ to  deduction developed in section 2.1.3. In fact,
this anchor model was used to establish anchor properties for which we could establish -
δ deductive continuity. Hence, the role of this idealization as an anchor model is not only
legitimate, but quite epistemologically robust in establishing the -ﬁdelity of our (wide scope)
representation.
It is our proposal that many (if not most) successful (i.e. knowledge generating) ap-
plications of idealized properties or models can be shown to be successful because of the
21Again, since property mappings need not be surjective, it is possible that ψ−1[q] = ∅, or ϕ−1[p] = ∅.
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existence of some -faithful representation, taking advantage of (wide scope) extrinsic close-
ness relationships. The plausibility of this proposal is supported by the fact that most
scientiﬁc knowledge predicted by making use of a mathematical representation is only ever
conﬁrmed up to some suitably small degree of accuracy. For example, if our carpenter wanted
to conﬁrm directly whether or not the angles of her wooden frame were actually right, she
could always do so by direct measurement with a well calibrated woodworking protractor.
However, even the best protractor can only be used to reliably measure the angle of a joint
up to a certain degree of precision. Hence, even the most precise tools only ever conﬁrm the
knowledge gained by using a congruent diagonals type deduction up to a certain () margin
of error.
This is not unique to carpentry. All scientiﬁc observations are ultimately bounded by
some level of precision beyond which our instruments cannot measure. If a given math-
ematical representation is used to gain some further knowledge about targeted physical
phenomena, this new knowledge can only ever be conﬁrmed up to this precision level. That
is to say, for a suﬃciently small margin of error  below the precision level of our measuring
devices, knowledge gained through an -faithful representation is no less conﬁrmed by direct
observation than a perfectly faithful representation. Unlike the latter case however, the
-ﬁdelity means this representation enables knowledge without running into the soundness
dilemma generated by Plato's problem.
2.2.2 -Fidelity and Experimentation
The practical constraints of our instrumentation are not limited to the imprecision of con-
ﬁrming knowledge gained by mathematical representation (the  end). They also inﬂuence
the degree of precision available in determining the initially matched properties attributed
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to a physical phenomenon (the δ end). Again, in the carpentry example Plato's problem
did not result so much from the fact that we knew that the interior edges of the physical
wooden frame were not congruent. Rather, we could not be reasonably conﬁdent that they
were at every level of precision.22 Even if our carpenter were to measure each side with
her most reliable measuring tape multiple times, she could not not conﬁrm that the lengths
are perfectly congruent at any scale of precision. What she can determine with reasonable
conﬁdence (from suitable measurement techniques and devices) is that the four edges of her
wooden frame are congruent (of measure S) up to an error of δ. That is to say, she can
reasonably detect through measurement that the wooden frame has the kind of abstract,
stable, phenomenal properties well matched with some member of Vδ,S.
Of course, the practical constraints of measurement precision prevent her from deter-
mining the particular member of Vδ,S to which the stable properties abstracted from her
wooden frame are perfectly matched. However, one of the key beneﬁts of the kind of δ to 
deduction used to establish -ﬁdelity is that knowing the particular member is not required.
All we need in order to make use of the deductions for such an -faithful representation is
the ability to detect that it is well matched with some member, even if we cannot determine
which member in particular.
This is one example of how understanding the -ﬁdelity of a representation helps to
eliminate some of the epistemic debt incurred in abstraction processes. One of the sources
discussed in section 1.3 was that in extracting and aggregating the data from the physical
22Note, the claim being made is in no way a claim of scientiﬁc anti-realism or skepticism. The claim here
merely pertains to the practical constraint that our measuring devices do not provide unlimited precision.
While a motivation for developing an account of -faithful representation is that we cannot assume unlim-
ited precision to justify knowledge gained (in part) through mathematical representation, a philosopher of
science can consistently make a claim about the (abductive?) theoretical justiﬁcation for the existence of
an unobservable entity (e.g. a photon) while still recognizing that certain knowledge about the phenomenal
properties of the entity are justiﬁed only up to some -error.
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system our measurement procedures are subject to experimental noise. Imagine we wish to
determine the value X of a measurable property of a physical system, or system type. We
have a procedure for coming up with measurement valuesXi but due to the noise, these values
are not always identical. If the eﬀects of noise sources meet certain conditions such as being
independent, accumulating linearly, and having symmetrical inﬂuence, then the average value
of such noise sources should converge to nothing with repeated measurements. That is to say,




will likely approach the obfuscated value X. Averaging such repeated measurements is one
simple example of how we might use data to detect a stable phenomenal property. Though
it may not be true that X¯(n) = X for any particular ﬁnite number of measurements n, for
large enough n the variation of the potential X¯(n) results decreases with order 1
n
, which in
turn allows us to increase our conﬁdence that our actual X¯(n) result is δ-close to the value
X. Our conﬁdence that the aggregated value X¯(n) is close to X can be made as large as as
we like by taking a suﬃciently large number of measurements.
To be clear, because we cannot completely rule out the possibility of certain (very unlikely)
outlier possibilities we cannot say that the value |X¯(n)−X| necessarily goes to 0. However,
we can say our conﬁdence that they are close can be made arbitrarily large (i.e. for any
δˆ > 0, the probability P (|X¯(n)−X| > δˆ)→ 0 as 1
n
→ 0).23 Note also that the relationship
between the 1
n
values and the δˆ values here is (somewhat) analogous to the type of -δ
continuity relationship discussed above, where the 1
n
values play the condition or δ role,
and the probability measurable sets associated with the δˆ values play the error or  role.
The idea is that, if with enough measurements (i.e. small enough 1
n
) we suﬃciently increase
our conﬁdence that |X¯(n) − X| < δˆ, then we can now justiﬁably use our conﬁdence that
23This is the weak version of the law of large numbers.
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X¯(n) is within a δˆ-neighborhood of X to potentially draw new conclusions about the system
up to an -error.
In contrast, requiring a perfect matching between a model with a precise value of X¯(n)
and the physical system (which ex hypothesi has a value of X) in order to make a deduction
is epistemologically highly suspect. That is to say, we can only have a vanishing small
conﬁdence that |X¯(n)−X| = 0 exactly even with an arbitrarily large number n of repeated
measurements. In the case of -ﬁdelity, however, when our conclusion only requires some
level of δ-closeness in matching between the model with a value of X¯(n) and a physical
system (in order to deduce some further fact about the system within an  margin of error),
then given enough measurements we can be very conﬁdent that the physical system is well
matched to our model or one of its δ-close neighbors. Hence, by accommodating for the
δ-imprecision in our measurement and then detection of the stable phenomenal properties,
we are able to attribute to a system (or system type) an -faithful representation that can
eliminate some of the epistemic debt incurred at the measurement and detection stage of
abstraction.
2.2.3 Putting the  in Subtle Transition
Our account of -ﬁdelity can also be used to resolve some of the representational diﬃculties
that occur when diﬀerent theoretical presuppositions (epistemic debts) come into conﬂict.
Recall, according to thermodynamics, the stable (phenomenal) relationship between state
variables (like pressure and volume) exhibits non-analyticities during phase transitions. This
results in kinks or discontinuities in functions in these variables (see e.g. ﬁgure 1.3.1). In the
theoretical context of thermodynamics the data is ﬁt piecewise to allow for this non-analytic
behavior at the phase transition boundaries. In contrast, in statistical mechanics of systems
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with a ﬁnite number of degrees of freedom (e.g. ﬁnite number of particles) it is not possible
to recover such non-analytic relationships between the thermodynamic state variables like
pressure, temperature and volume. In statistical mechanics, as in thermodynamics, variables
like these are identiﬁed with partial derivatives of a free energy function. However, unlike
thermodynamics, in statistical mechanics free energy (F ) is calculated with the following
following equation:
F = −kT · log (Z) ,
where k is Boltzmann's constant, T is temperature and, Z is the partition function calculated







where H(c) is the energy of the system in conﬁguration c.
The diﬃculty is that in statistical mechanics the partition function of a system with a
ﬁnite number (N <∞) of degrees of freedom can only have a ﬁnite number of conﬁgurations
c. So the partition function is calculated by taking ﬁnite sums of positive exponentials.
Hence, for ﬁnite systems, the partition function, the free energy function, and any partial
derivatives of these functions must be analytic.24 The mathematical fact that ﬁnite system
models of statistical mechanics cannot exhibit non-analyticities has led physicists such as
Leo Kadanoﬀ to make seemingly strange sounding claims like [s]ince phase transitions only
happen in an inﬁnite system, we cannot say that any phase transitions actually occur in
the ﬁnite objects that appear in our world (Kadanoﬀ, 2009, p10).25 He goes on to explain
24See e.g. (Liu, 1999) for nice technical elaboration of this piece of the argument. See also (Callender,
2001, Batterman, 2002).
25See also (Kadanoﬀ, 2000, p238).
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that [n]ature gives us no pure thermodynamic phases but only real objects displaying their
own complex and messy behavior. Kadanoﬀ's ostensible argument for the claim is as
follows: According to statistical mechanics, the non-analyticities precisely deﬁning pure
thermodynamic phase boundaries cannot be modeled in ﬁnite systems. Precisely deﬁned
phase boundaries are necessary for the existence of phase transitions. Therefore, according
to statistical mechanics, no pure thermodynamic phase boundaries exist through which
systems can transition.
Since statistical mechanics is supposed to be our more fundamental thermal theory,
Kadanoﬀ presumably draws his unqualiﬁed claim (about the non-existence of (pure) ther-
modynamic phases in our world) from this conclusion. The speciﬁcation that he is actu-
ally only denying the existence of pure thermodynamic phases takes some of the sting out
Kadanoﬀ's claim: Finite ice cubes can still melt according to statistical mechanics and solid
ice is still quite distinguishable from liquid water (in most thermal states). What Kadanoﬀ
is actually arguing for is that the precise phase boundaries, occurring in the regions of ther-
modynamic state space where non-analytic kinks and discontinuities are identiﬁed, cannot
be pinpointed with ﬁnite models of statistical mechanics. The transitions are more subtle.
Part of the diﬃculty with this example has to do with the fact that conﬂicting theoretical
presuppositions can inﬂuence how we abstract the phenomenal relationships from the data.26
As already emphasized, in thermodynamics this can be done piecewise where the pieces
need not be joined analytically. The relevant state relationships can hence be matched to
thermodynamic models with pure phases meeting at discrete boundaries. In the context of
ﬁnite system statistical mechanics, this sort of relationship is not available. What is available
are subtle transitions characterized by very steep (but continuous) changes in state variables
26Cf. Bangu's discussion on this topic in (Bangu, 2009).
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or very rapid (but unkinked) changes in their slope, etc. These kinds of behavior are similar
in some respects to the discrete behavior modeled in the thermodynamic cases, but they are
not identical.
If we want to exactly match a statistical mechanics model to the discretely bounded phe-
nomenal behavior that we might abstract in the thermodynamic context, then only inﬁnite
N statistical mechanics models will work. If we give up such an exact matching require-
ment, then given the right kind of -closeness (see section 2.3.2 below), it may be possible to
ﬁnd statistical mechanics models that fall within the appropriate neighborhoods of models
that do have the (mathematical properties) of models exhibiting what Kadanoﬀ calls pure
thermodynamic phase boundaries but which need only a ﬁnite number of degrees of freedom
themselves. If such -neighborhoods can be identiﬁed, then despite Kadanoﬀ's point we may
use -faithful representations to gain knowledge of systems with their own complex and
messy behavior whenever they are suitably (δ) close in the right way to crisply behaved but
idealized anchor models. This will allow us to use mathematical representations to under-
stand and gain knowledge of even the messy systems with their subtle (and never actually
discrete) phase transitions.
In the next section we will take a closer look at how this can be done even when the
idealized model is forced to meet certain unrealistic constraints like having an inﬁnite par-
ticle number, but, before closing this section, it is worth observing how such an -faithful
representation of phase transitions discharges another kind of the epistemic debt incurred
through the abstraction process. As we have mentioned, abstracting from data like that of
ﬁgure 1.3.2 depends on theoretical presupposition: if it is thermodynamics, we can choose
from the space of functions with non-analyticities, whereas with (ﬁnite) statistical mechanics
perhaps only analytic functions should be allowed. Once we shift our attention to the wider
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context matching of -faithful representation, these restrictions can be relaxed (i.e. the space
of abstracted models S may include models of both types). We might use an idealized an-
chor model with determinate kinks or discontinuities indicating in our model the boundaries
of pure thermodynamic phases. However, in the case of -faithful representation such an
idealized anchor model need not be directly matched to the physical target in every (or any)
respect.
It is the physical target and its extrinsic relationships to other potential physical systems
that is matched by the closeness relations characterizing the appropriate topological prox-
imity to this ideal system. Again, while in this sense the ideal system anchors the relevant
neighborhoods that are (- or δ-)close to it, we need not take an epistemic position about
the particular neighboring member to which it is best matched. Hence, we need not take on
the epistemic debt of insisting that phenomenal relationships can only be extracted from the
data in the form of analytic or non-analytic functions exclusively. The δ-neighborhoods may
include both analytic and non-analytic models. So as long as they are δ-close to the anchor
model in a way that lets us know that they must be -close to the anchor property (of the
idealized anchor model, if it exists), the debt of such further theoretical presupposition can
be avoided.27
27The example of note 20 in which we considered admitting non-Euclidean quadrilaterals into our space
and then restricted our δ neighborhoods to include only models with a suﬃciently small (order δ) deviation
from the law of cosines is another example of this. Such a move discharges the theoretical presupposition
that physical objects (even on earth) must obey the geometric relations of Euclidean geometry perfectly.
Such a representation may hence avoid the epistemic debt possibly incurred by committing exclusively to
Newtonian presuppositions over more relativistic ones.
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2.3 -Fidelity and Proximity to Pathology
In section 2.2.1 we developed our account of -faithful representation, explaining how such
representations simultaneously resolve both the mysterious ﬁdelity problem and Plato's prob-
lem by making use of δ to  deductions that can accommodate the experimental imprecision
and ampliative presuppositions inevitable in the abstraction of scientiﬁc phenomena. In
outlining how an -faithful representation of ﬁnite thermal systems might be used to under-
stand or gain knowledge about the ﬁrst-order phase transitions of such systems we proposed
possibly letting models with an inﬁnite number of degrees of freedom serve as the anchor
models for our δ to  deductions. In this section we will now consider what happens when
such pathological idealizations play the function of anchor models, where a model counts
as pathological whenever it meets constraints that either (I) cannot possibly be matched by
any physical system or (II) render the mathematical model incompatible with the deﬁning
constraints of the relevant physical theory. This investigation will complete our account of
-faithful representation, demonstrating that, as with non-pathological idealizations, appro-
priately using only proximity to a pathological anchor models avoids the epistemological
complications of matching the idealized model while continuing to enable the advantages
argued for above.
2.3.1 Limits and Anchor Properties
To motivate the arguments of the remainder of this chapter, in this section we will consider
a toy example based on the famous halving a square challenge from Plato's Meno. Imagine
that there exists a ﬁctitious substance called rationallium with the following properties:
Rationallium consists of discrete cube shaped atoms with side lengths of exactly 1unit.
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Imagine now that Plato asks us to consider pairs of square shaped stacks of rationallium
atoms exactly 1 rationallium atom deep, and stacked n atoms wide and tall for some n ∈ N+.
The challenge is to ﬁnd a particular pair of these square shaped rationallium stacks such
that the volume of the larger stack is exactly twice the volume of the smaller stack.
Observe that though our challenge is similar to the one posed to the servant from the
Meno (in that for both challenges we are looking for square shaped constructions with
a ratio of 2 to 1), the original challenge was an exercise in mathematical deduction. In
contrast, our challenge is one of mathematical application to the physical (albeit ﬁctitious)
rationallium systems. The subtlety of this diﬀerence between the two challenges is made
clear by the fact that unlike the Meno case (which, so the story goes, is solvable even by
agents with no mathematical training), our challenge has no solution. It is impossible to
construct two such square shaped stacks out of pure rationallium with a volume ratio of
exactly 2 to 1.
The essential reason why the mathematical application challenge fails where the pure
mathematics challenge succeeds follows from the irrationality of the number
√
2. Recall, the
solution in the case of the Meno is to quarter the larger square and then construct the
smaller square from the diagonals of the quarters (see ﬁgure 2.3.1). So if the side length of
the larger square is 8 then the diagonal lengths of its quarters (and so the side lengths of the
smaller square) must be 4
√
2. Though allegedly mystifying to the ancient Pythagoreans, such
an abstract mathematical construction of a ﬁgure with side length 4
√
2 is entirely possible.
In contrast, the physical construction of square shaped stack of rationallium is not
possible because rationallium only comes in ﬁxed discrete units. For example, in ﬁgure 2.3.2
we have a 1 × 8 × 8 conﬁguration for a total of exactly 64 atoms. So in order to construct
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Figure 2.3.2: Failed attempt to ﬁt enough
rationallium within a 4
√
2 × 4√2 square
region suggested by the original solution.
a conﬁguration of exactly half the size, we need our smaller square conﬁguration to consist
of exactly 32 atoms. The problem, however, is that the square root of 32 is the irrational
number 4
√
2. The arithmetic generalizes for any 1 × n × n model of our square shaped
rationallium stacks. If the smaller square has dimensions 1×m×m, then the integers n and




2. But this is an impossible task.
There are no rationallium atoms of irrational width. Since the numbers n and m must be
integers n
m
cannot be an irrational number. So, in contrast to the mathematical construction,
it is impossible to construct a conﬁguration of complete rationallium atoms with a ratio of
exactly 2 to 1.
Though the above deduction is valid, there is a trick that we might attempt in order to
meet the rationallium challenge. Noting that the decimal expansion of the
√
2 = 1.41421...,
we might construct a sequence, denoted by ((ai, bi))i∈N, of pairs of square shaped rational-
lium stacks such that the larger square has the dimensions 1×ai×ai and the smaller square
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has dimensions 1 × bi × bi where ai := 2 · 10i and bi :=
⌊
10i · √2⌋ for each i ∈ N (i.e. the
sequence ((ai, bi))i∈N is given by (2, 1), (20, 14), (200, 141), ...). If we look at this sequence






of the larger side lengths to
the smaller ones comes arbitrarily close to the number
√
2. In other words, in the limit as
i→∞ we have that the ratios of the lengths ai
bi








Such analysis might be taken to suggest the rather bizarre claim that if we were to make
both of the squares `inﬁnitely large' in a particular way we could get a pair of rationallium
stacks with a volume ratio of exactly 2 to 1! Even if we did think that such a limit pair
met Plato's challenge in a sense, there is something very pathological about this solution:
Beyond practical issues of getting our hands on the requisite inﬁnite amounts of time, space,
and rationallium, though the above mathematical analysis of the limiting behavior is sound,
the limit system consisting of two rationallium conﬁgurations of inﬁnite side length is not
well deﬁned.
Though we must conclude that no ﬁnite pairs of rationallium conﬁgurations can have a
ratio of exactly 2 to 1, the convergence to
√
2 of the ratios ai
bi
does enable further knowledge
about ﬁnite pairs of rationallium stacks. We cannot meet the rationallium challenge exactly,
but if we broaden our focus to look for conﬁgurations with a ratio of nearly 2 to 1, we can
ﬁnd pairs that come arbitrarily close to having the right ratio. If we make our pairs large
enough, our error in meeting Plato's rationallium challenge, though never vanishing, can be





of the corresponding suﬃciently
large pairs of rationallium stacks can be said to cluster in the neighborhood of 2 to 1 even
though none of them will ever meet the condition exactly.28
28This is an example of the kind of case described by Norton (2012) in which there exists an approximation
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Our account of -faithful representation developed in section 2.2.1 allows us to understand
how taking limits enable knowledge even in cases that the model is pathological or even non-
existent in S. Our space S of models, denoted by ordered pairs of positive natural numbers
(n,m), consists of pairs of square shaped rationallium stacks with dimensions 1 × n × n
and 1 × m × m respectively. The property space P will be given by the interval [−1, 1]
equipped with the overlapping interval topology. Our P-property homomorphism ϕ can
then be deﬁned by sending the elements (ai, bi) deﬁned above to the point 1i+1 ∈ [−1, 1],
and sending all other (n,m) pairs to the point −1.29 The overlapping interval topology on
this property space in particular allows us identify the neighborhoods δ(0) := (−δ, δ) around
the point 0 ∈ [−1, 1]. Next, we want our property space Q to indicate the volume ratio of
elements in S. So identifying this property space with the real numbers R equipped with
the natural topology, an appropriate Q-property homomorphism ψ can then be deﬁned by
the operation ψ : (n,m) 7→ ( n
m
)2. The limit discussed above can now be stated in terms the
resulting (continuous) -δ deductions: for every -error (viz every neighborhood (2− , 2 + )
around the exact value of 2 in the volume ratios property space Q), there exists some δ-
neighborhood such that all models in S that are δ-close to 0 must be -close to having a
volume ratio of 2. Hence, for any value , if we want a pair of rationallium atoms with a
ratio of 2, up to that -error, we know that there are pairs of rationallium squares (ai, bi)
that come that close or closer.
Observe, despite the existence of this convergence relationship, and the knowledge we
can gain from such an -faithful representation, there does not exist any anchor model s ∈ S
but (because there is no limit system) it fails to count as an idealization.
29Note, because all we are really interested in for this example is tracking how far along an element (ai, bi)
is in the sequence, if it is in the sequence, numerous other formulations would also suﬃce as a P property
space and its corresponding property homomorphism.
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such that ϕ(s) = 0 and ψ(s) = 2.30 Such an anchor model would constitute the kind of
limit system of rationallium stacks of inﬁnite side lengths ruled out above. Nevertheless,
as emphasized at the close of section 2.2.1, despite the absence of such an anchor model,
the existence of the δ to  deductions alone enables the knowledge gained by our (-faithful)
representation.
This observation will become highly relevant to our discussion in the remainder of this
chapter. The reason for this is that our analysis of the δ to  deductions about phase
transition phenomena will involve anchor models that qualify as pathological idealizations.
Though we may be able to abstract a model space S containing appropriate anchor models,
exhibiting what Kadanoﬀ refers to as pure phase transitions, because they are forced to
meet constraints such as having an inﬁnite number of degrees of freedom, arguments can be
made for why they could not possibly be matched with any physical system.
The moral of this section is that such arguments do not matter for -ﬁdelity. Even if
such anchor models only exist as (merely) inductive extrapolations of intrinsic and extrinsic
relations possessed by actual (ﬁnite) physical systems, as we saw in this section, the exis-
tence of an anchor model in our space of abstract models S is not required for us to gain
knowledge using -faithful representations. When understood primarily as exhibits of the
anchor properties that are in fact essential for our δ to  deductions, anchor models can
be illustrative even when pathological. However, as our rationallium example demonstrates,
-ﬁdelity can be established even when no anchor model exists. Hence, including a particu-
lar anchor model in S at the (ampliative) abstraction stage is not strictly necessary for the
epistemic gains made though -ﬁdelity.31
30The technical reason for this is that the sequences (ai)i∈N and (bi)i∈N both become arbitrarily large as
i→∞, entailing that lim
i→∞
(ai, bi) does not converge to an element in N2 and hence is not in S.
31This is yet another example of how -ﬁdelity allows us to eliminate some of the epistemic debt possibly
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2.3.2 Closeness in Context
Non-trivially -faithful representations do not enable perfectly precise knowledge of a physical
target. Instead these representations enable us to infer that the system (or system type) must
be close to having a particular property. So, it is important, in any case of non-trivial -
ﬁdelity that we understand the physical relevance of the particular kind of closeness invoked.
In our carpentry example the relevant kind of -closeness took advantage of the natural
topology of the real numbers. Angle measurements attributed to physical wood joints are
given real number values. Moreover, (to the degree of precision we can observe) the more
similar the angles of two physical joints, the closer our angle measurements are numerically
(i.e. in the topology of the real numbers). In other words, (at least at observable scales)
the topological structure of the real numbers nicely keeps track of these physical similarities
abstracted from wooden joints. For this reason the topological structure of the real numbers
is appropriate for the -closeness in our carpentry example. The chosen topology on the
property space Q keeps track of the kind of closeness in physical properties that we want to
know about. A very similar story exists for identifying the δ-closeness used in our carpentry
example. Because the topological structure of the real numbers similarly keeps track of
closeness in the length of wood beams, the neighborhood relations embedded in the real
number topology was appropriate for the sense of δ-closeness used in the example.
To illustrate the importance of employing a property space equipped with a topology
that appropriately tracks the sense of closeness in physical properties we wish to know about,
let us return to our discussion of -faithful representations of ﬁrst-order phase transitions
from section 2.2.3. Recall, the only way to recover what Kadanoﬀ referred to as pure
thermodynamic phases from a model in statistical mechanics (e.g. the partition function of
incurred through abstraction.
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an abstraction of a thermal system such as an Ising model) was by having an inﬁnite number
of degrees of freedom in the system. Partition functions of systems with ﬁnite degrees of
freedom are necessarily analytic, and hence cannot exhibit the non-analyticities used to
pinpoint thermodynamic phase boundaries.
The dichotomy between models that can be non-analytic (i.e. models with N = ∞ de-
grees of freedom) and those that cannot (i.e. models with N <∞) has led Robert Batterman
(2010, p18) to suggest that such necessary conditions for non-analytic behavior make it im-
possible to tell any kind of de-idealizing story that would enable one to rank idealizations in
terms of their distance from a matching model (Pincock) or from full isomorphism (Bueno
and Colyvan). Batterman is clearly correct that under the kind of narrow matching ac-
counts championed by Pincock and by Bueno and Colyvan, it does not appear possible to
develop an epistemologically coherent account for how such models may be de-idealized.32
If other closeness relationships can be included in a wide scope matching account though,
the situation can change. When the right kind of extrinsic closeness relationships are also
matched, it may be possible to use such closeness relationships to establish the -ﬁdelity of
a representation, even in cases like phase transitions where the anchor model in question
is so qualitatively distinct (in terms of its inﬁnite degrees of freedom and its non-analytic
behavior) from its -neighbors.
Let us consider Batterman's argument for why non-analytic statistical mechanics models
(i.e. ones that must have N = ∞ degrees of freedom) are not de-idealizable. One reason
is that the thermodynamic limit constitutes what Batterman calls a singular limit deﬁned
by sequences where the behavior as one approaches the limit is qualitatively diﬀerent from
the behavior one would have at the limit. The qualitative distinction between the relevant
32See note 6 above.
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N = ∞ models in statistical mechanics and the N < ∞ models is that the former can be
non-analytic whereas the latter cannot:
Finite systems with more and more particles may in some sense get `close to' the
nonanalytic behavior in the thermodynamic functions, but for ﬁnite N , the curves are
always smooth. There is no distance measure or metric saying how close an actually
smooth curve is to a nonsmooth/nonanalytic one. (Batterman, 2010, p18)
Considered out of context, this second sentence may seem problematic. After all, there are
in fact an inﬁnite number of metrics that can be deﬁned to measure how close a smooth
curve is to behaving like a non-smooth or non-analytic curve in a given compactly contained
region.33 Moreover, from each of these metrics a corresponding topology may be deﬁned to
keep track of how close a particular smooth curve comes (in that topology) to a non-analytic
curve, and these topologies may be put to good use in drawing δ to  deductions about the
kinds of (ﬁnite) models exhibiting such smooth behavior when in (topological) proximity to
a non-analytic and hence inﬁnite model.
Batterman elaborates his point about the dichotomy with these other modes of tracking
closeness in behavior in a footnote to the above long quote:
For instance, the relevant curves `look' sharper and sharper as the number of particles
increases. But `looking sharp' is not a relevant measure: For any ﬁnite N , no matter
how large, the curves are smooth and analytic, no matter how sharp they appear.
(Batterman, 2010, p18)
To understand what is going on let us consider an example of ﬁrst-order phase transitions
of ferromagnetic Ising models.34 In ﬁgure 2.3.3 we have an illustration of the magnetization
33For example, the metric structure inherited from any Lp(Ω) norm taken over the compactly contained
region Ω in the domain of the smooth curves may be used to compare any smooth curve with a non-analytic
curve that is e.g. suitably integrable or essentially bounded on Ω. If the non-analytic curve meets the
appropriate weak diﬀerentiability conditions, certain Sobolev norms may also be used to track closeness with
respect to various diﬀerential properties of interest.
34For a similar discussion of this particular example see (Kadanoﬀ, 2009, 1). Note, following Kadanoﬀ the
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Figure 2.3.3: Graph of magnetization density curves mN(h) as a function of the magnetic
ﬁeld h for systems with respectively increasing particle numbers. The absolute area enclosed
by a curve mN(h) and the discontinuous curve m∞(h), depicted in red, becomes negligible as
N →∞.
density mN := MµN as a function of the magnetic ﬁeld h for successively increasing values
of N . As the degrees of freedom N increase, the corresponding curves mN(h) appear to be
getting closer and closer to the discontinuous limit curve m∞(h) corresponding to the
case when N = ∞. In fact, we can deﬁne a precise metric quantifying how close each of
our ﬁnite curves mN(h) comes to the limit curve m∞(h) over any bounded interval Ω of h
values with the L1(Ω) norm:
graphics depicted in ﬁgure 2.3.3 should only be taken as cartoon views. Since our purpose here is (merely)
to illustrate the available notions of continuous convergence in this context, we will not present the relevant
ﬁnite-size scaling and simulation methods typically employed to generate such curve families. We will also
be ignoring issues associated with metastability and observation times. Results pertaining to convergence
in the simplest case of ﬁrst-order ferromagnetic phenomena depicted here can be found in (Fisher & Berker,
1982, Binder & Landau, 1984). For a contemporary example of the application of these techniques to more
sophisticated phase transition phenomena see e.g. (Zhou et al., 2008). See also (Landau & Binder, 2005).
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This metric can quantify the cumulative absolute diﬀerence between a curve mN(h) and
the limit curve over any such selected region Ω. Hence, the topology τL1(Ω) inherited from
the metric dL1(Ω) oﬀers at least one physically relevant deﬁnition of how close the various
magnetization curves come to behaving like the non-analytic curve as N →∞.
Moreover, there appears to exist an -δ deductive continuity relationship with respect
to τL1(Ω) neighborhoods of the inﬁnite model. Let SdN≤∞ be the space of all d-dimensional
Ising models with N ≤ ∞ degrees of freedom.35 For our space of P-properties, we will
again use the interval [−1, 1] equipped with the overlapping interval topology, and we will
deﬁne the P-property homomorphism by ϕ : sN 7→ 11+N where N is the degrees of freedom
of a given model sN ∈ SdN≤∞. For our Q-properties, we may use the space L1(Ω) of all
integrable functions deﬁned on an appropriate Ω interval and equipped with the metric
structure (dL1(Ω)) and topological structure (τL1(Ω)) induced by the L1(Ω) norm according
to the equations (2.3.1) and (2.3.2).36 Finally, the Q-property mapping ψ : sN 7→ mN(h)|Ω
sends a given model sN ∈ SdN≤∞ to its magnetization density function restricted over Ω.37
35For the purposes of our current discussion, we will ignore here the (otherwise philosophically signiﬁcant)
question of whether this space of models is a legitimate abstraction of the relevant intrinsic and extrinsic
relations detectible through observation of actual thermal systems.
36The interval Ω will signify the range of ﬁeld values h over which we wish to compare the various
magnetization curves. Though this interval can be as large (or small) as we like and made to include the
value h = 0 where an ostensible transition occurs, we keep it bounded to ensure individual integrability.
37Recall, functional dependencies such as mN (h) are found by taking the appropriate partial derivatives
of the free energy, determined in statistical mechanics through the partition function of sN .
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So one way of specifying the claim that as N →∞ the magnetization density curves mN(h)
come arbitrarily close to the non-analytic curve m∞(h) over Ω, is to say that for every
suﬃciently small -neighborhood of m∞(h) in the topology τL1(Ω) there exists a suﬃciently
large N (i.e. δ-neighborhood of 0 ∈ P) such that any model with N degrees of freedom (or
more) must be -close or closer to behaving like the model with non-analyticities. Hence,
in at least one potentially relevant sense we do have a way of saying how close an actually
smooth curve is to a nonsmooth/nonanalytic one. More importantly, given the right Ω, such
an -δ deductive continuity relationship would mean that this representation is robustly -
faithful when it comes to gaining knowledge about how suﬃciently large ﬁnite systems do
L1-approximate the genuinely discontinuous change in magnetization of m∞(h).
Batterman's point, of course, is that there are other relevant ways (topologies) with re-
spect to which no such continuous relationship can be established. In particular, let us deﬁne
the property space QAnalytic? := {yes, no} equipped with the discrete topology τAnalytic?, and
the QAnalytic? -property homomorphism ψAnalytic?, mapping all models in sN ∈ SdN≤∞ with
analytic partition functions (and so analytic magnetization density curves) to the property
yes ∈ QAnalytic? and the rest to the property no ∈ QAnalytic?. In contrast to the more ﬁne
grained topological structure of our τL1(Ω) the fact that τAnalytic? is the discrete topology on
QAnalytic? means that the only elements in SdN≤∞ that get mapped to a proper neighborhood of
a non-analytic partition function must be non-analytic themselves. Hence, the only way to
get close to a model with a discontinuous magnetization curve like m∞(h) in the τAnalytic?
sense is if you have N =∞ degrees of freedom. Also, the only inﬁnite sequences of elements
from SdN≤∞ converging with respect to τAnalytic? to an element that is non-analytic must
have only non-analytic elements after some point in the sequence. So, since ﬁnite models in
SdN≤∞ are all mapped to yes ∈ QAnalytic? no sequence of ﬁnite models can ever converge to
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a non-analytic one in the qualitative topology τAnalytic?. This is why Batterman says there is
a qualitative diﬀerence between, for example, Ising models with N < ∞ and the so-called
thermodynamic limit with N = ∞ degrees of freedom. Though a thermodynamic limit
model s∞ may count as the limit of some sequence (sN)N∈N in the sense that the sN con-
verge to s∞ with respect to some topology, they cannot converge to the thermodynamic
limit with respect to the topology τAnalytic?. That is to say, with respect to τAnalytic?, the
thermodynamic limit is not even a limit.
This kind of distinction has an analogy in our rationallium example above. In that case,
though the models in our sequence ((ai, bi))i∈N deﬁned above came close (in the Q space
topology deﬁned there) to having a volume ratio of 2 to 1, for no i <∞ was it the case that
ψ((ai, bi)) = 2. There is a qualitative distinction between failure and success in meeting the
challenge exactly. Consider the topology τ2? := {R,R\{2}, {2}, ∅} that is also well deﬁned
on R. Imagine that instead of using the property space Q deﬁned in section 2.3 which was
equipped with the natural topology on the real numbers, we had selected the property space
Q2? also consisting of the set of real numbers R, but this time equipped with the topology
τ2?. For this property space with this picky topology it is very diﬃcult to get close to
the property 2 ∈ Q2?. Using the same ψ as in section 2.3, the only way for a model s ∈ S
to be in a proper neighborhood of 2 is if ψ(s) = 2. But as we saw above, it follows from
the irrationality of
√
2 that ψ[S] ∩ {2} = ∅. The Q2? property space recognizes a qualitative
diﬀerence between models that have volume ratio of exactly 2 to 1, and those that do not,
and unrelentingly rules out every s ∈ S as not close enough.
The important point to take from this example is that even though no sequence of mod-
els in S can converge to the property 2 ∈ Q2?, there does exists a sequence of model that
converges to the property 2 in our original Q-property space. Both facts can be true simul-
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taneously, and both facts are just another way of expressing what we learned in section 2.3:
While the rationallium challenge cannot be solved exactly, we can ﬁnd pairs that come arbi-
trarily close to solving the problem (in the natural real numbers topology sense of closeness).
And though the former fact is problematic for perfectly faithful representations, the latter
makes way for knowledge gained through an -faithful representation.
The same thing is happening in the case of phase transitions. While no subset of ﬁnite
models from SdN≤∞ can get τAnalytic?-close to a model exhibiting Kadanoﬀ's pure thermo-
dynamic phases, it can also be true that suﬃciently large but ﬁnite models in SdN≤∞ get
close in other kinds of topologies such as τL1(Ω). Further, topologies like τL1(Ω) can track
physical similarity relationships in which we are interested.38 The remaining question, to
which we will turn in our ﬁnal section, is whether or not (and if so how) these topologies
can respectively enable knowledge about actual physical targets.
2.4 Concluding Remarks: Towards the Point of Patholo-
gies
The example of section 2.3.1 showed us that though anchor points in the respective property
spaces are essential to generating the kind of δ to  deductions establishing -ﬁdelity, the
presence of an anchor model in the space S is not necessary even when deductive continuity
can be established. Further, when an anchor model is admitted into our space of models,
the fact that it can be qualitatively distinguished from non-anchor models with respect
one topology imposed on a potential property space does not preclude the existence of
other property spaces equipped with other topologies that may allow for -δ continuity with
38Cf. the related point made by Butterﬁeld (2011, 3.3.2).
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respect to a certain sort of deduction. In particular, we saw that both the τL1(Ω) topology
and the τAnalytic? topology may be used on their respective property spaces to help draw
conclusions about how suﬃciently large but ﬁnite systems might behave τL1(Ω)-similarly to a
(pathologically inﬁnite) non-analytic anchor model even though they cannot possibly come
τAnalytic?-close. Hence, in contrast to what we have been calling narrow scope matching
accounts, this kind of result means that we need not worry about our anchor models being
pathological, because τL1(Ω)-proximity to a pathological anchor does not mean an actual
physical target must also be τAnalytic?-close (and hence pathologically inﬁnite according to
statistical mechanics). Two questions remain: First, is τL1(Ω)-proximity (or proximity using
another ﬁne grained topology) to a pathological model of epistemic merit when it comes
to learning about actual (ﬁnite) physical targets? And second, what role might pathological
anchor models themselves play in helping us to gain knowledge of non-pathological physical
targets?
As emphasized in section 1.3.4, our attempts to extract stable phenomenal patterns are
ultimately indebted to the kind of theoretical presuppositions we employ. No experimentalist
ever directly observes that the phenomenal magnetization relationshipm(h) is either analytic
or non-analytic. She observes is the data not the phenomena. Because there is an inevitable
gap in moving from the data to the phenomena, we must be circumspect (though not neces-
sarily skeptical) about our presuppositions. The epistemological situation is analogous to the
simple example considered in section 2.2.2 when we discussed measuring some value X under
noisy conditions. Expecting that a given abstraction is exactly captured by any particular
curve is incredibly diﬃcult to justify, even with the best equipment and unlimited time for
repeated measurements. In contrast, it is possible (with suﬃcient techniques, tools, and
repetition) to justify that an abstraction is close to a given curve if closeness is spelled out
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in the right way. So, for example, by committing to the magnetization relationship m∞(h)
up to some τL1(Ω)-neighborhood, we are able to avoid the prohibitive diﬃculty of justifying
the claim that m∞(h) is the absolutely correct phenomenal relationship for every h ∈ Ω,
while still rigorously establishing that on the whole m∞(h) is not too far oﬀ over the entire
interval Ω. It is an epistemically untenable position to insist that data gained from observ-
ing a phase transition can only ever count as evidence of a non-analytic (or an analytic)
phenomenal relationship. However, by allowing the kind of wiggle room provided by taking
advantage of a ﬁne grained topology such as τL1(Ω) we can avoid this kind of epistemically
untenable position.
Such a strategic relaxation of the epistemic commitments to a given phenomenal pat-
tern is especially salient given the pathologies associated with systems that are capable of
exhibiting pure phase transitions according to statistical mechanics. Though it is impossi-
ble to observe that a phenomenal relationship is either analytic or non-analytic, we can be
fairly conﬁdent that a boiling pot of water on the stove does not have an inﬁnite number of
molecules.39 Hence, representing phase transition behavior for such ﬁnite systems without
requiring that they meet conditions entailing that they have an inﬁnite number of degrees
of freedom is beneﬁcial. As already stated, this ability to avoid the inference that patholog-
ical constraints imposed on a particular model must be matched by a physical target is a
signiﬁcant advantage.
Given such arguments against epistemically committing to exclusively non-analytic phe-
nomenal patterns in phase transitions, we might wonder if there is any epistemological role
for such pathological models to play. The answer is yes. Chapter 4 will be devoted (in
39Note, this does not necessarily entail that a system must have a ﬁnite number of degrees of freedom, but
it is suggestive of the latter claim.
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part) to explicitly demonstrating how this can be done for the case of a particular pathology
that in chapter 3 we will argue occurs in Einstein's general theory of relativity. To get a
sense of how this will be done, we might note that though the existence of an anchor model
is not necessary in order to gain the kind of knowledge made available by -faithful repre-
sentation, such models can serve as stark paradigms of the kind of phenomenal behavior
we can expect (up to ) of non-pathological systems. Pathological anchor models do, after
all, anchor the kind of behavior that less pathological models can only () approximate.
So though pathologies preclude the possibility of these anchors being well matched to any
actual physical targets, as anchors they do (in a sense) exhibit in an unadulterated way the
kind of general patterns we might expect if we consider systems that should be well matched
with their non-pathological -neighbors.40
40As we will elaborate in chapter 4 such general patterns can be stated with more precision in terms
of the concept of universality phenomena. Batterman's admirable research on this kind of phenomena and
the sort of knowledge that may be gained from trying to understand it is the reason why he argues for the
importance of (also) appreciating the kind of qualitative distinctions in what he calls singular limits as




In his initial formulation of the general theory of relativity, Einstein's proposal that freely
falling gravitating massive bodies follow geodesic paths was submitted as an independent
fundamental principle. By adopting this geodesic principle to supply the theory's law
of motion, Einstein was immediately able to recover both the free-fall motion of bodies in
non-relativistic regimes and the previously anomalous precession of the perihelion of Mer-
cury. Over the last century numerous ostensible proofs claiming to have derived the geodesic
principle from Einstein's ﬁeld equations have been developed. As a result physicists and
philosophers of science alike frequently herald Einstein's theory for having the unique dis-
tinction of being able to derive its dynamical law of motion from its own ﬁeld equations.
In this chapter we will critically survey the multiple attempts to derive the geodesic
principle in the context of Einstein's theory. Grouping these results into three major families,
which we refer to as (1) limit operation proofs, (2) 0th-order proofs, and (3) singularity proofs,
we will argue that none of these strategies successfully demonstrates the geodesic principle,
1In the following, M will be taken to be a smooth, orientable, four-dimensional manifold, and (M, gab)
will be referred to as a Lorentzian spacetime if gab is a smooth metric of signature (+,−,−,−) deﬁned on
M. Excepting quoted material all further notational conventions follow that of (Wald, 1984).
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canonically interpreted as a dynamical law that massive bodies must actually follow geodesic
paths in Einstein's theory.
Speciﬁcally, we will argue for the following three claims: First, limit operation proofs fail
to demonstrate that massive bodies are ever guaranteed to follow geodesic paths. Second,
on the contrary 0th-order proofs demonstrate that extended massive bodies generically devi-
ate from uniformly geodesic paths. Moreover, the only potentially extended distributions of
matter and energy that fail to avoid a uniform geodesic evolution are highly unstable, devi-
ating from such motion under arbitrary perturbations of their angular momentum (or higher
order moments). Third, thanks to certain mathematical theorems concerning distribution
theory, alternative representations of massive bodies as unextended point particles must
result either in precluding the possibility of coupling the particle to the spacetime metric
in a way that is coherent with Einstein's ﬁeld equations or in having to excise the particle
(and its would-be path) from spacetime entirely. This three pronged argument reveals that
not only does the geodesic law of motion fail to be a deductive consequence of the ﬁeld
equations, but also any attempt to canonically interpret the geodesic principle in such a
way requires that either the gravitating body is not massive, its existence violates Einstein's
ﬁeld equations, or it does not exist within the spacetime manifold at all (let alone along a
geodesic).
Hence, in the context of Einstein's general theory, these results entail that models of
massive bodies following perfectly geodesic paths fall under the pathological idealizations
category discussed in chapter 2. While this is a problem for the canonical interpretation
of the geodesic principle as providing a fundamental law of motion or dynamical equation,
as we saw in section 2.3, such pathologies do not necessarily preclude using these models
to gain the kind of knowledge provided by -faithful representations. In chapter 4, we will
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directly investigate how this -ﬁdelity is possible in the face of the geodesic pathologies
identiﬁed in this chapter. Our ultimate argument will be that such models when understood
appropriately can serve a robust epistemological function in understanding the behavior of
actual massive and extended bodies that can coherently couple to the spacetime metric in
accordance with Einstein's theory in the following two ways: (1) such models can be used
in (-)approximating the paths of speciﬁc massive bodies (as with the perihelion of Mercury
conﬁrmation) whenever they meet certain relevant δ-proximity conditions on their volume
and gravitational inﬂuence, and (2) using results discussed below in section 3.4 to establish
an -δ deductive continuity relationship, we demonstrate how pathologically geodesic models
can play an important explanatory role as anchor models of classes of gravitating free-fall
bodies exhibiting a speciﬁc kind of (-)clustering conﬁrmable in nature. We shall argue that
this latter epistemological role recovers the geodesic principle in the form of a universality
thesis, where the concept of universality will be analyzed in chapter 4.
3.1 Einstein and The Canonical Account
3.1.1 Geodesic Dynamics
Einstein's adoption of the geodesic principle was originally thought to be an independent
postulate establishing the dynamics of the theory. Not long after the debut of his general
theory, however, numerous special-case results and plausibility arguments were developed
suggesting that in fact the principle was not logically independent (given certain assump-
tions about free-fall bodies) from Einstein's ﬁeld equations themselves.2 In the appendix
2Some of the earliest cited proofs and plausibility arguments include (Weyl, 1922, Eddington, 1923,
Pauli, 1921, Einstein & Grommer, 1927, Mathisson, 1937, 1940). Though (Einstein & Grommer, 1927)
has often been cited as the earliest result, the results by Eddington, Weyl, and Pauli clearly predate it.
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to the third edition of The Meaning of Relativity (1946), Einstein notes these developments
concerning what he still refers to as the law of motion as follows:
In the initial formulation of the theory the law of motion for a gravitating particle
was introduced as an independent fundamental assumption in addition to the ﬁeld law
of gravitation ... which asserts that a gravitating particle moves in a geodesic line.
This constitutes a hypothetic translation of Galileo's law of inertia to the case of the
existence of `genuine' gravitational ﬁelds. It has been shown that this law of motion -
generalized to the case of arbitrarily large gravitating masses - can be derived from the
ﬁeld-equations of empty space alone. (Einstein, 1922b, p113)
Beyond crediting the apparent redundancy of postulating the geodesic principle as an in-
dependent assumption, note that Einstein explicitly characterizes the derivation result as
pertaining not to some kind of test particle of either vanishing or arbitrarily small relative
mass, but to arbitrarily large gravitating masses. The referenced result is no doubt that of
(Einstein & Grommer, 1927) (and its successors), frequently considered a locus classicus of
early demonstrations. As we shall see in section 3.1.3, since (Einstein & Grommer, 1927) was
considered, at least by Einstein, to be a derivation of the geodesic principle, this work serves
as an invaluable guide to how he expected the principle to be interpreted. In particular,
it oﬀers signiﬁcant illumination into what Einstein came to believe was the content of his
geodesic principle.3
Lesser known variations of these results were also oﬀered in (Kopﬀ, 1923), (von Laue, 1921), and (Becquerel,
1922), which were popular as texts on the new theory at the time (see (Havas, 1989, 1993) for further
discussion of Einstein's evident oversight in recognizing this early work). Despite his comments on the
apparent redundancy of the geodesic principle (see below), Kenneﬁck (2005) has argued that Einstein was
very likely aware of the possibility of such special-case deductions prior to (Einstein & Grommer, 1927) as
evidenced by possible fragments of an unadopted manuscript for (Einstein, 1922b). Moreover, Einstein was
clearly aware of the possibility of a special-case deduction, which carries over to the general theory, from his
Entwurf predecessor to the debut of the full theory in (Einstein, 1913) (see note 14 below).
3The idea behind what Einstein and Grommer identify as their preferred result is to squeeze the bodies
into singular curves that are then excised from the spacetime entirely. At that point the source terms in the
ﬁeld equations of such a spacetime vanish, which is why in the long quote above Einstein notes that it can
be derived from the equations for empty space alone. (The bodies have been ﬁt entirely into the excised
curves making them technically outside of the manifold and so not source terms of the ﬁeld equations.) The
demonstration is supposedly completed by their argument that, if we were to replace the excised curves,
they would be geodesics of the vacuum solutions to the re-patched spacetimes (cf. (Infeld & Schild, 1949,
p410)). This vacuum-cum-singularities technique was further developed by Einstein, along with Infeld and
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With these results it seemed that general relativity diﬀered remarkably from other classi-
cal ﬁeld theories such as classical electrodynamics or Newtonian gravitation. In (Einstein &
Grommer, 1927), the authors highlight an apparent matter-ﬁeld duality found in these classi-
cal ﬁeld theories. Echoing this dichotomy Leopold Infeld and Alfred Schild later characterize
this equation duality in classical ﬁeld theories as follows:
Classical physics is dominated by a characteristic duality of ﬁeld and matter. In
Newton's theory of gravitation as well as in the Maxwell-Lorentz theory of electromag-
netism the physical laws fall naturally into two independent classes. The ﬁrst class
consists of the partial diﬀerential equations which (with suitable boundary conditions
at inﬁnity) determine the ﬁeld in terms of the distribution and motion of the matter
which generates it. The second class consists of the dynamical equations governing
the motion of matter under the forces exerted by the ﬁeld. (Infeld & Schild, 1949,
pp408-9)
They then proceed to explain how the equations of general relativity (viz Einstein's ﬁeld
equations plus the geodesic equation) ﬁt into this picture, observing that just as in cases
like classical electrodynamics, where there are two sets of equations, one set for how the
ﬁelds couple with source charges (Maxwell's equations), and another for dynamics of how
passive charged bodies behave in those ﬁelds (the Lorentz force law), so too is there a
duality corresponding to the two sets of equations in Einstein's theory. His ﬁeld equations
govern how the ﬁeld couples with the gravitational sources, while the geodesic equation
provides the law for how gravitating bodies then surf the resulting metric ﬁeld. In contrast
to other classical ﬁeld theories, however, for Einstein's theory it now seemed that the ﬁeld
equations for coupling the metric to energy-momentum sources also entailed the geodesic
equation for how free-fall massive bodies behave in a given geometric ﬁeld. Unlike with
electrodynamics and Newtonian gravitation, the dynamical equations appeared not to be
Hoﬀman, in (Einstein et al., 1938, Einstein & Infeld, 1940, 1949) as Einstein became increasingly opposed
to representations of matter by means of continuous ﬁelds (see section 3.1.3).
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logically independent.4
This duality of ﬁeld and matter and the dichotomy of their corresponding equations,
endorsed by Einstein himself, is signiﬁcant for two reasons. First, it emphasizes the ap-
parent boon for Einstein's theory: general relativity is special in comparison with other
classical theories because the dynamical equations of the theory appear to logically follow
from its own ﬁeld equations.5 Second, in order to even claim that general relativity has
such a special status among classical ﬁeld theories, one must subscribe to a key presumption
about the role of the geodesic principle active in the early decades of the theory (and still
endorsed frequently today), namely, that (analogous to the role of the Lorentz force law in
electrodynamics) the geodesic principle plays the role of providing the dynamics of material
bodies in the general theory of relativity. In the following, we shall refer to this account of the
role of the geodesic principle as providing the dynamics of general relativity as the canonical
account.
In his early comments on the geodesic principle, Einstein frequently endorses this canon-
ical account. In (Einstein, 1916) as well as his (Einstein, 1922b) lectures on the theory,
Einstein refers to the geodesic equation or the principle as the equation of motion or law
of motion over a dozen times, characterizing them in this way not only for application
4By `logical dependence' here we mean derivability, perhaps under certain conditions characterizing the
body in question. Of course dissolving the conceptually suspect bifurcation of bodies into background
charged sources, which determine the ﬁeld, and passive charged bodies that then react to the ﬁeld (without
generating self-forces) in this caricature of electrodynamic evolution leads to well known signiﬁcant compli-
cations that have (even after over a century of eﬀort) yet to be fully resolved (for an historical presentation
and philosophical discussion of this problem see e.g. (Frisch, 2005)). As we will see, similar complications
involving self-force-like eﬀects are relevant in determining the actual motion of free-fall bodies in general
relativity. The independence resulting from such a bifurcation of bodies into background sources and passive
test bodies is, nonetheless, a separate notion from the logical independence of the dynamical equations of
motion from the ﬁeld equations, which (at least according to the interpretation we are now considering)
exists in the electrodynamics case but not in the relativistic case.
5This distinction has been highlighted by philosophers such as Brown (2005, pp140-1) as well as the
physicists who worked on this problem in the early decades (e.g. (Einstein & Grommer, 1927, Infeld &
Schild, 1949)). Unlike these physicists, however, Brown astutely notes what he describes as the limited
validity of deductions establishing exact geodesic motion, a point that we will investigate in detail below.
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to particles, but also in describing planetary motion (most importantly the motion of
Mercury) and the motion of a gravitating body in general. As already indicated by the
above long quote, Einstein continued to view the geodesic principle as providing the law of
motion not only for massless test particles but also for arbitrarily large masses well after
the theory's initial introduction.
During this period, the canonical view was likewise frequently articulated by Einstein's
colleagues. It takes only a brief survey of the literature from the ﬁrst half of the 20th century
to reveal the widespread general adoption of the canonical view, with most authors taking it
for granted that the geodesic principle provided the dynamics of the theory regardless of its
logical independence from the ﬁeld equations.6 Expressions of this view were unmitigated
(and sometimes even highlighted) by the apparent redundancy of postulating the geodesic
principle as an independent assumption. This attitude is typiﬁed by the commentary of
physicists such as Lanczos, for instance, who punctuates his demonstration by noting that
his penultimate equation is equivalent to the `law of the geodesic line' which has always been
considered the natural dynamical law of general relativity (Lanczos, 1941, p818 emphasis
added). Moreover, this canonical view of the geodesic principle as providing the dynamics is
frequently cited in text books on the subject both classical (e.g. (Bergmann, 1942, pp224-5))
and contemporary (e.g. (Hobson et al., 2006, pp188-90) and even (Misner et al., 1973, pp475-
80)).7 Though our focus will be on Einstein's interpretation of the geodesic principle and its
6E.g. references to the geodesic principle as providing the dynamics or law of motion in some form or
another are evident in (Eisenhart, 1928, Eddington, 1923, Tolman, 1930, Dirac, 1938, Lanczos, 1941, Infeld &
Schild, 1949). Some authors judiciously express the view in restricted form only as pertaining to relatively
small masses or simply to mass points (e.g. (Weyl, 1922, p256) or (Bergmann, 1942, pp224-5)). As we will
see, in the former case, there was still little real justiﬁcation for such heuristic winks at suﬃcient smallness
(see sections 3.1.2 and 3.4.2 below), whereas in the latter case signiﬁcant diﬃculties abound when it comes
to representing the massive point particle that supposedly follows a geodesic within the theory (see section
3.2).
7In the case of references found in contemporary texts there should be no doubt that the authors are
well aware of gravitational multipole and self force eﬀects resulting in non-geodesic motion (see section
3.3 below). (Misner et al. (1973, p479) are notably circumspect about some of these failures and later oﬀer
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role in providing the dynamics of the theory, he was not alone in this attitude well into the
mid 20th century. It is thanks to this combination of endorsements that the account of the
geodesic principle providing the dynamics of Einstein's theory is plausibly characterized as
canonical.
3.1.2 Whither Test Particles?
If, according to what we have described as the canonical account, the geodesic principle
provides the dynamics of the general theory of relativity, we must ﬁgure out to what exactly
such a dynamical principle is supposed to pertain. Who follows geodesics? A natural answer
might be something like test bodies, the theoretical tool in the physicist tool box used
to describe how certain sources react to the ﬁeld without having to attend to the actual
eﬀects on the ﬁeld values caused by the presence of the bodies in question. In the case of
relativity theory, we might then answer that it is test bodies who follow geodesics.
While we will ultimately see that under a non-canonical interpretation something like this
answer might be endorsed (section 3.5), in the following survey of geodesic demonstrations
it will be of central importance to observe exactly why and in what manner ignoring the
source eﬀects of test bodies can be justiﬁed. That is to say, we will need to pay special
attention (i) if a gravitating object is treated as a test body because its source eﬀects
are simply left unaccounted for, or (ii) if the object is treated as a test body because its
source eﬀects can be shown to be negligible (but non-vanishing) for the relevant purposes of
the deduction. The hazards of leaving test body approximations unjustiﬁed (i.e. case (i))
become most vivid when we consider proofs of the geodesic principle. In cases where the ﬁeld
explicit instruction on calculating spin eﬀects.) Hence, such references should be taken only as evidence of
the pervasive popular endorsement of the canonical view and the fact that the eﬀect of the view's initial
adoption still lingers in contemporary conceptions of Einstein's theory.
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equations and dynamical equations are starkly separated, physicists have the luxury of an
apparent distinction: bodies whose source behavior is turned on are governed by the ﬁeld
equations, whereas the behavior of test bodies can seemingly be restricted to the purview
of the dynamical equations alone. However, if one attempts to deduce the dynamical laws
from the ﬁeld equations, this specious luxury evaporates. We are forced in the course of the
proof to simultaneously discuss the matter-energy of the ﬁeld equations as the matter-energy
that we ultimately hope to show obeys the dynamical equations. Hence, it is not even an
apparent option to treat test matter-energy as being entirely free of the ﬁeld equations as
might happen in case (i).
As we will see, under the canonical interpretation, ignoring source eﬀects of a body
(even when they are small) can often have signiﬁcant impact on the general validity of the
deductions. With his characteristically sardonic wit when discussing this subject, Jürgen
Ehlers, in collaboration with Ekkart Rudolph, emphasizes this challenge as follows:
The test body approximation is usually deﬁned by the requirement that the con-
tribution of the body to the metric gαβ be negligible. The justiﬁcation of this drastic
simpliﬁcation in any particular case is by no means trivial and is therefore rarely consid-
ered. Since, according to Einstein's (and similar) ﬁeld equations, the curvature within
a body is of the order of the density, the self curvature usually dominates or is at least
comparable to the incident or external curvature (even for a small iron ball near the
Earth's surface), and then it is wrong to take the metric within the body to be nearly
equal to the given, external one in the local mechanical law [Tαβ ;α = 0]. (Ehlers &
Rudolph, 1977, p208)8
In case (ii) above the physicist will be able to explain why the eﬀects of the test bodies are
inconsequential in a relevant and rigorous sense and may hence be justiﬁably ignored. While
the majority of attempts at geodesic demonstrations (certainly, at least, at the time of this
quote) seemed to fall under case (i), Ehlers and Rudolph here explain that a supplementary
8Ehlers and Rudolph go on to explain in a parenthetical that For this reason the mathematically elegant
argument given in (Geroch & Jang, 1975) is physically not very enlightening, in our opinion. We will return
to this point in section 3.4.1.
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justiﬁcation of these test body approximations with heuristic winks at relative smallness will
not typically suﬃce; far more work is left unfulﬁlled.
If the geodesic principle is to provide a dynamics that can be legitimately used to predict
the paths of actual bodies, we must ﬁnd a way to draw suitable inferences from how these
test particles are supposed to behave to how actual bodies behave. Unfortunately, as is well
known from the case of classical electrodynamics, paying attention to the actual ﬁeld-creating
abilities of our (in the electrodynamics case, charged) test bodies, things become increasingly
messy. Shrinking the body down to inﬁnitesimal volume results in a singular charge density,
and extending the particle still results in having to grapple with non-analytically expressible
expansions of the eﬀects that the particle's own ﬁeld has on its motion.
In the case of general relativity things are even more treacherous. As we shall see, not
only are there self-force and spin eﬀects to be grappled with, but also, in the case of general
relativity, the presence of matter-energy, whose powers as a ﬁeld source have not been artiﬁ-
cially turned oﬀ, will aﬀect the very metric that determines what counts as a geodesic. An
inﬁnite matter-energy density in general relativity is not just an aesthetically disheartening
anomaly in our representation, it often results in our inability to coherently speak about the
spacetime path where the singularity occurs. But if the metric becomes undeﬁned wherever
the source particle is located (if it can even be said to have a location), how are we supposed
to say that it is following a geodesic of that metric? On the other hand, the modeling of
extended bodies in general relativity leaves a good deal more freedom available for how the
body's matter-energy is distributed, making it diﬃcult to speak generally about representa-
tions of the bodies (especially that they universally follow geodesics). As we shall see, some
of these issues had already become manifest by the time of (Einstein & Grommer, 1927).
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3.1.3 Einstein and Grommer's Three Ways to get it Straight
In the introduction to their paper Einstein and Grommer lay out the same dichotomy in
Newton's theory of gravitation and classical electrodynamics between ﬁeld equations and
dynamical equations articulated decades later in the long quote discussed above from Infeld
and Schild. Characterizing such matter-ﬁeld dualism as disturbing to any systematic
spirit, they proceed to identify three ways [Betrachtungsweisen] in the general theory of
dealing with such duality (Einstein & Grommer, 1927, p3).9
Their ﬁrst way is modeled after Newtonian gravitation, in which the ﬁeld equations and
the geodesic equation are posited independently.10 This approach is most similar to Einstein's
initial introduction of the theory in that the ﬁeld equations and the geodesic equation are
postulated independently. Unlike his initial introduction of the theory, however, in this
method the ﬁeld equations in question are not Einstein's full ﬁeld equations:
Gab = Tab (3.1.1)
where the Einstein curvature tensor on the left hand side is deﬁned by
Gab := Rab − 1
2
gabR (3.1.2)
and the right hand side of the equation represents the ﬂow of matter-energy from any per-
9Unless noted otherwise, this and all below translations of (Einstein & Grommer, 1927) are thanks to the
gracious assistance of Bihui Li.
10This method can be thought of as being modeled after the ﬁeld theoretic accounts of Newtonian grav-
itation in the sense that there too background sources might be represented by singular points generating
a gravitational potential ﬁeld φ, where φ is a solution to Laplace's equation (i.e. Poisson's equation with
ρ = 0) with suitable boundary conditions at the singular points. This potential ﬁeld is then surfed by test
bodies satisfying the equation of motion −∇iφ = d2xdt2
i
, which of course comes from Newton's laws of motion
and gravitation. Einstein emphasizes this analogy explicitly in (Einstein & Infeld, 1949, pp209-10), his ﬁnal
collaboration with Infeld on the subject.
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spective. Instead, for their ﬁrst way they specify that the relevant ﬁeld equations are the
vacuum ﬁeld equations where equation (3.1.1) reduces to the equation:
Rab = 0 (3.1.3)
once the energy-momentum tensor ﬁeld is made to vanish everywhere. At ﬁrst blush, the
appeal to the vacuum ﬁeld equations in this account may strike the reader as somewhat
backwards. According to the dichotomy discussed above, it would seem that in this method
Einstein and Grommer are dealing with the uncomfortable distinction between test energy-
momentum and the energy-momentum sources contributing to the gravitational ﬁeld by
eliminating the sources while keeping the test bodies. But in the discussion above, it was
the energy-momentum test bodies facing conceptual complications, not the background
sources. So in their ﬁrst way it might appear that they are getting things the wrong way
round, having eliminated the source energy-momentum while retaining only the conceptually
suspect test bodies.
One way of seeing why they specify the vacuum equations in this case is to consider
why (from the perspective of 1927) Einstein might have wished to employ the two sets of
equations to generate predictions.11 In particular, we might consider how he would have
calculated the perihelion of Mercury at that time. Once the Schwarzschild solutions had
been discovered, it was possible to determine the stable geodesics of the metric and from
there calculate the perihelion of the orbit. So modeling the sun (minus all the planets) with
the Schwarzschild solution, we could apply this calculation schema to the case of a Mercurial
test body in such a background metric. But observe, the Schwarzschild solution is a vacuum
11See Einstein's comments on this strategy in (Einstein, 1995, p310).
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solution. According to our application of this model, all the matter and energy of the Sun
is to be found not in the spacetime manifold but in the singularity of the Schwarzschild
Solution located at the origin of the coordinate system. Einstein and Grommer could
consider the ﬁrst way to be a possibility even though there is literally no place for energy-
momentum sources in the manifold, because hiding the sources in the singularity works so
well in this kind of application. Einstein and Grommer's selection of the vacuum equations
in the ﬁrst way is indicative of a signiﬁcant shift in how Einstein in particular began to
prefer to represent matter-energy in his (as he saw it, not yet complete) theory. This attitude
becomes even more apparent in their response to the next method.
The problem with the ﬁrst way of course is that rather than dissolve the aforementioned
discomfort with matter-ﬁeld dualities when it comes to the general theory, it exacerbates
the dichotomy. In contrast, according to their second way, all matter-energy is represented
via a continuous and singularity-free energy-momentum tensor ﬁeld Tab. Unlike their ﬁrst
way method, this time they seem to get things the right way round when it comes to the
elimination of the potentially suspect test bodies. They keep only the source matter-energy
of the tensor Tab while eliminating all appeals to test matter-energy.
After noting that as a consequence of (3.1.1), the total divergence of the energy-momentum
tensor vanishes, without any calculation or further explanation, they make the following
claim:
If one assumes that matter is arranged along narrow world-tubes one obtains from
this by an elementary consideration the theorem that the axes of those world-tubes
are geodesic lines (in the absence of electromagnetic ﬁelds). This means: the law of
motion is a consequence of the ﬁeld law.12
It is diﬃcult to speculate which elementary consideration establishes their demonstration.
12Translation of quote from (Havas, 1989, p240).
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Though by 1927 special-case derivations of the geodesic principle from Einstein's non-vacuum
ﬁeld equations had gained substantial proliferation, in the intervening decade since the de-
but of his general theory, Einstein never published any discussion or recognition of such
(apparent) redundancy. Given his well known reputation for neglecting the literature, it is
possible (though remarkable in light of his familiarity with a number of the authors)13 that
Einstein was not even aware of the abundance of such results.14 Eddington's plausibility
result in particular would appear to be paradigmatic of Einstein and Grommer's second
way approach, but it requires signiﬁcant symmetry assumptions about the world-tubes in
question in order to establish geodesic motion. Whether they were aware of these earlier
results or simply referring to their own margin calculations, for reasons that will become
evident in section 3.3, it is diﬃcult to imagine that Einstein and Grommer's unexplicated
13See (Havas, 1989) for detailed discussions on this point.
14Einstein's decade of silence (at least in publications) on the derivability should not be taken as evidence
of his ignorance of special-case derivations. It has been recently argued by Kenneﬁck (2005) that there is
evidence that he was quite familiar with the possibility of special-case results. In particular the geodesic
motion of pressureless dust matter, which transfers to the full theory, was derived within the Entwurf theory.
The easily transferred Entwurf result in question can be understood by considering the following elementary
derivation: Suppose matter takes the form of a pressureless dust such that the energy-momentum tensor
ﬁeld can be written
T ab = ρUaU b
where the Ua have been normalized to be unit timelike. Then, if the covariant derivative of the left hand
side vanishes we have
0 = ∇a(ρUa)U b + ρUa∇aU b
but contracting with Ub annihilates the second term leaving us with
0 = ∇a(ρUa).
So plugging this back into the second equation, at spacetime events where ρ 6= 0 we can divide through by
ρ giving us that the dust matter there obeys the geodesic equation
0 = Ua∇aU b.
In a recently uncovered fragment of notes evidently intended for his (Einstein, 1922b), Einstein claims
that his ﬁeld equations already contains [sic.] the divergence equation and with it the laws of motion of
material points, suggesting that he remained aware of this kind of result during the intervening decade. It
should go without saying that success in such a pressureless dust derivation does not generalize to arbitrary
applications of the principle (nor is its application in certain cosmological models above reproach).
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second way derivations could have been terribly general, despite their tone to the contrary.
In any case, they immediately abandon this victory over the matter-ﬁeld dualism in
general relativity, rejecting such second way derivations on the grounds that the use of a
continuous energy-momentum tensor ﬁeld Tab to represent the distribution of matter-energy
throughout the manifold is suspect:
It looks as though the general theory of relativity has already overcome that annoying
dualism. This would be the case if we had already arrived at a representation of matter
through continuous ﬁelds, or if we were at least convinced that one day we will arrive
at it. But there can be no question of that happening. All attempts in the last years
to explain the elementary particles of matter through continuous ﬁelds are failures.
The suspicion that this is ultimately not the correct route to understanding material
particles has become very strong in us.
This suspicion of the energy-momentum tensor was by no means a sudden development in
Einstein's attitude. Such comments echo cautions voiced by Einstein from the very beginning
of his presentation of the general theory. He expresses wariness about such a representation
of matter-energy, for instance, in his (Einstein, 1922b) lectures as follows:
In reality, matter consists of electrically charged particles, and is to be regarded itself
as a part, in fact, the principal part, of the electromagnetic ﬁeld. It is only the circum-
stance that we have no suﬃcient knowledge of the electromagnetic ﬁeld of concentrated
charges that compels us, provisionally, to leave undetermined, in presenting the theory,
the true form of this tensor. From this point of view it is at present appropriate to
introduce a tensor, Tµν , of the second rank of as yet unknown structure, which provi-
sionally combines the energy density of the electromagnetic ﬁeld and that of ponderable
matter; we shall denote this in the following as the `energy tensor of matter'. (Einstein,
1922b, p85)15
And in his perhaps most poetic (and well known) rejection of such a continuous energy-
momentum tensor ﬁeld representation, in 1936 Einstein oﬀers the following illustration of
this attitude:
[General Relativity] is suﬃcient - as far as we know - for the representation of the
observed facts of celestial mechanics. But it is similar to a building, one wing of which
15See also his reﬂection on these hesitations in (Einstein & Rosen, 1935, note 3)
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is made of ﬁne marble (left part of the equation [(3.1.1)]), but the other wing of which
is built of low-grade wood (right side of equation [(3.1.1)]). The phenomenological
representation of matter is, in fact, only a crude substitute for a representation which
would do justice to all known properties of matter. (Einstein, 1995, p311)
Einstein's disparagement of the energy-momentum tensor as analogous to low-grade wood
has to do with its representation of matter-energy by means of the continuous tensor ﬁeld.
He describes it as a phenomenological representation because such a continuum representa-
tion is so close to the representation of matter in continuum mechanics as taking the form of
a continuous medium (as is phenomenologically apparent) rather than an atomistic or quan-
tum form.16 Einstein's resistance to the low-grade wood representation of matter-energy
particularly in the context of determining the motion of bodies was intimately tied to his
hopes for a uniﬁed theory, and the ﬁnal remark of (Einstein & Grommer, 1927) explicitly
speculates about their preferred third way methods leaving room for integration with the
quantum theory of matter.17 Though such hopes failed to come to fruition, save for a brief
wavering in 1935,18 Einstein would continue to resist the representation of matter-energy by
means of a continuous tensor ﬁeld in favor of a singularity approach for the remainder of his
life, frequently voicing his skepticism of low-grade wood approaches.19
Einstein and Grommer's third way avoids both the low-grade wood representation of
background sources with a continuous tensor ﬁeld as well as suspect appeals to test bodies.
Instead (in the absence of electromagnetism), it makes use of the vacuum ﬁeld equations
alone, attempting to hide all matter-energy along singular world-lines of the manifold. In
16Cf. (Einstein, 1922b, pp52-3)
17His early hopes (later dashed) that attending to the motion of bodies may yield insight into such
uniﬁcation have been recorded by collaborators such as Infeld (1980). For discussions see (Pais, 2005,
Howard, 1990, Earman & Eisenstaedt, 1999).
18This wavering was in response to a persistent challenge posed in his correspondence with Ludwik Sil-
berstein (see (Havas, 1993) for a detailed review of this controversy) and only lasted for a period of months
surrounding his publication of (Einstein & Rosen, 1935).
19See e.g. (Einstein et al., 1938, Einstein & Infeld, 1940, 1949)
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the conclusion they characterize their result as a (special-case) demonstration that these
singular world-lines obey the geodesic principle, stating that [i]f one understands masses
in the gravitational ﬁeld as singularities, then the law of motion is fully determined by the
ﬁeld equations.
Einstein's ultimately preferred singularity approach to the representation of matter-
energy signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced his interpretation of the geodesic principle. His adoption
(and somewhat mistaken interpretation) of the singularity method makes it clear why in his
1946 appendix to (Einstein, 1922b) he thought he could characterize the geodesic law as
applying not just to test matter-energy but to arbitrarily large bodies. By making use of
the singularity results, he believed he was free to hide as much matter-energy as he likes in
the singular world-lines, while still (ostensibly) being able to derive the geodicity of such
curves. In section 3.2 we will critically review the incoherence of such third way strategies,
particularly in attempting to show that such world-lines are geodesics.20 But for now it
is worth noting that though their introduction of the singularity method is initially charac-
terized as a representation of elementary particles, Einstein quickly shifts the auspice of his
derived principle to include large composite bodies such as Mercury as well.21 Einstein's
dynamical interpretation of the principle did not hinge on the ability to treat bodies obeying
the principle as arbitrarily small, nor did he see the proper interpretation of the dynamical
role of the principle as subject to the uncomfortable matter-ﬁeld duality found in classi-
cal electrodynamics and Newtonian gravitation. In fact, his work with Grommer strongly
20To avoid a tempting conﬂation, note that Einstein and Grommer's three ways are distinct from what
we will below (in sections 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4) classify as the three general families of deductions. Though the
method of singularity proof of section 3.2.1 uses Einstein and Grommer's third way strategy, both the
0th-order proofs and limit operation proofs of sections 3.3 and 3.4 clearly count as second way strategies
according to the Einstein and Grommer classiﬁcation, breaking any compelling analogy.
21Moreover, early post-Newtonian conﬁrmations of the two-body motion of stellar objects is often credited
back to the work in (Einstein et al., 1938) and its successors, which likewise adopts the singularity method.
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indicates that by 1927 he viewed the evident derivability of the principle by means of the
singularity method as a signiﬁcant triumph in this respect. In his view, by making use of
such singularity methods, Einstein could allow the geodesic principle to play a dynamical
role for actually massive bodies without (any longer) having to succumb to such dualism.
Unfortunately, singularity proofs, both those using Einstein's methods as well as those using
more sophisticated methods, ultimately fail to establish the geodesic principle in a way that
is compatible with his ﬁeld equations.
3.2 Singularity Proofs
The family of proofs which we will refer to as singularity proofs really consist of two distinct
subclasses. The ﬁrst subclass follows Einstein and Grommer's original third way method
in which they attempt to use true singularities in the manifold in order to represent matter-
energy. These singularities in the manifold are then (somehow) supposed to be shown to
be geodetic. With the mathematical advances in distribution theory, these true singularity
proofs were succeeded by the second subclass, which attempts to leave the metric well deﬁned
at the location of the geodesic following particles by coupling it to energy-momentum tensor
distributions. In the next two subsections, we will consider each of these in turn.
3.2.1 The Geodesic that Wasn't There
As already hinted, the most perspicuous diﬃculty with Einstein's method of deducing
the geodesic principle for particles represented as singularities in vacuum solutions is that
(strictly speaking) the supposed path of such geodesic following particles is not even in the
spacetime manifold. In (1995, p12) Earman poetically summarizes this perplexing strategy
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with the explanation that to speak of singularities in gab as geodesics of the spacetime is to
speak in oxymorons. The proponent of such a vacuum-cum-singularity technique is faced
with the rather paradoxical challenge of explaining in what sense we can say that a singular
curve (ostensibly constituted by the missing points in the manifold) is actually a geodesic of
the spacetime from which it is absent. Not only is no metric deﬁned at the singularity, but
technically there are not even any spacetime events there: The geodesic doesn't exist. By
eliminating the low-grade wood representation of matter-energy sources, Einstein dodged
the diﬃculties associated with using continuous representations of energy-momentum that
might restrict the generality of the principle (see section 3.3 below) but only at the cost of
having to justify the geodicity of a metric-less hole in spacetime.
Though Einstein and Grommer avoid elaborate consideration of this challenge, their
strategy might (brieﬂy) be characterized as follows: splitting the ﬁrst order perturbations of
the Minkowski metric in the neighborhood of the singularity into an exterior (γ(ext)αβ ) part
resulting from sources far from the singularity and an interior (γ(int)αβ ) part resulting from
the ostensible presence of the body at the singularity, they then argue that in their chosen






along coordinates of the x4-axis where they locate the singularity.22 The suggested implica-
tion then is that for a second singularity-free spacetime, whose metric is given by a γ(ext)αβ
correction to the Minkowski metric, the x4-axis (not in the domain of the ﬁrst metric) is
22Of course, technically the metric is not well deﬁned at those coordinates, but they claim to avoid this
problem by stipulating that, since γ
(ext)
αβ is generated by external sources, it should be regular in the neigh-
borhood of the singularity. The (suspect) intimation being that for this reason it can be unproblematically
extended across the coordinates of the singularity.
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a geodesic. They seemingly take for granted, however, that we must associate the singular
boundary in the former spacetime with the corresponding ﬁlled in points along the x4-axis
in the latter spacetime, perhaps due to the appearance of an embedding relationship sug-
gested by the similarity in the coordinatizations of the respective spacetimes. Unfortunately,
the claim that Einstein and Grommer's second singularity-free spacetime can tell us some-
thing about the nature of the singularity of the original spacetime is spurious. A similarity
in the coordinates used to refer to the singularity in one spacetime and the coordinates of a
second spacetime without a singularity at those coordinates is not enough to infer that the
second spacetime is a ﬁlling in of the singularity.
In an attempt to vindicate the vacuum-cum-singularity strategy, Infeld and Schild con-
cede that [c]learly, the statement that a singular line is (or is not) a geodesic has no mean-
ing(Infeld & Schild, 1949, p410).23 They proceed to argue that the geodesic principle might
nonetheless be proven by means of the vacuum-cum-singularity strategy, if it is once again
asserted that the principle is (at least) germane for a certain kind of representation of test
particles:
Physically, we can consider a sequence of particles, with masses tending to zero, and
a corresponding sequence of gravitational ﬁelds. In the limit m = 0 we obtain a
limiting world line along which the limiting gravitational ﬁeld, the background ﬁeld,
is continuous. We must think of the background ﬁeld as being assigned a priori ; the
geodesic postulate refers to the limiting world line in this continuous ﬁeld and is thus
meaningful.
Recall, Einstein claimed (as late as 1946) that the vacuum-cum-singularity method can be
used to derive the postulate for arbitrarily large masses. The move of restricting their
geodesic result only to this speciﬁc variety of test particles, which we will refer to as Infeld-
23Infeld, Einstein's long time collaborator on the motion of bodies, became one of the principle champions
of singularity methods (both the vacuum-cum-singularity method and then later the distributional method)
well after Einstein's ﬁnal contributions to the problem (Einstein et al., 1938, Einstein & Infeld, 1940, 1949,
Infeld & Schild, 1949, Infeld, 1954, 1957, Infeld & Plebanski, 1960).
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Schild or IS-particles, constitutes a strategic retreat from Einstein's position. Infeld and
Schild's derivation might hence be thought of as an attempt to embrace case (ii) considered
in section 3.1.2 by trying to justify why the eﬀects of the test body can be ignored. By
restricting their results to these IS-particle sequences of spacetimes, Infeld and Schild were
forced to limit their result to particles of arbitrarily small mass but now had the chance of
explaining why we can associate the geodicity of a curve γ of the background ﬁeld with
the character of the singularities in spacetimes with m 6= 0: The background spacetime is
a limit of the singular spacetimes, and the coordinates in each of these spacetimes demar-
cating the singularity are the same as those used to locate γ in the background spacetime.24
The limiting procedure Infeld and Schild use is fatally ﬂawed. Though there is a coordi-
nate similarity of the limit spacetime and the singular spacetimes (speciously) suggesting
an embedding relation, the singularity will exist for every one of the m 6= 0 spacetimes in the
run up to the supposed limit. For every spacetime short of the background one, the be-
havior at γ will remain undeﬁned, obscuring the sense in which the singular spacetimes are
approaching the background one. Again, there is no rigorous sense in which the singular
behavior of the sequence of spacetimes converges to a non-singular background spacetime,
making references to the limiting behavior literally nonsensical.25
Infeld and Schild's attempts to derive the geodicity of singularities in the manifold by
considering perturbations in the boundary conditions that could be taken to indicate the pres-
ence of arbitrarily small matter-energy located at the singularity ultimately failed. Though
it is possible to use surface integral techniques, integrating around the singularity to suggest
that there is (something like) matter-energy hidden so to speak at the undeﬁned (singular)
24Actually, unlike Einstein and Grommer, they attempt to use (proto-)geodesic completion methods to
covariantly specify the singular points. Such completion methods unfortunately remain insuﬃcient.
25There may not even be a pathology-free (e.g. Hausdorﬀ) way to ﬁll in the singularity (see (Geroch et al.,
1982)). See (Torretti, 1996, pp178-9) for further discussion of this fallacy.
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boundary region, there is no way of rigorously discussing what goes on at the singularity
of such vacuum solutions, and in particular, no way of inferring geodicity. Einstein and
Grommer's third way vacuum method hence turns out to be unsalvageable even with a
retreat to the arbitrarily small IS-particles.
By 1954, even Infeld had turned to a kind of compromise between the second way
appeal to a non-vanishing energy-momentum tensor ﬁeld and the third way attempts to
concentrate matter-energy onto a world-line where the metric diverges (Infeld, 1954, 1957).
In this method Einstein's low grade wood is replaced (metaphorically speaking) by a kind
of sturdier (but ultimately poisonous) pressure treated wood through the introduction of
energy-momentum tensor distributions.
3.2.2 Distributional Energy-momentum
The idea behind distribution proofs of the geodesic principle is to concentrate all the matter-
energy of a (would-be) geodesic following particle onto a one-dimensional (often timelike)
curve γ. Once this is done, the task is to deduce from Einstein's ﬁeld equations (or a
generalization of them) that γ must be a geodesic. In contrast to the singularity proofs
of the last section, proofs using distributional energy-momentum do not use the vacuum
ﬁeld equations (3.1.3) ultimately preferred by Einstein. Instead a non-vanishing energy-
momentum tensor distribution on the right side of the equation is used to represent the
particle. In a sense then, distribution proofs are similar to Einstein and Grommer's so-
called second way demonstrations in that, like those proofs, they appeal to ﬁeld equations
coupling the geometry of the manifold (via the Einstein curvature) to non-vanishing energy-
momentum sources.
Unlike second way demonstrations, however, distribution proofs do not (strictly speak-
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ing) make use of Einstein's original ﬁeld equations (3.1.1). In second way demonstrations,
the objects equated (Gab and Tab) are typically supposed to be smooth tensor ﬁelds deﬁned on
the manifold. In distributional (singularity) proofs, on the other hand, the energy-momentum
ﬁeld on the right hand side of the equation is a distributional object in some neighborhood
of γ: assuming no electromagnetic contributions in that region, its support is restricted to
a measure-zero region (i.e. the one-dimensional region γ). Yet in order to attribute non-
vanishing matter-energy to the particle, we do not want integrals of the ﬁeld in that region
to vanish. Hence, such proofs make use of an energy-momentum tensor distribution that
is deﬁned by its action on a space of well behaved (mathematical) test objects.26 The
deﬁnition of the space of tensor distributions oﬀers a natural extension of the space of lo-
cally integrable tensor ﬁelds in a way suggesting that we can integrate certain distributions
concentrated on measure-zero regions without the integral necessarily vanishing (details are
reviewed in appendix A).
In order to conduct a distributional derivation of the geodesic principle from the ﬁeld
equations of general relativity, Einstein's original equations (3.1.1) must (at least implicitly)
be modestly generalized by saying:
Gab = Tab as tensor distributions (3.2.1)
I.e. ifM is an orientable manifold, for all φab ∈ T 20 (M) with compact support:
26The use of the term `test' in the context of distribution theory is only incidentally similar to the use
of the term to refer to test bodies. The former are well behaved sets of mathematical objects on which
distributions act, the latter (as already discussed) refers to a kind of theoretical representation signifying
entities that react to physical ﬁelds but do not act as (signiﬁcant) sources of those ﬁelds. Hence, there is no











where vol can be any volume element deﬁned onM.27 Distributional proofs hence constitute
a kind of compromise between Einstein and Grommer's second and third way methods
of derivation. Equation (3.2.1) is not a vacuum equation, but rather than taking a low
grade wood approach to representing the matter-energy of the particle as a continuously
distributed ﬁeld, it (in a sense) allows us to specify the particle's four-dimensional extension
as being precisely restricted to the world-line (not tube) γ.
The earliest (implicit) use of distributional energy-momentum in the problem of motion
in a relativistic context can be read into the derivations of the geodesic principle made by
Myron Mathisson.28 Infeld did not trade in Einstein's vacuum-cum-singularity method for
distributions until decades later in his (Infeld, 1954, 1957, Infeld & Plebanski, 1960).29 Even
still Infeld (1957, p399) characterized his reluctance about such a shift by noting that though
it is technically unfaithful to Einstein's idea of not using the energy momentum tensor,
the introduction of a distributional energy-momentum tensor can be exculpated by the fact
that it tremendously simpliﬁes the entire deduction of the equations of motion.
The key to distribution proofs involves establishing a variational principle for integrals
27Since smooth tensor ﬁelds T 02 (M) are locally integrable and so have a natural embedding in the space
of tensor distributions D′02(M), using variational techniques, this relation trivially entails equations (3.1.1)
in cases where the respective ﬁelds are smooth (see appendix A).
28As we will discuss in section 3.3, Mathisson's technique involved deriving a variational principle for the
integral of an expansion (in gravitational multipole moments) of the energy-momentum tensor ﬁeld, from
which motion can then be deduced. In particular, in (1937, 1940) Mathisson casually shows that applying the
principle only to the lowest order term in the expansion (because such a tensor ﬁeld might be representative
of a spinless point particle) entails the geodesic equation. Though Mathisson does not make explicit use
of distributions in these 0th-order derivations, such an appeal can naturally be read into this technique as
was done later by Havas & Goldberg (1962). See also (Tulczyjew, 1959) for a distributional reconstruction
of Mathisson's work.
29Infeld and Mathisson were colleagues in Poland when Mathisson had been developing the work from
which his derivations follow. Infeld, who was familiar with the relevant papers, later conceded that at the
time he had not understood Mathisson's (signiﬁcantly more advanced) methods (Infeld, 1968, p204).
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of the energy-momentum tensor for which, in the special case of energy-momentum tensor
distributions concentrated on a world-line, the geodicity of the path is entailed. Speciﬁcally,





∇aξbvolg = 0 (3.2.2)
where volg is the volume element for some metric gab and
g
∇a is the derivative operator
compatible with gab. It follows from (3.2.2) that if T ab has (distributional) support restricted
to a timelike curve γ in some neighborhood around it, then γ is a geodesic of gab.30 So letting
T ab represent a point particle whose world-line is given by γ in that region of the manifold,
we might interpret the result as saying that point particles can only have a geodesic world-
lines.
Since condition (3.2.2) is suﬃcient for such a distributional representation of a point
particle to follow only geodesic world-lines, it is worth considering how such a variational
principle can be established in general relativity. Heuristically, we might ﬁrst note that
for smooth tensors, it is (in a sense) a purely mathematical consequence of the Bianchi
identities that the total divergence of the Einstein tensor deﬁned by (3.1.2) vanish (i.e. that
∇aGab = 0). Hence, Einstein's original equations (3.1.1) immediately give us that
g
∇aT ab = 0 (3.2.3)
referred to as the conservation condition, which holds for any smooth solution (M, gab, T ab) to
(3.1.1). Condition (3.2.2) follows for such smooth solutions from (3.2.3) by simply contracting
30The full proposition is given with a proof in appendix B .
131
3.2. SINGULARITY PROOFS
with arbitrary test co-vector ﬁelds ξb and then integrating over the entire manifold.31
The problem is that we want (3.2.2) to hold not just for smooth solutions to (3.1.1) but
for distributional solutions to (3.2.1) as well. And in fact, the Bianchi identities do not au-
tomatically hold for distributional Einstein tensors for every solution of the generalized ﬁeld
equations (3.2.1).32 Hence, the conservation equation (3.2.3) does not automatically follow in
the generalized case of tensor distributions. But both Mathisson's implicit distribution result
and Infeld's explicit one overlook this nuance, conﬂating the distinction between solutions
to (3.1.1) and (3.2.1) and then inferring that (3.2.3) (and so (3.2.2)) automatically follows
even for distributional sources.33
In 1974, Jean-Marie Souriau developed his own proof of the geodesic principle by mak-
ing use of distribution techniques, which again (essentially) take advantage of condition
(3.2.2). Unlike earlier attempts, however, Souriau justiﬁes the condition not through the
Bianchi identities, but by (rather ingeniously) formulating a variational method of ex-
pressing the condition that the ﬁeld equations must be generally covariant (now referred to
in the literature as Souriau's (local) covariance condition)(Souriau, 1974).34 In the case of
the generalized ﬁeld equations (3.2.1), such Souriau covariance easily reduces to condition
(3.2.2).
Though Souriau's method is able to avoid the particular invalidity of his predecessors'
31In fact, as discussed in appendix A, if the connection is smooth, the (covariant) derivative of a distri-
butional T ab is calculated precisely by negating the left side of equation (3.2.2). Hence, condition (3.2.2)
is the natural generalization of the classical conservation condition (3.2.3) and for this reason is sometimes
referred to as the generalized conservation condition.
32Most importantly, they do not automatically hold for the important class of GT-regular solutions dis-
cussed in appendix C (see (Geroch & Traschen, 1987, p1020)).
33See (Infeld, 1957, 4) and (Mathisson, 1937, 2). See also the explicitly distributional reconstruction
of Mathisson's demonstration in (Havas & Goldberg, 1962, 2). This equivocation can still occasionally be
found in introductory texts oﬀering what might be interpreted as heuristic derivations of the principle (see
e.g. (Hobson et al., 2006, pp188-9)).
34The application of Souriau's local covariance condition was further developed in both relativistic and
non-relativistic contexts in (Guillemin & Sternberg, 1978, 1990, Sternberg, 1978, 1985b,a, 1999) and (Duval
& Künzle, 1978, 1984) respectively.
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arguments, his result is faced with an even more general threat to the use of distribution
techniques in Einstein's theory. In order to understand what goes wrong, observe that
condition (3.2.2) does not just express a restriction on T ab, but rather it expresses a restriction
on the energy-momentum tensor ﬁeld (or distribution) in relation to a metric gab. Hence,
condition (3.2.2) (and Souriau's subtly more general covariance condition) deﬁne a subset of
ordered pairs of symmetric tensor ﬁelds or tensor distributions (gab, T ab) deﬁned on a manifold
M.35 Let us refer to such pairs as Souriau pairs. Of course, solutions to the generalization of
Einstein's ﬁeld equations (3.2.1) can also come in ordered pairs deﬁned onM. And Souriau's
covariance principle is supposed to establish that for any solution (gab, T ab) to (any) generally
covariant ﬁeld equations (such as (3.2.1)), (gab, T ab) will constitute a Souriau pair. So the
logic works as follows:
1. By Souriau's covariance argument, if (gab, T ab) is a solution to (any) generally covariant
ﬁeld equations (such as (3.2.1)), then the pair satisﬁes condition (3.2.2).
2. And by proposition B.2,36 if (gab, T ab) satisﬁes condition (3.2.2), and T ab is concentrated
as a distribution onto a timelike world-line, then it must be a geodesic of gab.
3. Hence, if (gab, T ab) is a solution to (3.2.1), and T ab is concentrated as a distribution
onto a timelike world-line, then it must be a geodesic of gab.
Though this argument is valid, the antecedent of line 3 renders the conclusion (essentially)
vacuous. The reason for this was ultimately demonstrated by Geroch & Traschen (1987,
35Moreover, in the context of linear distributions, gab must be non-degenerate, and (at minimum) it must




Thm. 1) in which they show that the only reasonable37 solutions gab to the equations
(3.2.2) cannot have sources (T ab) with support concentrated on a one-dimensional curve.38
Hence, there is no (reasonable) distributional solution (gab, T
ab) to Einstein's generalized ﬁeld
equations (3.2.1) such that T ab can also be concentrated onto a timelike world-line.
Geroch and Traschen's theorem hence serves as an eﬀective death nail for attempts to
deduce the geodesic principle from Einstein's ﬁeld equations by using singular models of one-
dimensional point particles. As a result we seem to be left with the following option: We
could conduct deductions from inexact (namely linearized) ﬁeld equations.39 It is possible
to deduce exact geodesic motion in this case, but not from Einstein's actual ﬁeld equations.
Alternatively, we might move to so-called second way proofs attempting to deduce geodesic
motion from Einstein's (non-vacuum) ﬁeld equations (3.1.1) using smooth energy-momentum
tensors with four-dimensional support to represent our geodesic following objects.40 In the
next two sections we will review the major strategies that have been used in such second
way deductions. As we shall see, by moving to a context of extended models of massive
bodies, much more freedom in the behavior of the object is introduced, ultimately leading to
the deduction of non-geodesic motion in generic cases. It will turn out that these additional
modes of freedom can be later reduced by appealing to certain limiting cases, but this has
the detrimental result of either bringing us back to the context of singularity proofs, or to
37Recall, according to (3.2.1) the energy-momentum tensor is equated with the Einstein curvature tensor,
and the curvature tensor in turn depends on the metric and its derivatives. Hence, the metric and its
derivatives must meet certain minimal conditions on their integrability in order for integration (i.e. the
action) of the Einstein tensor (and so the energy-momentum tensor) to make sense as a well deﬁned tensor
distribution. Geroch and Traschen deﬁne a class of metrics now called GT-regular metrics designed to meet
such conditions so that the energy-momentum tensor distributions determined by these metrics can make
sense. See appendix C for the precise deﬁnition of this class of metrics and a brief discussion of why this
class in particular constitutes the appropriate class of reasonable solutions to (3.2.2).
38They prove that distributional sources must have support of co-dimension no greater than 1 inM.
39The Geroch-Traschen proof crucially depends on the non-linear dependence of Einstein curvature on the
metric. See appendix C for discussion.
40A third possibility involving neither the original ﬁeld equations (3.1.1) nor the (linear) distributional
generalization (3.2.1) that might be developed is considered in Appendix C (see note 4).
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limiting representations in which (contrary to the canonical account) the gravitating body
simply vanishes.
3.3 0th-Order Proofs
Einstein's ﬁeld equations have an initial value formulation. Under suitable conditions, this
problem can be well posed so that we might use the ﬁeld equations to deduce how a given ten-
sor ﬁeld deﬁned on a particular hypersurface evolves over time (viz the domain of dependence
of that hypersurface). Though this works in principle, such a program is far more easily said
than done in most cases and often numerically rather than analytically. As a consequence
if physicists wished to predict, say, the motion of celestial bodies, it was more practical to
ﬁgure out a way to approximate the structure of the bodies and the metric ﬁeld aﬀected
by their presence by expanding both of these ﬁelds through various procedures and then
dropping some of the higher order terms.41 After the respective ﬁelds have been suitably
simpliﬁed in this way, the physicist can take steps to determine the expected approximate
paths of such bodies. For the most part the resulting paths are not geodetic. However, when
all of the higher order terms of the tensor ﬁeld representing the energy-momentum of a body
(and the tensor ﬁeld representing the body's eﬀect on the metric) are dropped, it is the case
that one is able to deduce geodicity from the reduced equations. Since these proofs share
the feature that all higher order terms accounting for the energy-momentum of the body
41Aside from historical computational hurdles, there is the epistemological motivation investigated in
chapter 2 for why such approximation techniques might be advantageous. Models of gravitating bodies
whose higher order eﬀects are ignored may be used to develop an -faithful representation through which
we can draw conclusions about bodies with higher order terms that are non-vanishing but (-)small in some
relevant way. In such cases, the former (higher-order term free) models may serve anchor models for the
relevant  to δ deductions establishing the -ﬁdelity of these representations. As we shall elaborate in chapter
4 when we discuss the geodesic universality thesis, geodesic models can be used to help draw such conclusions
about the the bulk behavior of general massive bodies that may be obfuscated by attending to every detail
as in the initial value formulation.
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(and its eﬀects on the metric) must be dropped in order to ensure geodicity, this class of
deductions will be referred to as 0th-order proofs. The overwhelming majority of geodesic
derivations in the literature can be classiﬁed as belonging to this family of proofs. The
explanation for this pattern is entirely pragmatic: expansion methods are an eﬃcient way
of generating approximations of the motion of bodies under the inﬂuence of relativistic ef-
fects within particular margins of error.42 So, 0th-order proofs are quite abundant in the
literature, but ironically only thanks to the desire for approximations of motion accurate to
degrees higher than 0th-order, the lowest order geodesic deductions being oﬀered as a kind
of afterthought or perfunctory check.43
By far, the earliest concerted attempts to approximate motion in relativity theory by
expanding the energy-momentum of a body can be found in the works of Mathisson (1937,
1940). To understand the sense in which Mathisson expanded the energy-momentum
tensor, consider a (timelike) world-tube W in a relativistic spacetime (M, gab).44 We then
consider a symmetric (locally integrable) tensor ﬁeld T ab with support contained inW . This
tensor ﬁeld can be interpreted as representing the energy-momentum of a body moving
along in the world-tube W . At this point, Mathisson takes advantage of the fact that we
can understand the properties of such a ﬁeld by considering the following linear operation
42Bursts of progress in such techniques often appear to be motivated by concomitant instrumental advances
demanding further accuracy. For example, the advances in approximating self-force eﬀects in the last dozen
years seem to have been originally motivated by the promise of gravitational wave detectors (see (Quinn &
Wald, 1999)).
43Because of such abundance, in this section we will not attempt a comprehensive review of all major
attempts. Instead, we focus only on a few examples paradigmatic of the general methods of expansion
techniques recovering geodesic motion (at the lowest order).
44Since our purpose in this section is primarily illustrative, in the following discussion it is assumed that
the spacetime is simply connected, orientable and that the metric is smooth. Some of these constraints
might be relaxed, but as discussed above in section 3.2.2, doing so can lead to serious complications. Though
Mathisson's work was quite sophisticated for his time, there are a number of mathematical ambiguities in his
original formulation that we will not dwell on here, especially since such infelicities were eventually rectiﬁed
by Dixon (see below). For example, the sense in which W is timelike is made precise by Dixon through
a construction that involves joining a particular set of local, convex, disjoint, hypersurfaces with compact
closure that are normal to a timelike baseline curve.
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deﬁned on arbitrary smooth tensor ﬁelds φab also compactly supported in W :




Picking an arbitrary smooth timelike curve I  s 7→ γ(s) ∈ W parametrized by proper
time s, and letting Σ(s) be a local foliation of W parametrized by s and meeting certain
orthogonality conditions with respect to γ, Mathisson proceeds to show that by integrating
across the Σ(s)'s the action (3.3.1) can be equivalently approximated by a series of integrals















Where the tensor ﬁelds I
n
abm1...mn satisfy certain symmetry conditions and orthogonality
conditions with respect to γ. These tensor ﬁelds represent the 2n-gravitational-multipoles of
the body T ab. The ﬁnal move to arrive at Mathisson's variational equation of motion is to
let φab = ∇bξa for arbitrary smooth, compactly supported co-vector ﬁelds ξa. But in these
cases, the left side of (3.3.2) takes the form of the left side of the generalized conservation
condition (3.2.2), which as we discussed above is equivalent to the traditional conservation
condition for a smooth T ab and metric. Based on this reason, Mathisson sets the left side of













Mathisson was able to use this variational equation, expanded to the ﬁrst (dipole) and to
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the second (quadrupole) terms to generate explicit approximate equations of motion for a
small test body with angular momentum and spherical asymmetries. These equations were
(much later) derived in the better known (Papapetrou, 1951), using hyperbolic coordinates
and somewhat similar expansion techniques, and are sometimes referred to as theMathisson-
Papapetrou equations. In the late 60's W. G. Dixon took up the Mathisson project, eventually
producing a fantastic series of papers (Dixon, 1964, 1967, 1970b,a, 1973, 1974, 1975), which
rigorously put what he called the multipole approximation technique on fully maturated
mathematical footing.
The geodesic result (already mentioned in section 3.2) comes when we drop all higher







From this constraint one can then deduce that if I
0
ab 6= 0 on γ[I] then the curve is a geodesic
of the metric compatible with the connection ∇a.45 So since (ex hypothesi) I
0
ab is supposed
to be the only (signiﬁcant) contribution to the energy-momentum of the body and our initial
choice of γ was arbitrary, we can think of this result as telling us that certain suitable46
timelike γ's contained in such a body must be geodetic. The victory is rather Pyrrhic,
however, because approximations involving even one non-vanishing multipole term will no
longer describe geodesic motion, instead predicting a kind of wobbling behavior inside W .
45A deduction (somewhat diﬀerent from that of Mathisson's original proof) is contained in the proof of
proposition B.2 in appendix B (condition (3.3.4) is equivalent to condition (B.2), which in the course of the
proof is shown to entail geodicity, when we also assume that the body is non-vanishing on γ).
46The suitable γ must be a curve with respect to which the higher order terms nI
abm1...mn can be dropped.
Intuitively this can be thought of as a timelike axis of symmetry with respect to all of the multipole moments
of the body. As we shall see, when we expect perfect geodicity (i.e. that all the higher order terms can




In order to dodge this Pyrrhic foil, we might search for ways to justify the use of constraint
(3.3.4) as an exact (or at least stable) description satisfying the canonical interpretation. One
possibility is to justify the constraint by insisting that, if the body is a point particle with
only timelike extent, then the particle's lack of spatial extent means that all higher order
multipole terms must vanish, making the only curve left in the support of the point particle
relevantly suitable and hence geodetic. This approach validates the inference to constraint
(3.3.4) from Mathisson's full variational equation (3.3.3), but it has the unfortunate side
eﬀect of turning the deduction into a variety of singularity proof which as we saw in section
3.2 is incoherent with Einstein's ﬁeld equations.
A second strategy is to accept that the body has spacelike extent, but then suggest that
(3.3.4) holds of a certain conceivable type of material body, namely, one that is perfectly
symmetrical about some timelike γ with respect to every higher order multipole moment.
Though by construction such a representation would reduce the equation (3.3.3) to constraint
(3.3.4), the proof is far from general. Such a conceivable body is not possible according
to just about any serious theory of matter considered by physicists. For example, such ex-
treme symmetry constraints would require that the body could not be composed of atomic
or molecular constituents for such inhomogeneities would necessitate spherical asymmetries
in the distribution of the body's energy-momentum.47 Moreover, such restrictions necessary
to generate geodesic motion are highly unstable under perturbations. Any change in the
angular momentum (or any other multipole moment) would break the symmetry needed to
exactly recover constraint (3.3.4). Though we might wish to identify these perfectly symmet-
rical constructs as a kind of idealization in Einstein's theory, the idealization is degenerate
47The body would need to consist of something like the metaphysically curious homogeneous material
famously considered by Saul Kripke. In the context of Kripke's spinning disk, it is ironic that one of the
constraints that we are explicitly placing on such a material body is that it would have to be completely




with respect to recovering precise geodesic motion: the path becomes non-geodetic under
arbitrarily small perturbations of the energy-momentum.48
Before moving on to the ﬁnal class of geodesic deductions, it is worth pointing out that
by invoking a multipole approximation of the energy-momentum, the body considered is
no longer coupled to the metric in accordance with Einstein's equations (3.1.1). In other
words, multipole approximations (even ones that do involve some higher order terms such
as the Mathisson-Papapetrou equations) are guilty of adopting test body approximations
that have not been explicitly justiﬁed. They ignore the so-called back reaction or self-
force eﬀects that the body has on the metric.49 Hence, when considering the path of
extended bodies (i.e. second way deductions) we must not only worry about correcting
for the possibility of unjustiﬁed test body approximations facing earlier proofs, but now
must also manage the spin eﬀect corrections to geodesic motion resulting from the internal
degrees of freedom available to an energy-momentum tensor with spacelike extent. In the
next section we will consider the ﬁnal family of deductions, which attempts to manage such
deviations from geodicity by conducting certain limit operations. As we shall see, it is only by
taking limits that appropriately manage both of these sources of non-geodicity that success
is achieved. Unfortunately for the canonical view, this will also mean that the body must
vanish completely before we can recover such geodicity.
48The degenerate instability that results when we try to recover exact geodesic motion in accordance
with the canonical interpretation is analogous to the examples discussed in chapter 2, where accounts of
mathematical representation aimed at narrowly matching very speciﬁc constraints were shown to lead to
Plato's problem. As indicated in the opening of this section, we shall argue in chapter 4 that it is possible
to eliminate (or at least avoid) this kind of (pathological) degeneracy, once we understand the role of such
geodesic idealizations as anchor models used to establish an -faithful account of the near geodesic behavior
of suitable massive bodies.
49Signiﬁcant advances have been made in (Mino et al., 1997, Quinn & Wald, 1997, Gralla & Wald, 2008,
Pound, 2010), which approximate the consequences of self-force eﬀects as ﬁrst order perturbations in the
background metric. Though these methods are not without their own diﬃculties (particularly when it comes
to justifying what is referred to as the Lorentz gauge relaxation) because these self-force eﬀects lead to
violations of geodesic motion, these complications will not be elaborated here. For a nice introduction to
these issues see (Wald, 2011).
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3.4 Limit Operation Proofs
The strategy behind the ﬁnal family of limit operation proofs is to avoid the complications
arising from investigating the motion of true point particles with extent restricted precisely
to one-dimensional timelike curves by instead considering sequences of energy-momentum
representations of particles whose spacelike extent is conﬁned to increasingly smaller neigh-
borhoods of those curves. We can think of these inﬁnite sequences of tensor ﬁelds as repre-
senting particles with arbitrarily small (but non-zero) spacelike extent in the sense that no
matter how narrow we might want the particle to be, eventually the sequence will list
tensor ﬁelds with support entirely conﬁned in such a narrow region. The strategy then is to
show that if such a sequence of ﬁelds can be constructed for a given curve γ, then γ must be
a (timelike) geodesic, allowing one (roughly) to claim that arbitrarily small particles must
follow (timelike) geodesics.
3.4.1 Geroch-Jang Particles
In contrast to the overabundance of 0th-order derivations, the class of limit proofs con-
sists primarily of two elegant results.50 The ﬁrst result by Geroch & Jang (1975) considers
sequences of ostensible energy-momentum tensor ﬁelds of ever narrowing support. More
50The self-similarity limit operations done by Gralla & Wald (2008) can (in part) also be classiﬁed as an
enhancement of these limit proof strategies, thought they then proceed to employ some of the expansion
techniques discussed in section 3.3. Hence, (Gralla & Wald, 2008) appears to constitute a kind of borderline
case between the two families. The work done far earlier by Robertson (1937) might also be considered
a kind of proto-limit operation proof attempt, in that he follows the general strategy of considering the
limiting behavior of an extended corpuscle as the spatial extent goes to 0. In contrast, the limits taken
by Infeld & Schild (1949) in the IS-particle constructions discussed in section 3.2.1 would determinately
not count as a member of the family of limit operation proofs we are considering in that (aside from the
ill-deﬁned convergence issues already discussed) for each of the sequence entries the test body is represented
by a singularity rather than a smooth tensor ﬁeld representation of an extended object. This distinction
between considering the limiting behavior of sequences of extended bodies and merely attempting to appeal
to limits in the course of the demonstration is signiﬁcant, and the former more restrictive characteristic is
required for our present classiﬁcation (cf. Havas (1989, p254) who seems to overlook the signiﬁcance this
distinction).
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precisely, Geroch and Jang's theorem can be formulated as follows:
Theorem 3.1. (Geroch-Jang, 1975) Let γ : I → M be a smooth curve in Lorentzian
spacetime (M, gab). Suppose that given any open neighborhood O of γ[I], there exists a
smooth symmetric tensor ﬁeld Tab deﬁned onM such that for all points p ∈M:
1. Tab has non-vanishing support contained in O,








∇aT ab = 0,
then γ[I] is the image of a timelike gab-geodesic.
In order to illustrate the signiﬁcance of these conditions, consider any set of nested
neighborhoods (Oi)i∈N that becomes arbitrarily narrow around the curve γ as i→∞. Next
consider a sequence of tensor ﬁelds (T
i
ab)i∈N such that each T
i
ab satisﬁes conditions 2 and
3, and for each i, T
i
ab satisﬁes condition 1 for the neighborhood Oi. Let us refer to such
a sequence of tensor ﬁelds (T
i
ab)i∈N as a Geroch-Jang or GJ-particle. The existence of a
GJ-particle sequence for an arbitrary sequence of nested neighborhoods tightening around γ
is equivalent to the satisfaction of the conditions of theorem 3.1.
Let us consider what each of the conditions says about GJ-particles. First, condition 1
establishes the arbitrary smallness characteristic of GJ-particles. Since the nested neighbor-
hoods (Oi)i∈N become arbitrarily narrow, no matter how tight around γ we demand that the
world-tube of the particle be conﬁned, T
i
ab will eventually (for suﬃciently large i) stay that
close (or closer). If we interpret the symmetric ﬁeld T
i
ab as an energy-momentum tensor, then
condition 2 says that from the perspective of any observer the matter-energy in that part of
the universe (a) is non-negative and (b) only ﬂows in timelike directions (it doesn't go as fast
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or faster than the speed of light). So, roughly speaking, the theorem is only telling us about
the behavior of a certain kind of body that is of positive mass (as opposed, for example,
to photons, which we don't expect to follow timelike geodesics anyway or the kind of body
we might wish to associate, say, with non-classical negative energy solutions). Hence, such
conditions restricting the kind of matter-energy that can constitute a GJ-particle appear
appropriate for the sort of material body about which we expect the principle to be rele-
vant. However, it is worth observing that condition 2 does not follow from Einstein's ﬁeld
equations, and hence constitutes an additional assumption that must be obeyed in order to
get Geroch and Jang's geodesic result.51
Condition 3 is the familiar conservation condition (3.2.3), which (as discussed in section
3.2.2) follows directly from Einstein's original ﬁeld equations for all smooth solutions. Con-
dition 3 is the primary reason why one might say that theorem 3.1 constitutes a deduction
of the geodesic principle from Einstein's ﬁeld equations. If (gab, T
i
ab) were a solution to Ein-
stein's ﬁeld equations, then condition 3 would be automatically satisﬁed for T
i
ab. This might
allow us (roughly) to characterize Geroch and Jang's result by claiming that arbitrarily
small bodies of positive mass that obey Einstein's ﬁeld equations must follow geodesics.52
51A recent discussion of this logical independence can be found in (Malament, 2012), along with a demon-
stration that the existence of an almost GJ-particle (viz ones that satisfy the ﬁrst and third but not the
second condition) fails to ensure that γ is a geodesic. See also (Weatherall, 2011) in which it is shown
that condition 2 (as opposed to a slightly weaker energy condition originally used by Geroch and Jang) is
necessary.
52A nuance worth noting that is imposed by condition 3 involves the question of electromagnetic (or
other non-gravitational) ﬁeld eﬀects. One might think that this phrasing of the principle is too strong:
though neutral massive bodies are supposed to follow geodesics, charged bodies under the inﬂuence of an
electromagnetic ﬁeld should not. Of course, if there is an electromagnetic ﬁeld to inﬂuence our GJ-particle it
would supply further energy-momentum (T
(EM)
ab ) in the neighborhoods of γ (indeed, electromagnetic energy-
momentum that should not stay conﬁned to arbitrary neighborhoods of γ). So if, for example, we were
talking about a charged body iTab interacting with an electromagnetic ﬁeld T
(EM)
ab near γ, then Einstein's
ﬁeld equations only ensure that the total energy-momentum is conserved (e.g. g∇cgca(iTab + T (EM)ab ) = 0).
This means that when we interpret the GJ-particle entries iTab as representing the matter-energy ﬂow of
(small, massive) bodies, condition 3 can be thought of as requiring that the bodies are free in the sense that
their energy-momentum does not change due to interactions with other non-gravitational energy carrying
ﬁelds in the neighborhood of γ. Hence, we might paraphrase the result even more appropriately by saying
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Unfortunately, this claim reveals a signiﬁcant complication. Assume that the T
i
ab repre-
sent the entire contribution to the source side of Einstein's ﬁeld equations (3.1.1) in their
respective neighborhoods of γ. In this case, they each should be having a non-zero per-
turbative eﬀect (
i
ab) on the metric of the spacetime manifold. The problem is that since
the support of the GJ-particle is non-vanishing but continually shrinking down in spacelike
extent, this non-zero perturbative eﬀect 
i
ab will not be stable in every region of spacetime
even for suﬃciently large i. That is to say, if solutions to the respective T
i
ab of a GJ-particles
take the form g
i
ab = gab + 
i
ab, the perturbation ﬁeld 
i
ab must vary for some larger i value.
This means in particular that 
i
ab cannot vanish for arbitrarily large i, so no matter how far
out in the sequence we look the remaining T
i
ab's will never all couple to the metric gab in
accordance with Einstein's ﬁeld equations. Hence, the constraints placed on the existence of
a GJ-particle do not prevent diﬀerences between (a) the geodesic structure of a spacetime in
which a GJ-particle entry obeys Einstein's ﬁeld equations and (b) the geodesic structure of
the background metric gab according to which γ actually counts as a geodesic. In other words,
geodesics of gab will not necessarily remain geodesics of the spacetimes with GJ-particles in
them. We can think of imposing a GJ-particle in neighborhoods of γ as having a kind of
bending eﬀect on γ, ruining its geodicity.
So while it is nice to know that GJ-particles must follow geodesics of some spacetime,
strictly speaking the theorem does not ensure that GJ-particles must follow geodesics of the
spacetime(s) in which they might actually exist (at least not without violating Einstein's ﬁeld
equations). Though Geroch and Jang's theorem is appealing with respect to its mathematical
elegance and certain aspects of its representational fertility, in this form it is guilty of relying
on a test body approximation that is ultimately left unjustiﬁed by the conditions. That being
that arbitrarily small free bodies of positive mass must follow geodesics. (But see next.)
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said, reﬂection on the theorem leaves one with the sense that if only the perturbative eﬀect

i
ab could be controlled somehow as the GJ-particle shrinks down in size, then we might at
least be able to say that the spacetime metrics g
i
ab coupling to our GJ-particle entries should
`come close' to the background metric gab.53 In the next section, we will consider a second
limit operation proof achieving just this sort of result.
3.4.2 Ehlers-Geroch Particles
In 2004, Ehlers, who had evidently been concerned by the Geroch-Jang test body approxi-
mation for nearly three decades (see note 8), collaborated with Geroch to develop a second
result that accommodates for the geodesic bending eﬀects of GJ-like particles. If Geroch
and Jang's theorem approaches things from the source side of Einstein's ﬁeld equations
(3.1.1), then the Ehlers & Geroch (2004) result can be said to approach things from the geom-
etry side of the equations. Speciﬁcally, instead of considering sequences of energy-momentum
tensors, they consider sequences of metrics which converge in an appropriate way to a back-
ground metric and whose energy-momentum sources simultaneously satisfy (essentially) the
same conditions as those placed on GJ-particles. Their result can be formulated as follows:54
Theorem 3.2. (Ehlers-Geroch 2004) Let γ : I → M be a smooth timelike curve in
Lorentzian spacetime (M, gab). Suppose that for any suﬃciently small closed neighborhood
K ⊂ M of γ[I] there exists a sequence of smooth Lorentzian metrics g
j
ab deﬁned on K such
that for all points p ∈ K:
53Note, for any GJ-particle sequence (iTab)i∈N, there exists a second GJ-particle sequence (iTˆab)i∈N whose
matter-energy density vanishes arbitrarily quickly as i→∞. (Just deﬁne iTˆab := (αi)(iTab) for each i where
(αi)i∈N is a sequence of scalars converging to 0 with suitable quickness.)
54The theorem as stated originally in (Ehlers & Geroch, 2004) is slightly stronger than the following
version: their result still goes through if the strict inequality in condition 2 is weakened to allow for equality
as well. Of course the theorem as stated is an immediate consequence of the slightly stronger version. The
diﬀerence is inconsequential to our current discussion.
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1. For all j: G
j
ab has non-vanishing support contained in the interior of K,
2. For all j and timelike ξa: G
j
abξ
aξb ≥ 0 and if G
j

















ab → gab as metrics in C 1(K) as j →∞,55
where G
j
ab is the Einstein curvature tensor determined by g
j
ab, then γ[I] is the image of a
gab-geodesic.
As with GJ-particles, we might illustrate the content of the theorem by considering an
arbitrary set of nested neighborhoods (Ki)i∈N converging down around γ[I]. For these neigh-
borhoods, we can now consider the double indexed sequences of smooth metrics ( g
(i,j)
ab)i,j∈N
and corresponding curvature tensors ( G
(i,j)
ab)i,j∈N deﬁned for each i on Ki. The latter sequence
of curvature tensors ( G
(i,j)
ab)i,j∈N can then be identiﬁed via Einstein's equations as a sequence
of energy-momentum tensors ( T
(i,j)
ab)i,j∈N which we will call Ehlers-Geroch or EG-particles.
Observe, it follows from conditions 1 and 2 in theorem 3.2, that each T
(i,j)
ab satisﬁes conditions
1 and 2 of theorem 3.1 in (Ki, g
(i,j)
ab). Moreover, because each T
(i,j)
ab is equal to a smooth Ein-
stein curvature tensor, they automatically satisfy condition 3 of theorem 3.1 in (Ki, g
(i,j)
ab) as
well. Hence, EG-particles are quite similar to GJ-particles, the diﬀerence with EG-particles
is that the further condition 3 ensures that the perturbative eﬀect of EG-particles on the
background metric (gab) can be made arbitrarily small (in the relevant senses) for suﬃ-
ciently large j. Most importantly, the convergence demanded in condition 3 ensures not
only that the γ is a geodesic of the background metric gab, but also for suﬃciently large
55The C 1(K) topology τC 1(K) is deﬁned on the space of ordered pairs of symmetric tensor ﬁelds and
covariant derivative operators deﬁned for the closed region K. τC 1(K) consists of point-wise neighborhoods
of the tensor ﬁelds and connections respectively, varying continuously with p but otherwise arbitrarily in the
respective spaces (this can be done explicitly, for example, with the selection of arbitrary positive deﬁnite
metrics deﬁned on K). We say that jgab → gab as metrics in C 1(K) if for every neighborhood N ∈ τC 1(K)
of (gab,∇a), for suﬃciently large j we have (jgab,∇(j)a ) ∈ N where ∇a and ∇(j)a are the unique derivative
operators compatible with their respective metrics. Because these operators are uniquely determined by
their metrics, explicit reference to them can be suppressed in the articulation of the theorem.
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j, γ will come arbitrarily close to being a timelike geodesic with respect to the perturbed
metrics g
(i,j)
ab. So not only can EG-particles (like their GJ-particle cousins) be made arbi-
trarily small in (spacelike) extent around γ for suﬃciently large i, unlike GJ-particles by
picking suﬃciently large j we can also control the geodesic bending eﬀects resulting from
their presence, ensuring that the EG-particle will be shrunken down around a curve that will
come arbitrarily close to actually being a geodesic. Hence, Ehlers and Geroch's result can
be characterized by the claim that arbitrarily small bodies of positive mass come arbitrarily
close to following geodesics.
Unfortunately for the canonical view, the theorem cannot ensure the actual geodicity of
γ in the presence of any massive body obeying the ﬁeld equations. Though by turning up
the i and j indices so to speak, we can make the EG-particle both as narrow and close to
straight as we want, we can never ensure actual geodicity for any ﬁnite j. Actual geodicity
is only achieved at the limit in the spacetime with the metric gab. Ehlers and Geroch's
theorem ensures near geodicity in the approach to the limit, but if in accordance with the
canonical view we are looking to ensure massive bodies following actual geodesics, theorem
3.2 does not do the trick.56
An ardent defender of the canonical view might attempt to get around the fact that
geodicity is not acquired for j < ∞ by focusing on the limit case directly. One problem
with this is that though condition 3 establishes convergence of the metrics and an approach
to the geodicity of γ, it is insuﬃcient for the convergence of EG-particles to a limit energy-
56Note the similarity to our discussion of the rationallium and phase transition examples considered in
section 2.3 above. In all three cases, we have a situation where there exists some relevant more ﬁnely
grained topology with respect to which the series of models comes close to having an (qualitatively
distinguishable) anchor property (viz having a volume ratio of exactly 2, behaving non-analytically, and
following an absolutely geodetic path, respectively). As with the former two examples, our below resolution
of these geodesic pathologies will involve relaxing the requirement of precisely meeting said properties, so
that we can also take advantage of the closeness aﬀorded by the more ﬁnely grained topology.
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momentum ﬁeld.57 In general, there is no energy-momentum limit of an EG-particle. In
fact, the only way to get convergence of EG-particles in a way that does not allow for new
energy-momentum to suddenly appear at the limit (but not before) and likewise does not
violate Einstein's ﬁeld equations at the limit is by having the EG-particle converge to a tensor
ﬁeld that vanishes around γ.58 In other words, EG-particles don't generally converge, but
even the ones that might converge (at least in any acceptable way) either violate Einstein's
ﬁeld equations or vanish. Again the canonical view is left unable to establish actual geodesic
motion for massive bodies. Though EG-particles can be said to come close to exhibiting
geodesic motion, the only way to establish actual geodicity is by violating the ﬁeld equations
or having energy-momentum of the particle completely disappear. As in the case of 0th-order
57Ehlers and Geroch consider an explicit counterexample sequence of spacetimes whose metrics converge
according to condition 3, but whose associated curvature tensors (and so energy-momentum tensors) become
divergent. The reason for this possibility is that curvature tensors involve not just derivatives of the metric
but also of the connection (see equations (C.1) and (C.2) below), but convergence in the C 1 topology only
ensures closeness of the metric and the connection, but not higher derivatives. They note that ruling out
such examples would involve strengthening condition 3 to require convergence in a more restrictive C 2(K)
topology.
58To see why this is the case, let K be an arbitrary suﬃciently small closed neighborhood of γ from theorem
3.2. If we want to preserve coherence with Einstein's ﬁeld equations, then any converging sequence of
energy-momentum tensors (jTab)j∈N coupled to the metrics jgab deﬁned for K as in theorem 3.2 will have
to converge to some energy-momentum tensor Tab equal to the Einstein curvature tensor Gab determined by
the background metric gab. (Otherwise, it would be the case that the energy-momentum in the limit fails
to couple to the limiting metric in accordance with equations (3.1.1).) Now let τ be any topology on the
space of rank (0, 2)-tensor ﬁelds with respect to which it might be claimed that jTab → Tab as j → ∞. Of
course there are numerous topologies with respect to which this might be claimed; some may be physically
appropriate and others may not. Luckily, we need not determine here which particular topology (if any) is
in fact most appropriate. Instead we will only require that any relevant convergence must at least ensure
the following condition for all p ∈ K:
Vacuum-point preservation: If there exists a j0 ∈ N such that for all j > j0, T
j
ab|p = 0 , then Tab|p = 0.
The vacuum-point preservation condition should strike us as a reasonable restriction on any τ -convergence
in this context since it only precludes the sudden appearance of new energy-momentum at the limit that
wasn't already present in the approach as j →∞. (Vacuum-point preservation would be obeyed, for instance,
if we wanted to focus our discussion speciﬁcally on convergence in C 2(K).) Now from condition 1 of theorem
3.2, we know that for every j, jTab = jGab = 0 on ∂K. Hence, if the limit is vacuum-point preserving we have
that Tab|∂K = 0. But K was an arbitrary suﬃciently small neighborhood of γ, which means that Tab will
vanish on the boundary of every suﬃciently small neighborhood of γ. Moreover, since gab is smooth, we know
that Tab = Gab must be smooth. It follows from these two facts that Tab must vanish in some neighborhood
of γ. Hence, the only way to ensure that the energy-momentum tensors coupling to the sequences (jgab)j∈N
deﬁned in theorem 3.2 converge in a vacuum-point preserving way without violating Einstein's ﬁeld equations
is by having them vanish around γ.
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proofs, though the proofs can establish a kind of approximation to geodesic following in the
case of extended bodies with matter-energy, when it comes to establishing genuine geodicity,
both fall short, achieving such strict results (at best) only for inapposite or pathologically
idealized special cases.
3.5 Towards a Geodesic Universality Thesis
In this chapter we have argued against the canonical view that the geodesic principle provides
the dynamics of general relativity theory. Under this interpretation, the commonly endorsed
belief that the principle can be derived either from Einstein's original ﬁeld equations or a dis-
tributional generalization of them must be rejected (even if we allow for further background
assumptions about the kind of matter-energy that is supposed to follow such geodesics). By
reviewing the three major classes of proof, we have seen that would-be geodesic following
bodies are forced either (i) to meet unrealistically restrictive special-case conditions, (ii) to
have no matter-energy at all (i.e. vanish), (iii) to violate Einstein's ﬁeld equations, or (iv)
to be located on paths that don't just fail to be geodetic but fail to exist in the spacetime
manifold at all.
These results establish that models in general relativity of massive bodies precisely follow-
ing some geodesic unavoidably qualify as examples of the pathological idealizations deﬁned
in chapter 2. Such pathologies associated with exact geodesic following reveal that the claim
that massive bodies follow geodesics in Einstein's theory cannot be accepted as a (precisely)
faithful representation of the actual motion of bodies in general relativity. However, this does
not mean that there is no place for the principle. We shall argue in the next chapter that it
is possible to take advantage of the results discussed in section 3.4.2 to still develop a robust
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-faithful representation of dynamics in general relativity. Such -faithful representations
will appeal to the (pathologically) perfect geodesic cases, but instead of treating them as
directly matched representations of relativistic dynamics, the pathological idealizations play
the role of anchor models in the relevant δ to  deductions. Further, taking advantage of the
continuity of these δ to  deductions, we will argue that as anchors, such pathological models
can be used to understand the group behavior of entire classes of gravitating bodies in the
form of a universality phenomena. Under this interpretation, though the geodesic principle
can no longer play the role of a precise dynamical law governing the paths of massive bodies
in Einstein's theory, it will still be recovered as a (less fundamental) geodesic universality




Geodicity and -Faithful Universality
In chapter 3, we saw that according to Einstein's original conception of the general theory
of relativity, the behavior of gravitating bodies was determined by two laws: The ﬁrst (more
fundamental) law consisted of his celebrated ﬁeld equations describing how the geometry of
spacetime is inﬂuenced by the ﬂow of matter-energy. The second governing principle, referred
to as the geodesic principle, then provides the law of motion for how a gravitating body
will surf the geometric ﬁeld as it moves through spacetime. According to this principle
a gravitating body traces out the straightest possible or geodesic paths of the spacetime
geometry. Not long after the theory's initial introduction, it became apparent that the
independent postulation of the geodesic principle to provide the theory's law of motion
was redundant. In contrast to classical electrodynamics and Newtonian gravitation, general
relativity seemed special in that its dynamics providing principle could be derived directly
from the ﬁeld equations.
Though the motion of gravitating bodies is not logically independent of Einstein's ﬁeld
equations, the geodesic principle canonically interpreted as providing a precise prescription
for the dynamical evolution of massive bodies in general relativity does not follow from Ein-
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stein's ﬁeld equations. To the contrary, in chapter 3 it was argued that under the canonical
interpretation, not only does the geodesic principle fail to follow from the ﬁeld equations, but
such exactly geodetic evolution would generically violate the ﬁeld equations for non-vanishing
massive bodies. In short, under the canonical interpretation the two laws are not even con-
sistent.
Despite this failure, the widespread approximately geodetic motion of free-fall bodies
must not be denied. The nearly-geodetic evolution of gravitating bodies is frequently well
conﬁrmed within certain margins of error. Moreover, some of the most important conﬁrma-
tions of Einstein's theory, including the classic recovery of the otherwise anomalous perihelion
of Mercury, also appear to conﬁrm the approximately geodetic motion of massive bodies.
This abundance of apparent conﬁrmation suggests that though the claim that massive bod-
ies must exactly follow geodesics fails to cohere with Einstein's theory, geodesic following
may constitute some kind of idealization or approximately correct description of how generic
massive bodies behave.
To understand the geodesic principle we must hence reconcile an apparent dilemma: On
the one hand geodesic following appears illustrative as an ideal of the true motion of massive
bodies. On the other hand the arguments against the canonical view in chapter 3 reveal that
non-vanishing bodies that actually follow geodesics would be highly pathological with respect
to the theory. So in order to gain knowledge about the paths of actual bodies, adopting such
models as idealizations must come with an account of how models generically incompatible
with the theory can still be epistemologically potent when it comes to understanding non-
pathological targets.
In this chapter, we will reconcile this dilemma by taking advantage of the account of
-faithful representation presented in chapter 2. Further, by developing an analysis of the
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concept of universality phenomena, we will identify an epistemic gain made possible through
the explanatory role such wide scope representations can play by making use of pathological
models to anchor the general behavior found across suitable classes of gravitating bodies.
Because of the anchoring role played by geodesic models in such cases, we will propose that
the geodesic principle be adopted as a universality thesis about the clustering of certain
classes of gravitating bodies that exhibit nearly-geodetic motion.
We begin this investigation in section 4.1 by ﬁrst taking a closer look at attitudes held
by contemporary theoreticians towards the current role of the principle in general relativity.
In section 4.2, we will proceed to develop an analysis of the general concept of universality
phenomena to designate a certain kind of similarity of behavior exhibited across a wide
class of (ostensibly diverse) systems of a particular theory. Using this analysis, in section
4.3, we will look at how the nearly geodetic behavior observed in numerous gravitational
systems counts as such a clustering within appropriately close (topological) neighborhoods
of geodesic anchor models. Finally, in section 4.4, we will explain why such pathological
anchor models can be employed to characterize this clustering of the realistic models, taking
advantage of the arguments presented in section 2.3 to show why it is not necessary to reify
the pathological models in order to gain knowledge of actual physical systems.
4.1 Another place for the Principle?
The geodesic principle cannot accurately provide an account of the motion of massive bodies
consistent with Einstein's equations. Even in the case of arbitrarily small bodies, the
principle fails to account precisely for the dynamics of general relativity theory. However,
general relativity does have a well-posed initial value formulation. So, even if we were to purge
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the principle from the theory, we would not leave it dynamically neutered. Geroch punctuates
this spurious need for a geodesic principle (at least from a fundamental perspective) rather
poetically as follows:
Matter in general relativity is normally described by ﬁelds subject to equations,....
These equations have an initial-value formulation. So, the detailed motion of bodies
(i.e., what every little part of the body is doing at every time) is determined within
the theory. If one is lucky, one may be able to summarize this detailed motion by a
slogan (e.g., geodesic motion of the body as a whole) in some limiting cases. If you
can, more power to you; and if you can't, well, this was only a diversion in any case.
In other words, general relativity (as presently envisioned ...) has no need for - indeed
no place for - any geodesic postulate.1
The well posed initial value formulation allows us (in principle) to evolve dynamically a
set of initial conditions of the state of the world to the state at future times (i.e. ﬁll in
the future domain of dependence of a time-slice of some local region). Geroch emphasizes
that this sort evolution of the of initial values is what (at least according to contemporary
visions) more appropriately plays the dynamical role canonically thought to be ﬁlled by the
geodesic principle. Strictly speaking, the geodesic principle is not necessary when it comes
to satisfying this more fundamental dynamical need. Under the right circumstances and
with enough information about the initial state we can (in principle) ﬁgure out what every
little part of a body will be doing at every spacetime point.
So not only do the arguments reviewed in chapter 3 reveal that the geodesic principle
should not be used to prescribe the precise dynamics of massive bodies in general relativity,
strictly speaking we do not even need it to play this role. These two facts appear to be
strong motivations for purging the geodesic principle from contemporary relativity theory.
Nevertheless, there still remain some compelling reasons against such expurgation. Some of
the reasons are simply pragmatic: We generally do not have access to all of the appropriately
1Personal correspondence 11/5/2010, reproduced with permission.
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detailed initial data information required (e.g. it is diﬃcult to ever attain precise information
about the ﬂow of matter-energy in the interior of Mercury). Moreover, even if we did have the
appropriate initial data down to every detail, there are signiﬁcant practical hurdles involved
with ﬁnding solutions to initial value formulations not the least of which being that results
will generically have to be numerical rather than analytic.
Highlighting these complications associated with relying exclusively on initial value for-
mulations for relativistic dynamics, Gralla & Wald (2008, p2) have recently noted that
[a]lthough it is now possible to ﬁnd solutions numerically in many cases of interest, it is
diﬃcult and cumbersome to do so, and one may overlook subtle eﬀects and/or remain un-
enlightened about some basic general features of the solutions. They go on to emphasize
that [t]herefore, it is of considerable interest to develop methods that yield approximate
descriptions of motion in some cases of interest.
Gralla and Wald's point here is particularly germane to answering the question of whether
there is a proper place for the geodesic principle: Even if we do have access to suﬃcient initial
data, and we were able to bound the pragmatic hurdles (numerically if not analytically),
having the precise details about what every piece of matter-energy is doing at every single
point in spacetime runs the risk of obscuring what we should expect of the general behavior
of bodies under gravitational inﬂuences. Perhaps counterintuitively, by taking a step back
from the deluge of details that we might receive from an initial value result, searching for
general approximations of the motion may yield information about what they refer to as the
basic general features of the solutions that cannot be clearly identiﬁed through the more
precise approach.
Being able to recognize the occurrence of certain basic features has epistemic as well as
practical value in gaining a greater (though perhaps no longer fundamental) understanding
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of the theory. However, it is just this sort of scientiﬁc knowledge that can be obfuscated if our
attention were entirely focused on the precise evolution rather than more general patterns of
dynamical clustering. Of course, by attending to such general patterns, there should be an
inevitable loss in the way of accuracy. Claims about the kinds of patterns of dynamical clus-
tering we should expect in general relativity theory will have to be approximate in a certain
sense, but if we wish to understand not just the precise evolution, but also the broad charac-
teristics of the paths of general gravitating bodies, certain approximate descriptions may
indeed have more potency with respect to identifying such dynamical clustering patterns.
Remarkably, if we wish to understand the principle as playing this role of characterizing
general behavior, then the limit operation proof of (Ehlers & Geroch, 2004), discussed in
section 3.4.2, helps to provide a substantial justiﬁcation for why we should expect such
approximate geodicity of their paths. Recall, though theorem 3.2 was unable to establish
perfect geodesic evolution of (actually massive) bodies, the interpretation of the theorem's
signiﬁcance oﬀered above was able to establish that appropriately small massive bodies will
follow timelike paths that are almost geodesic. So while such a result fails to tell us about
the paths with absolute precision, it does enable us to draw the broad inference that for
suitable time scales, large classes of bodies can be expected to stick to paths that are close
to being geodesics. If understood in context, being able to draw this kind of inference for
such general classes of bodies without having to know about their exact constitution oﬀers
great opportunity for understanding about gravitation and gravitational dynamics despite
the lack of attention to details at every level of precision, and this knowledge can be achieved
even though the geodesic principle fails to provide the kind of fundamental dynamics-deﬁning
role expected by the canonical interpretation.
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The kind of near-geodesic clustering of massive bodies, which we will argue can be ex-
plained by results such as (Ehlers & Geroch, 2004), is well conﬁrmed by our experimental
observations.2 Planetary bodies of relatively small size and gravitational eﬀect compared
to the sun actually exhibit nearly geodesic motion. In particular, the Mercury conﬁrma-
tion shows that this clustering can be conﬁrmed in relativistic regimes. Though a precise
enough experiment should reveal divergence from perfect geodicity, as a thesis about the
near-geodesic clustering of freely gravitating bodies in general, the kind of subtle wobbling
we might expect given the discussion in section 3.3 need not count as disconﬁrmation. In-
stead, a vast number of examples from Newton's apple to gravitation on astronomical scales
can constitute opportunities to conﬁrm such general near-geodesic clustering in the form of
a thesis about the kind of universality phenomena that we analyze in the next section.
4.2 Universality in Physics
The suggestion considered above that the geodesic principle might be reinterpreted as a
characterization of the general patterns of behavior of (small) gravitating bodies (despite
signiﬁcant possible variations in details of how the bodies are constituted or the type of ex-
ternal gravitational ﬁeld they might be exposed to) is analogous to a prominent classiﬁcation
of certain phenomena studied in other ﬁelds of physics. Referred to as universality phenom-
ena, such clustering patterns across multiple systems were originally used to characterize
the similarities in behavior exhibited by thermal systems during phase transitions and near
criticality. Kadanoﬀ (2000, p225), often identiﬁed as one of the ﬁrst to apply this concept
2In fact, as long as we do not expect perfect geodicity, results from more sophisticated 0th-order type
proofs (e.g. those in (Gralla & Wald, 2008, Pound, 2010)) can be used to identify the appropriate regime
scales for which we might expect such observed clustering.
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in its contemporary sense in physics, has deﬁned the concept of `universality' as applying
to patterns in which [m]any physically diﬀerent systems show the same behavior. In the
study of critical behavior, for instance, the phenomena is identiﬁed when numerous systems
seem to cluster into what are called universality classes, despite possible vast disparities in
the fundamental details characterizing diﬀerent members of a class.
In the next two sections we will take a closer look at the concept of `universality phe-
nomena.' We begin with a discussion in section 4.2.1 of the most well known example of
universality observed in thermal systems undergoing phase transitions. In section 4.2.2 we
will proceed to oﬀer a general analysis of universality phenomena in the context of particular
theories.
4.2.1 The Paradigm Case: Universality in Phase Transitions
The notion of a universality phenomenon was initially appealed to in order to characterize
a remarkable clustering in the behavior of thermal systems undergoing phase transitions,
particularly the behavior of systems in the vicinity of a thermodynamic state called the
critical point. In thermodynamics the state of a system can be characterized by the three
state variables pressure (P ), temperature (T ), and density (ρ). In ﬁgure 4.2.1 we see a
phase diagram of some generic material projected onto the pressure-temperature plane. As
discussed in chapters 1 and 2, according to the thermodynamic study of phase transitions,
when the state of a system is kept below the particular critical point values (Pc, Tc, ρc)
associated with the substance, phase transition boundaries correspond to discrete changes
in the system. These boundaries are signiﬁed in our diagram by the thick black lines. If,
however, a system is allowed to exceed its critical values, there exist paths available to the
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Figure 4.2.1: Phase diagram of a generic material at ﬁxed density.
system allowing it to change from vapor to liquid (or back) without undergoing such discrete
changes. These paths involve avoiding the vapor-liquid boundary line by navigating around
the critical point as depicted by the broad arrow in ﬁgure 4.2.1.
There exists a remarkable uniformity in the behavior of diﬀerent systems near the critical
point. One such uniformity is depicted in ﬁgure 4.2.2. In this ﬁgure we see a plot of data
recovered by Guggenheim (1945) in a temperature-density graph of the thermodynamic
states at which various ﬂuids transition from a liquid or vapor state to a two phase liquid-
vapor coexistence region. Systems in states located in this latter region can be in liquid or
vapor phases and (according to thermodynamics) will maintain constant temperature as the
density of the system changes. An important feature exhibited in ﬁgure 4.2.2 is that (after
rescaling for the ρc and Tc of the respective molecules) the transition data of each of the
distinct substances near criticality appears to be well ﬁt by a single curve referred to as the
coexistence curve. This similarity in the coexistence curves best ﬁtting diverse molecular
substances can be characterized by a particular value β referred to as the critical exponent
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Figure 4.2.2: Adapted plot of (Guggenheim, 1945) data rescaled for criticality.




where the parameter Ψ(T ), called the order parameter tells us the width of the coexistence
curve at a particular temperature value T . As depicted in ﬁgure 4.2.2, as T gets closer and
closer to the critical temperature Tc from below, this width drops down eventually vanishing
at criticality. We can think of the critical exponent β as telling us about how rapidly such a
vanishing occurs. As conﬁrmed by the above data, this number turns out to be similar (in
the neighborhood of β ' .33) for vastly diﬀerent ﬂuid substances.3
What is fascinating about examples such as this is not the universal (or nearly univer-
3This similarity in the value of the critical exponent exists not only for thermal ﬂuid systems, but also
in describing the behavior of ferromagnetic systems in the neighborhood of a thermal state that can be
analogously characterized as the critical point.
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sal) regularity in physical systems. That uniform reliable regularities (viz universal laws)
can be found to apply to numerous physical systems (though remarkable) is nothing new.
The interesting part is that such uniform reliable behavior occurs despite the fact that at
least at one level of description the systems are so incredibly dissimilar. From a level of
description thought to be perhaps more fundamental than the gross state variables (P ,
T , and ρ) used to characterize thermodynamic systems, the various substances exhibiting
similar critical exponent values have quite diverse descriptions: At the quantum mechanical
level, for instance, the state vectors or density matrices representing the respective quantum
mixtures will be incredibly distinct (e.g. close to orthogonal). Moreover, we need not go
down to a quantum level of description to recognize the vast diversity. From a chemical per-
spective monotonic neon is diﬀerent from a diatomic oxygen molecule, or an asymmetrical
carbon monoxide molecule. We might hence expect surprise from a physicist or chemist,
analyzing the behavior of these systems at these respective levels of theorizing, over the fact
that despite such vast diﬀerences in the ostensibly pertinent details at these levels, the sub-
stances still share this observed similarity. This similarity despite such (speciously relevant)
diﬀerences is what distinguishes the behavior across thermal systems as a kind of universal-
ity phenomenon. In the next section we will begin a more explicit analysis of the concept's
general application in physics.
Before proceeding, it is worth noting that though the usage of the term originated in
the study of thermal systems, universality has now been identiﬁed in a multitude of other
domains. Over the past decade, Robert Batterman has argued convincingly in the philo-
sophical literature that while most discussions of universality and its explanation take place
in the context of thermodynamics and statistical mechanics,... universal behavior is really
ubiquitous in science (Batterman, 2002). A (far from comprehensive) list of vindicating
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examples includes the clustering behavior found in contexts including non-thermal critical-
ity patterns exhibited in avalanche and earthquake modeling (Kadanoﬀ et al., 1989, Lise &
Paczuski, 2001), extinction modeling in population genetics (Sole & Manrubia, 1996), and
belief propagation modeling in multi-agent networks (Glinton et al., 2007, 2010). Batterman
has discussed many examples of universality phenomena distinct from criticality phenomena,
including patterns in rainbow formation, semi-classical approximation, and drop breaking
(Batterman, 2002, 2005, 2006, 2009). Numerous non-criticality examples of universality have
also been discovered in contexts such as the study of chaotic systems exhibiting universal
ratios in period doubling (Feigenbaum, 1978, Hu & Mao, 1982), or the clustering similarities
in models of cold dark matter halos found in astronomical observations (Navarro et al., 1997,
2004), to name a couple. In the next section we will begin a more explicit analysis of the
concept's general application in physics.
4.2.2 The Same but Diﬀerent: Analyzing Universality
The term universality is generally used in physics to describe cases in which broad similarities
are exhibited by classes of physical systems despite possibly signiﬁcant variations according
to apparently more fundamental representations of the systems. Recall, Kadanoﬀ (2000,
p225) describes the term most generally as applying to those patterns in which [m]any phys-
ically diﬀerent systems show the same behavior. Batterman (2002, p4) explains that the
essence of universality can be found when many systems exhibit similar or identical be-
havior despite the fact that they are, at base, physically quite distinct, and Berry (1987) has
described it as the way in which physicists denote identical behavior in diﬀerent systems.
Characterizations such as these reveal that the concept hinges on the satisfaction of the two
seemingly competing conditions of displaying a particular similarity despite other (evidently
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irrelevant) diﬀerences in the systems at some level of description. To make this conceptual
dependency explicit, let us propose the following analysis of universality phenomena.
(UP): A class XT of models of physical systems in a theoretical context T will be said to
exhibit a universality phenomenon whenever the class can simultaneously meet
the following two conditions:
(Sim) There exists a robust similarity in some observable behavior across
the physical systems modeled by members of XT .
(Var) This similarity in the behavior of members modeled in XT is sta-
ble under robust variations of their state descriptions according to
context T .
The ﬁrst thing to specify is what counts as a class of models of physical systems in a
theoretical context. In order to avoid complications associated with multiple (possibly not
entirely equivalent) formulations of a full physical theory, (UP) is best analyzed in terms
of the more restrictive notion of a theoretical context T which identiﬁes within a given
theory a particular formulation and variety of studied phenomena. Examples of diﬀerent
theoretical contexts in classical mechanics include the Hamiltonian versus the Lagrangian
formulations, or in quantum mechanics we might distinguish between wave mechanics and
operator mechanics.4 A theoretical context may also restrict the phenomena considered by
the total theory. For example, source free classical electrodynamics might be considered
a distinct theoretical context within the full theory of classical electrodynamics which also
models the eﬀects of sources. In some cases it is possible for a theoretical context T to
specify an entire theory uniquely; in other cases, a speciﬁcation in terms of (potentially
non-equivalent) formulations and speciﬁc phenomena types may be appropriate.
4Note, in both dichotomies there exist occasional circumstances or conditions such that the alternate
formulations can cease to be equivalent.
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Given a particular theoretical context T of a universality phenomena, the expert will
typically be able to identify pertinent state descriptions according to context T . For
example, in classical electromagnetism the relevant state description may come in the form of
ﬁelds specifying the ﬂow of the source charges and the electromagnetic ﬁeld values throughout
a spacetime; in general relativity the metric and energy-momentum tensors might play this
role; in thermodynamics, state descriptions may be parametrized by P , T , and ρ (or perhaps
V and N), whereas in quantum statistical mechanics one may use density operators.
Satisfaction of (Sim) is primarily an empirical question. In order to claim that something
universality-like is occurring, there must be an evident similarity in the class of systems
exhibiting the phenomenon. This evident similarity need not be (directly) in terms of any
of the state descriptions used to characterize elements of XT . So for the paradigm example
of the universality of phase transitions, (Sim) is satisﬁed once physicists recover suﬃcient
empirical data of the kind depicted in ﬁgure 4.2.2. The robust similarity of (Sim) can be
quantiﬁed in terms of the remarkable closeness of the critical exponents of these various
systems even though the critical exponent parameter β may not necessarily be put in terms
of the state quantities of T (e.g. chemistry or statistical mechanics). In the context of our
discussion of section 1.3, this latter step of identifying the remarkable closeness exempliﬁes
the fact that determining whether or not (Sim) has been satisﬁed is not strictly a matter of
observing the data. In order to identify the relevant robust similarity necessary for (Sim),
phenomenal patterns must be abstracted from this data in a way that permits us to identify
how the phenomenal behavior detected by the observed data is similar. In the thermal case,
this (ampliative) data to phenomena move occurs when the coexistence curve is ﬁt to the
data after rescaling for criticality.
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Satisfaction of (Var) will depend primarily on the size and most importantly the diversity
of the models in class XT . The larger and more varied the members of class XT with respect
to the relevant state descriptions of T , the more stable under variations. If XT is suitably
rich with diverse members, then a member x ∈ XT may be mapped to a rich variety of other
members of XT while still maintaining the very similarity shared by all members of XT that
allowed the class to satisfy (Sim). In the paradigm example of thermal universality, (Var)
is satisﬁed by the fact that at the chemical or the statistical mechanics levels of description,
the members in our class sharing this similar critical behavior are so diverse.5
Though satisfaction of the (UP) conditions will be evaluated in the above terms, note
that the central concepts of robust variation and robust similarity on which (Var) and (Sim)
respectively depend are not binary. We can think of some universality phenomena as more
robust than other instances, in terms of both the degree of similarity displayed and the
degree of variations that the systems can withstand while still exhibiting such similar
behavior. The greater the robustness of the pertinent similarity in behavior across the class
of systems and the more variation (with respect to the irrelevant diﬀerences in the T -state
descriptions) found within the class, the more robust the universality is.6 This dependance
on non-binary conditions means the concept of universality may be subject to vagueness
challenges in some cases. While certain examples, such as thermal criticality behavior and,
as we shall argue, the clustering behavior of free-fall massive bodies around geodesic paths
may be identiﬁed as determinant cases of universality, penumbral cases where it is unclear
5As already discussed, the substances depicted in ﬁgure 4.2.2 are quite varied in their molecular structure,
and at the quantum level we might quantify this point with an appeal to vanishingly small transition
probabilities.
6Often this can be rigorously assessed by an appropriately natural norm, metric, topology, etc. deﬁned
on the space of state descriptions of T . E.g. we might use some integration norm to quantify the diﬀerence
between two (scalar) ﬁelds found in XT . Of course, the choice of appropriate norm, topology, etc. identifying
diﬀerences in the members of XT will inevitably be dependent on the context T .
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whether a candidate universality class is suﬃciently similar and robust under variations may
exist.
4.3 The Geodesic Universality Thesis
In this section we reconsider the case of near-geodesic clustering observed in nature in terms
of the (UP) analysis. In 4.3.1 we will examine why such clustering qualiﬁes as an example
of a universality phenomenon. In 4.3.2 we will then identify how the limit operation result of
Ehlers and Geroch oﬀers what we will identify as a universality explanation of this clustering.
4.3.1 The Similarity and Diversity of Geodesic Universality
Consider a sequence of classes (XGR)∈(0,s) indexed by some suﬃciently small error parameter
 ∈ (0, s). For ﬁxed , the class XGR consists of (local) solutions to Einstein's ﬁeld equations
(3.1.1). Each member of XGR models some massive body whose spacetime path comes close
to following a (timelike) curve γ that is close to actually being a geodesic (where these two
senses of closeness are parametrized by respective functions monotonically vanishing with
the smallness of ).7 With the (UP) analysis in hand, for a given degree of -closeness we
can now ask if such a class XGR satisﬁes the (Sim) and (Var) conditions in the context of
general relativity theory purged of the canonical commitment to geodesic dynamics argued
against in chapter 3.
The satisfaction of (Sim) is an empirical matter apparently well conﬁrmed by centuries
7For example, the closeness to geodicity of γ can be put in terms of the vector ﬁeld values ξa∇aξb along
the points of γ where the ∇ are the unique connections of the respective spacetime metrics gab of the (local)
solutions, and ξa is the (timelike) tangent vector ﬁeld of γ. Assigning numerical quantiﬁcation to our  values
can be achieved with the selection of a chart, allowing us e.g. to bound the absolute interval magnitudes
of the (spacelike) ξa∇aξb by an appropriate monotonic function of the  values. A similar quantiﬁcation
of closeness of following γ can be evaluated in terms of the maximum (spacelike geodesic) distance of the
body from γ for points along the curve.
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of astronomical data recovered from cases in which a relatively small body (a planet, moon,
satellite, comet, or even a star) travels under the inﬂuence of a much stronger gravitational
source. Examples involving non-negligible relativistic eﬀects (like the Mercury conﬁrmation)
are of particular importance, but even terrestrial cases including Galileo and leaning towers or
other (nearly) free-fall examples in determinately Newtonian regimes can count as conﬁrming
instances for certain -closeness values. Since observational precision is inevitably bounded,
in many of these cases it is often claimed that the satellite, moon, planet, etc. indeed
follows a geodesic, despite the results of chapter 3. In such instances, a body is actually
observed to come close enough to following a geodesic to warrant such equivocation. These
instances hence conﬁrm membership in a class XGR for some  threshold below the level of
experimental precision or attention.
In order to appreciate the satisfaction of (Var), we must consider the relevant theoretical
context of general relativity theory. State descriptions of physical systems according to the
theory come in the form of the tensor ﬁelds Tab and gab, related by the equations (3.1.1).
Assuming we only consider (local) solutions to Einstein's equations, there exist six indepen-
dent ﬁeld components describing gab and so the matter-energy ﬂow Tab. In other words, from
a fundamentals of relativity theory perspective, there are six physical degrees of freedom to
how these bodies are described at each spacetime point.
Given the wealth of evident conﬁrming instances falling under a class XGR with suitable
, there will be signiﬁcant variation in terms of these degrees (even after rescaling) once we
consider the signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the density, shape and ﬂow of the matter-energy of a
planet, versus a satellite, asteroid, anvil, etc. In these fundamental state description terms,
the diversity of the bodies in a given class XGR will be quite signiﬁcant (again even after
rescaling with respect to the background). Despite this diversity, such bodies still satisfy the
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deﬁning requirement of -closeness to following a geodesic. It is with respect to this diversity
in these degrees of freedom (of the energy-momenta/gravitational inﬂuences of the near-
geodesic following bodies of members in XGR) that a robust stability under variations can
be established in accordance with (Var).
So, according to our (UP) analysis, such near-geodesic clustering observed in nature
constitutes a geodesic universality phenomenon. However, meeting the conditions of the
analysis depends entirely on the truth of the above made empirical claims about the existence
of bodies well modeled by some member of the respective XGR classes for a suitable range of
 values, and that the bodies in each class are so fantastically diverse from the perspective
of their Tab (gab) ﬁelds. In the next section we will turn to the more theoretical question of
understanding how such geodesic universality is possible in general relativity, by considering
the properties of the classes (XGR)∈(0,s) in terms of the important geodesic result of Ehlers
& Geroch (2004).
4.3.2 Explaining Geodesic Universality
We have now formulated the geodesic universality thesis in the context of general relativity
as an empirically contingent claim about classes of the form XGR whose members model a
physical system such that the path of some body counts as -close to being geodetic without
violating Einstein's ﬁeld equations. We have also given a plausibility argument suggesting
why a good deal of observational data already obtained by experimentalists conﬁrms this
empirical hypothesis. Moreover, given such conﬁrmation and the diversity of the energy-
momenta of the respective bodies, membership in some XGR will be suﬃciently stable under
signiﬁcant variations of the fundamental state descriptions of the theory to satisfy (Var). A
remaining theoretical question must now be answered: How can the systems exhibiting this
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universality phenomenon behave so similarly while being so diﬀerent at the level of theoretical
description fundamental to general relativity?
Geodesic universality can be explained by appealing to limit proofs of the geodesic
principle discussed in section 3.4. It was argued there that Ehlers & Geroch (2004) are
able to deduce the approximate geodesic motion of gravitating bodies with relatively small
volume and gravitational inﬂuence, by considering sequences of energy-momentum tensor
ﬁelds with positive mass of the form ( T
(i,j)
ab)i,j∈N, referred to as EG-particles. The spatial
extent and gravitational inﬂuence of these EG-particles can be made arbitrarily small by
picking suﬃciently large i and j values respectively. The theorem of (Ehlers & Geroch,
2004) entails that if for a given curve γ there exists such an EG-particle sequence, then by




Speciﬁcally, let ( g
(i,j)
ab)i,j∈N be the sequence of metrics that couple to these ( T
(i,j)
ab)i,j∈N
according to (3.1.1) in arbitrarily small neighborhoods (Ki)i∈N of γ, containing the support
of the respective T
(i,j)
ab. Then if for each i, as j → ∞ the g
(i,j)
ab approach a limit metric
gab in the C 1(Ki) topology, which keeps track of diﬀerences in the metrics and their unique
connections, then the curve γ approaches geodicity as j →∞.
We can understand the impact of the theorem for our universality classes (XGR)∈(0,s) in
terms of the deductive continuity of the resulting -δ relationship, as deﬁned in section 2.2.
The limiting behavior of the Ehlers-Geroch result establishes exactly this kind of relationship
between (on the -end) how nearly-geodetic we want the curve around which the body
travels to be, and (on the δ-end) how much we need to bound the gravitational eﬀects of the
body on the background spacetime.8 That is to say, the Ehlers-Geroch limit result can be
8See also the limit results in (Gralla & Wald, 2008, 3-5).
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thought of as telling us that for every degree of -closeness to geodicity we want the bodies'
path to be, there exists a δ-bound on the gravitational eﬀect of the body that will keep the
path at least that close to geodicity. The important thing to observe about why this -δ
interplay works is that though the limiting relationship does require imposing a δ-bound (in
terms of the respective C 1 topologies) on the perturbative eﬀects of the body, it does not
impose any speciﬁc constraints on the details of how the matter-energy of the body ﬂows
within in the (-close) spatial neighborhood (K) of the curve, nor how the metric it couples to
speciﬁcally behaves. So though the metric is bounded within a certain δ-neighborhood of
the limit metric, the particular details of the tensor values, the corresponding connection, and
especially the curvature have considerable room for variation so long as they stay bounded
in that neighborhood.
This relationship established by the Ehlers-Geroch theorem hence gives us a kind of
details-free way of understanding the diverse populations of our respective universality classes
(XGR)∈(0,s). In eﬀect the Ehlers-Geroch limiting relationship highlights that for each X

GR
class, there exists a particular δ-bound around a limit metric with some geodesic anchor γ
such that any body coupling to a metric that stays within that bound (in addition to remain-
ing spatially close enough to γ) will satisfy the relevant -closeness part of the requirements
for membership in XGR. This deduction enables -ﬁdelity with respect to knowledge of the
nearly geodetic behavior of particular δ-close members in a class XGR, but it also allows
us to speak generally about entire subsets of XGR whose membership is entailed by their
δ-proximity. But as we just emphasized, falling under this δ-bound does not impose speciﬁc
constraints on the detailed values of the energy-momenta or metric ﬁelds. So, membership in
the universality class XGR is possible as long as the body is a massive solution to Einstein's
equations, and its gravitational eﬀect and extent are bounded in the right way.
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Beyond these requirements the speciﬁc details concerning what the gravitational eﬀect
does below those bounds are irrelevant. Hence, the limit behavior established by the Ehlers-
Geroch theorem explains how the universality of this -clustering near geodesic anchors is
possible despite signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the energy-momenta of our near-geodesic following
bodies: So long as the bodies' gravitational inﬂuences are bounded in the right way their
(positive) matter-energy can vary as much as we like under those bounds.
This explanation is an example of the special kind of knowledge made possible by the
-ﬁdelity of our representation that cannot even be broached in the context of narrow scope
matching accounts.9 By carefully investigating the right topological proximity, in particu-
lar the δ-bounds delineated by the C 1-proximity to some geodesic anchor model, we can
understand how it is possible to have so much diversity in a universality class XGR despite
potentially signiﬁcant variation in their tensor ﬁeld state descriptions. In the next section, we
will return to the arguments of section 2.3, where we discussed the role of such pathological
anchor models in establishing this -ﬁdelity.
4.4 Explanation without Reiﬁcation
Before closing there remains a potential challenge concerning how we can endorse any kind
of geodesic idealization thesis if the actual geodesic motion of massive bodies is incompat-
ible with Einstein's theory. Recall, while explaining how the classes XGR whose respective
members are -close to geodesic following models could be so diverse, we needed to take
the geodesic limit of the metrics ( g
(i,j)
ab)i,j∈N coupling to the EG-particles ( T
(i,j)
ab)i,j∈N in
accordance with the equations (3.1.1). By taking such a geodesic limit in order to iden-
9See (Batterman, 2010) for a parallel discussion of how narrow scope matching accounts are incapable of
mathematically representing universality phenomena anchored by pathological idealizations.
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tify the diversity of the kinds of solutions populating our XGR classes, haven't we made an
essential appeal to the kind of pathological models precluded by Einstein's ﬁeld equations?
The answer to this challenge hinges on the importance emphasized in section 2.3.2 of
keeping track of the types of topological closeness we are appealing to in our (continuous) -
δ deductions. Recall, though the ( g
(i,j)
ab)i,j∈N converge to a well deﬁned geodesic limit (in the
C 1 topologies) the coupled energy-momentum tensors ( T
(i,j)
ab)i,j∈N may not. Moreover, even
if they do converge in a physically salient and independently well deﬁned way, at the limit
they must either fail to obey the ﬁeld equations (3.1.1) or vanish. The reason why this is not
a problem goes back to the fact, emphasized in section 2.2.1, that the property mappings
to the respective P and Q property spaces need not preserve every property and closeness
relation to be found in the abstracted space of models S. In the current example, for ﬁxed
K, the P-properties and relations are restricted to the metrics, their uniquely determined
connections, and their C 1(K) proximities. Consequently, the curvature properties associated
with these metrics (and so which energy-momentum tensors they couple with according to
(3.1.1)) do not make any diﬀerence in the δ-proximity used in the δ to  deductions. Similarly,
the relevant Q-properties only track the closeness to geodicity of γ (as outlined in note 7).
Neither of these property spaces is equipped with a less ﬁnely grained topology τFieldEquations?
that (analogously to the course topologies τAnalytic? and τ2? of section 2.3.2) discretely sorts
the (gab, Tab) pairs strictly on the basis of whether or not they obey the ﬁeld equations (3.1.1).
In contrast, falling within an appropriate δ-neighborhood of the geodesic limit in a C 1
topology was essential to our explanation of geodesic universality. If we allow in our ab-
straction of the space of models (S) to be broad enough (e.g. we allow it to include (gab, Tab)
pairs that may not obey 3.1.1), then there can exist geodesic models to anchor these
δ-neighborhoods in that (at the Q-properties end) the relevant curve γ is actually a geodesic
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of the metric, and (at the P-properties end) the metric and connection in the K spacetime
neighborhoods around γ are identical to the relevant background metric and connection.
Whether such ﬁeld equations violating models are included or not,10 as argued for at length
in section 2.3, the role played by geodesic anchor models does not require us to reify the
idealization, matching it with any physical system. Even though there are signiﬁcant compli-
cations associated with what happens at the geodesic limit, the δ to  deductions are based
on well deﬁned topologies describing the approach to the limiting anchor properties in the
respective property spaces, and the behavior of the models in XGR, which are close but not
identical to a geodesic anchor model exhibiting these properties, all still obey Einstein's
theory. Hence, they can still be well matched with physical targets that obey the ﬁeld equa-
tions. The only thing such geodesic anchor models do in our (-faithful) representation is
exemplify the appropriate anchor properties of respective (topological) neighborhoods, but
they need not be matched with any physical target (ﬁeld equations violating or not) in order
to anchor these properties for the elements of the respective XGR classes to cluster around
them. Hence, using these models as anchors to identify the points around which the actual
solutions to Einstein's equations cluster does not require that the anchors themselves be
admitted in XGR.
Universality phenomena (understood through -faithful representations of sets of math-
ematical models) are about the group behavior of classes of XT not individual systems. For
narrow scope representations requiring perfect matching, severe pathologies can be detri-
mental because they render the sole idealized model theoretically inapposite. In contrast,
when we are representing universality with wide scope matching, the existence of a patho-
10Note, such anchor models need not necessarily violate the equations (3.1.1). Models with vanishing
energy-momentum in some neighborhood containing γ can also suﬃce as anchors in that such solutions can
possess each of these anchor properties exactly.
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logically idealized model close to but excluded from a universality class XT or sequence of
classes (XT )∈I need not entail that members of the class(es) are likewise poorly behaved.
Moreover, if a topological clustering near to an idealized model has physical signiﬁcance
(as with the C 1 topologies), such proximity enables -ﬁdelity, providing knowledge about
systems that can match members of the well-behaved classes without molesting the models'
admissibility according to the laws of T .
This is precisely what occurs in the case of geodesic universality. Members of a class
XGR are able to take advantage of their closeness to the pathological geodesic anchor models
without contracting any of the problems occurring at the actual geodesic limits. Moreover,
we were able to explain such -closeness by appealing to what we characterized as the speciﬁc
details irrelevant δ-closeness in the C 1 topologies. The -ﬁdelity of our representation hence
comes in two forms: The δ to  deductions allow us to know that a particular δ-close model
will follow almost geodesics, but it also allows us to gain knowledge about general dynamical
clustering in Einstein's theory. These deductions allowed us to understand why entire classes
XGR of -close to geodetic models are able able to exhibit so much diversity and still share
this signiﬁcant similarity. The -ﬁdelity of our representation, hence, plays an important role




The primary question we have now answered is how mathematical representations enable
knowledge of actual systems in the physical world. Our solution follows once we account
for the imprecisions inevitable in the process of developing mathematical models of physi-
cal targets. We argued that this can be done with the condition we called -ﬁdelity, where
a mathematical representation is -faithful when it enables knowledge about physical tar-
gets not with absolute precision, but within suitable  margins of error. In chapter 2, we
demonstrated that such -ﬁdelity can be established through the use of δ to  deductions
that take advantage of wide scope potential relations abstracted from diﬀerent physical
systems of similar type. Such deductions allow us to (-faithfully) gain knowledge about
any physical target in some δ-neighborhood of meeting the conditions required for the de-
duction, without demanding that they match such conditions at every level of precision. By
relaxing the conditions presupposed in order to match a physical target, we argued that
the knowledge gained by the resulting -faithful mathematical representations can avoid the
epistemologically untenable requirement that the particular physical system must meet some
given constraint with absolute precision.
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Multiple epistemological beneﬁts follow from this relaxation. In sections 2.2.2 and 2.3.2,
we saw that many of the so-called epistemic debts, identiﬁed as resulting from the abstrac-
tion process in section 1.3, could be eliminated once we permit δ-imprecisions in matching
our models. Further, we demonstrated that this relaxation has broad relevance in legitimiz-
ing the use of idealized models as part of our mathematical representations. In section 2.1
we argued that that appealing to idealizations under direct matching accounts of mathemat-
ical representation leads to a soundness dilemma, referred to as Plato's problem. In such
cases the physical target either fails to meet certain idealized constraints essential to the
deduction or the deduction used fails to soundly apply to the physical target in question.
By shifting to our wide scope matching proposal, we explained how δ to  deductions, aimed
at (mere) -ﬁdelity rather than perfect precision, can still be used to gain robust knowledge
of a physical target even when the relevant mathematical deductions explicitly rely on such
idealizations in some ways.
This epistemological legitimization was shown to be especially advantageous in under-
standing the role of what we called pathologically idealized models. In such cases of idealiza-
tion, a mathematical representation employs models forced to satisfy constraints that could
not possibly be met by realistic physical systems or that are incompatible with the physical
theory. In chapter 3 we carefully investigated the particular pathological constraints imposed
on gravitating bodies in order to deduce the geodesic motion of such bodies in the context of
Einstein's theory of general relativity. After identifying such geodesic motion as pathological
in Einstein's theory, in chapter 4 we applied the arguments of section 2.3 to demonstrate
how such pathological models of geodesic motion can still be used to anchor (topologically)
the deductions of certain -faithful representations of relativistic gravitation.
The knowledge gained through -faithful representations of geodesic universality is twofold:
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First, for individual targets (e.g. Mercury's speciﬁc path around the sun) the relevant δ to 
deductions allow us to infer that the body, whose relative gravitational inﬂuence and volume
is δ-small, must be () close to geodesic following. Second, we can also gain knowledge
of classes of physical targets, called universality classes. In the latter case, the -faithful
representation is used to gain a kind of general knowledge about the gravitational dynamics
in Einstein's theory. It allows us to better understand why (generically) large classes of
(also δ-small) gravitating bodies all seem to come () close to geodesic following, despite
the fact that members of a class can diﬀer from one another signiﬁcantly in terms their
general relativistic state descriptions. In short, these deductions securing the -ﬁdelity of
our representation explain the phenomena of geodesic universality conﬁrmable through ac-
tual empirical investigation. We hence propose that the geodesic principle, rejected as a
fundamental part of the theory in chapter 3, can in this way be recovered in virtue of the
anchoring role that pathological geodesic models can nevertheless play in establishing such
explanations of geodesic universality.1
1As observed in chapter 4, examples of universality phenomena are abundant in mathematical sciences.
Though the conceptual analysis given in section 4.2.2 does not entail the existence of pathological anchor
models, discussions of many examples of interest in the literature seem to rely on such idealizations. This
is true for each of the criticality examples listed at the close of section 4.2.1. Explanations of many of
Batterman's examples of non-criticality universality phenomena found in the contexts of short-wave optics,
semi-classical mechanics, and hydrodynamics likewise appeal to pathologically idealized models at certain
points. Hence, there exists rich potential for further projects analyzing the pathologies involved in generating
universality explanations for these phenomena analogous to the sort of analysis of geodesic deductions we





LetM be an orientable n-dimensional smooth manifold. The space D′(M) of scalar distribu-
tions onM can be deﬁned as the linear dual to the (LF-)space Ωnc (M) of smooth, compactly
supported n-forms onM. The space Ωnc (M) plays the role of our test ﬁelds in a diﬀerential
geometry context in that (sinceM is orientable) these test ﬁelds can essentially be thought
of as products of smooth, compactly supported scalar ﬁelds (i.e. the test functions of typical
distribution theory) and an arbitrary volume element  := abcd ∈ Ωn(M).
This construction can be generalized to deﬁne linear spacesD′sr(M) of tensor distributions
of rank (r,s) onM as the dual of the space T rs (M)⊗Ωnc (M) of test tensor ﬁelds consisting
of exterior products of smooth tensors of rank (s, r) and compactly supported n-forms. Each
element of T rs (M) deﬁnes a mapping (via contraction) from the space D′sr(M) to the space
D′(M). In fact, the space D′sr(M) is isomorphic (as a C∞(M) module) to the space of
products of smooth tensors of rank (s,r) with elements of D′(M) (Grosser et al., 2001, Thm
3.1.15).
Hence, tensor distributions of rank (s, r) can be intuitively thought of as familiar smooth
tensor ﬁelds of the same rank with scalar distributions as their coeﬃcients. Analogous to
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the case in scalar distribution theory, a locally integrable tensor ﬁeld αa1...asb1...br (not necessarily
smooth) has a natural embedding in D′sr(M), where the action < αa1...asb1...br , · > on a test tensor










It is this embedding that suggests that the action of distributions on test objects is like
that of integrating the contraction of the tensor distribution with a test tensor ﬁeld. The
support of tensor distributions is likewise extended in the following way: a tensor distribution
< αa1...asb1...br , · > is said to have support on K if all test ﬁelds with support disjoint from K are
in the kernel of < αa1...asb1...br , · >.
If ∇b is any smooth derivative operator, the derivative of a tensor distribution αa1...asb1...br ∈
D′sr(M) is a distribution ∇aαa1...asb1...br ∈ D′sr+1(M) whose action is deﬁned by:
< ∇bαa1...asb1...br ,Φb1...brba1...as >= − < αa1...asb1...br ,∇bΦb1...brba1...as > ∀Φb1...brba1...as ∈ T r+1s (M)⊗ Ωnc (M)
In the case that αa1...asb1...br is a locally integrable tensor ﬁeld (not necessarily diﬀerentiable in




>= − < αa1...asb1...br ,∇bΦb1...brba1...as > ∀Φb1...brba1...as ∈ T r+1s (M)⊗ Ωnc (M)




Elements in the linear spaces D′sr(M) do not have a well deﬁned product structure, and
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so unlike smooth tensors, they do not constitute an algebra. As a consequence, we can only




Proof from Generalized Conservation of
T ab
In order to represent a point particle by means of an energy-momentum tensor distribution
T ab, it will be useful to deﬁne the following scalar distribution in the space D′(M).
Deﬁnition B.1. If γ : I → M is a smooth curve in the spacetime (M, gab) then we will






φ ◦ γ ds ∀φ ∈ C∞0 (M) (B.1)
as the concentrating distribution for γ in spacetime (M, gab).1
Proposition B.2. Let (M, gab) be a Lorentzian spacetime, and let γ : I →M be a smooth
timelike curve in M for some interval I. Then, if there exists a smooth symmetric tensor
1For any φ ∈ C∞c (M), the set of test-function weighted volume elements φ volg is equivalent to the space
of test 4-forms Ω4c(M). So though we have deﬁned the action of D(γ,g) relative to its action on test functions
C∞c (M) deﬁnition B.1 clearly gives a well deﬁned element of the space D′(M) constructed in appendix A. Of
course despite this equivocation, it is worth observing that the action of D(γ,g) does depend on the particular












∇bξavolg = 0 ∀ξa ∈
(T 01 (M))c
where (T 01 (M))c is the space of smooth co-vector ﬁelds on M with compact support and
D(γ,g) is the concentrating distribution for γ in (M, gab), then γ[I] is the image of a geodesic
of gab.











∇bξads = 0 ∀ξa ∈
(T 01 (M))c (B.2)
Let K(γ) be the set of smooth functions on M that vanish on γ[I]. Clearly for any ξa ∈







∇b(αξa)ds = 0 ∀α ∈ K(γ), ξa ∈
(T 01 (M))c (B.3)







∇bαds = 0 ∀α ∈ K(γ),∀ξa ∈
(T 01 (M))c (B.4)
We now observe that (B.4) holds (if and) only if for each ξa ∈ (T 01 (M))c there exists a
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a ∀p ∈ γ[I] (B.5)
where Ua is the unit tangent vector to the curve γ (recall γ is timelike). Hence, since this
holds for arbitrary ξb, on γ[I] we have that T
γ
ab must take the form:
T
γ
ab = UaP b (B.6)
for some smooth vector ﬁeld P a deﬁned on γ[I]. Moreover, since T
γ
[ab] = U [aP b] = 0 on γ[I],
contracting with Ub entails that there exists a smooth scalar ﬁeld m = UaP a deﬁned on γ[I]
such that:
P a = mUa (B.7)











∇bmUads = 0 ∀ξa ∈
(T 01 (M))c
In particular for all ξa compact on γ[I], the ﬁrst term vanishes and by arbitrarily varying
these ξa with compact support on γ[I], it follows from the second term that
U b
g
∇bmUa = 0 (B.8)
2The only if direction is satisﬁed by assuming for contradiction that for some ξa the vector γT
abξa is not
proportional to the tangent vector to γ at some point p0 ∈ γ[I]. Since γT abξa is smooth this means that for
some sub-interval I0 ⊂ I such that p0 ∈ γ[I0], γT abξa will not be proportional to the tangent vector. We
now select an α which is positive at all points in a suﬃciently small neighborhood of γ[Io] save those points
on γ[Io] and vanishing everywhere else to give us a non-zero value for the integral
´
T abξa∇bαds in violation
of (B.4).
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Last, the ﬁrst integral of equation (B.8) gives us that the value m2 (and so m) is constant
along γ. So since T
γ
ab 6= 0 on the curve, we have that m is a non-zero constant on γ and the
geodesic equation follows immediately from (B.8):
U b
g
∇bUa = 0 (B.9)




GT-regular and Semi-regular Metrics
In order for a tensor distribution source such as Tab to be well deﬁned as a distribution, it
must be locally integrable.1 So since we want gab to be a solution to Einstein's generalized
ﬁeld equations (3.2.1), Geroch and Traschen tailor their class of GT-regular metrics by
ﬁrst looking at how the Einstein tensor, equated (as a distribution) to Tab, depends on the
metric and then considering what integrability properties the metric must satisfy in order to
achieve integrability of the curvature. Speciﬁcally, let ∇˜a be any smooth derivative operator
with Riemann curvature R˜abcd. Now consider the dependence of another Riemann curvature





a]c + 2∇˜[bCda]c (C.1)
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Inspection of (C.1) reveals that Rabcd will be locally integrable if the tensor Cabc is locally
square integrable.2 Moreover, (C.2) reveals that Cabc will be locally (square) integrable if g
ab
is locally bounded and the weak derivative of gab exists and is locally (square) integrable.
We hence have the following class of metrics:3
Deﬁnition C.1. (GT-regular metrics) A symmetric tensor ﬁeld gab deﬁned on M is
called a GT-regular metric if gab and gab are both in L∞loc ∩H1loc.
In this deﬁnition L∞loc is the space of locally bounded ﬁelds, and H
1
loc is the Sobolev space
of square integrable ﬁelds, whose weak ﬁrst derivatives exist and are also square integrable.
Hence, membership in the class of GT-regular metrics suﬃces for having a well deﬁned
Einstein tensor distribution.
The ﬁrst nuance to note about this class is that though these metrics are suﬃcient for
well deﬁning curvature tensors as distributions, Geroch and Traschen's restrictions can be
weakened a bit more. That is to say, we do not necessarily need the (weak) derivative of





contraction not the exterior product) exist and are locally integrable (though we still need
gab and gab to be deﬁned almost everywhere and essentially bounded). Such a (strictly) wider
class of metrics are referred to as semi-regular or Garﬁnkle metrics after his investigation
in (Garﬁnkle, 1999). In contrast to GT-regular metrics, there do exist semi-regular metrics
2This condition directly suﬃces for the second term. Moreover, since L2loc ⊂ L1loc and the last term will
be locally integrable if Cabc is locally integrable, it also suﬃces for the ﬁnal term. Since all smooth tensor
ﬁelds are locally integrable, the ﬁrst term is locally integrable without any further condition.
3It should be noted that since GT-regular metrics are not in general Lipschitz in their ﬁrst derivative,
integral curves of geodetic ﬁelds Ua satisfying the condition Ua∇aU b = 0 will not always exist (or be
uniquely determined for an initial value Ua(p0)). In other words, geodesic curves will not always be well
deﬁned, particularly across regions of singular curvature.
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whose Einstein curvature tensor distribution can be concentrated on sub-manifolds of co-
dimension 2.
Unfortunately, as previously observed in (Geroch & Traschen, 1987), even this meager
weakening to semi-regularity faces representational complications. The reason for this has
to do with why GT-regular metrics are so appropriately termed regular. A second important
set of results proved by Geroch & Traschen (1987, Thm. 2-3), was that Cauchy sequences
of regular metrics not only converge to a regular metric, but their respective curvature
tensors converge to the curvature tensor of the limiting metric. In contrast, when we move
to semi-regular metrics, this property is lost. This means that though we can deﬁne the
action of curvature tensor distributions in semi-regular cases with support in less than three
dimensions, such cases cease to have a natural interpretation as an extension of the classical
framework of relativity theory.4
4 Recently in (Steinbauer & Vickers, 2006, Steinbauer, 2007, Steinbauer & Vickers, 2009) the authors
have worked to generalize Einstein's original equations even more than equation (3.2.1) in order to allow for
solutions from non-linear tensor algebras (for clarity we refer to elements of these algebras as generalized ten-
sors) that can make sense of non-regular metric solutions such as GT-irregular Garﬁnkle metrics. Assuming
this generalization project will come to fruition, such an end run around the Geroch-Traschen result would
remain unable to avoid pathological models in representing geodesic motion in accordance with the canonical
view. Actual material bodies have spacelike extent. That is to say massive bodies, even really small bodies
or atomic constituents are not true points. This fact is germane to representations by means of tensor
distributions and generalized tensors alike. Typically, physicists are able to avoid this problem when making
use of (strictly) distributional objects by arguing that objects of very small extent are well approximated
by point particle representations through tensor distributions. In chapter 2 we develop a way of making
sense of the role played by such mismatched models in establishing -ﬁdelity through the use of appropriate
δ to  deductions. However, as we saw in section 3.3, any spacelike extent will generically molest the result
of perfect geodesic motion expected of the canonical view (cf. Butterﬁeld's atomism thesis regarding limits
of the arbitrary small in (Butterﬁeld, 2011)).
The point is further punctuated in the case of generalized tensor algebras. Tensor distributions are
embedded into these algebras through a process called association where it is shown that integrals of the
inﬁnite sequences constituting generalized tensors converge (in a speciﬁed way) to the action of a tensor
distribution. In the context of -ﬁdelity, such association embeddings of (linear) tensor distributions into
algebras of generalized tensors may ultimately be used in generating (continuous) δ to  deductions with the
metrics establishing the association convergence. In contrast, this embedding through convergence method
faces the same interpretive challenges for vindicating the canonical view as we presented in the case of EG-
particles (section (3.4.2)): It is quite possible for such an association relation to exist even if every element
of the sequence constituting the generalized tensor has support that extends outside the one-dimensional
curve. So even if one-dimensionally supported sources could be associated with solutions to some such
generalized ﬁeld equations, such a discrete change in the dimensionality of the support of the associated
tensor distribution distinguishes it from every member of the (generalized tensor) sequence. That is to say,
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As a ﬁnal remark, it is worth noting that Geroch and Traschen's proof strategy cru-
cially depends on the required square integrability of the connection. It is because of this
dependance (in part) that an analogous theorem preventing the existence of solutions with
one-dimensional concentrations of energy-momentum (or mass-momentum) cannot be recon-
structed for linearized approximations of Einstein's equations (or for Newtonian gravitation).
This means that (in a sense) it is thanks to the non-linearity of Einstein's ﬁeld equations
that we are unable to coherently represent point particles in general relativity theory. In
other words, it is the non-linearity that precludes the possibility of using distribution proofs
to deduce the geodesic hypothesis (in its most literal form) from the exact ﬁeld equations.
Since historically the ability to deduce the geodesic principle from the ﬁeld equations in
the canonical account has typically been attributed to the fact that Einstein's equations are
non-linear, it is not without irony that this non-linearity is what stands in the way of the
most literal variety of geodesic deduction.
when it comes to interpreting the physical signiﬁcance of such associated solutions we can still only recover
a point particle source that could count as being concentrated entirely on a geodesic curve at the (associated
distributional) limit, but not before (see our discussion of competing topologies and singular idealizations
in section (2.3.2)).
For further work developing generally covariant algebras of generalized tensors, see (Grosser et al., 2001,
2002, 2009) and references therein.
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